AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR WAR CRIMES URGES KENYA TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 001416

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KCRM RW KE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR WAR CRIMES URGES KENYA TO
END KABUGA'S IMPUNITY

REF: 06 NAIROBI 5301

Classified By: Poloff Melissa Sweeney for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues
Clint Williamson met privately with GOK Ministers to push for
Felicien Kabuga's apprehension and also met with various
Chiefs of Mission to discuss further cooperative strategies
on the issue. It is widely believed that Kabuga, ICTR
fugitive and alleged financier of the Rwandan genocide,
continues to remain at large within Kenya, likely enjoying
protection from high-ranking former and current government
officials. Despite some progress on improved information
sharing and investigative cooperation between the GOK and the
ICTR, there is little expectation that the GOK will take the
necessary measures to bring Kabuga to justice any time soon.
End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Clint
Williamson, accompanied by Brendan Doherty, visited Nairobi
March 14-15, 2007. His visit followed the creation in early
February of the long-awaited (see reftel) GOK and
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Joint Task
Force to investigate leads on Rwandan genocide indictee
Felicien Kabuga's alleged presence in Kenya. The work and
even the existence of this Joint Task Force is being kept low
profile, even within the government of Kenya, in an attempt
to avoid GOK interference with its investigations.

Deputy Foreign Minister: A Personal Stake, But...
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Moses Wetangula
met with Ambassador Williamson on March 14. Williamson
reaffirmed the USG's continued friendship with the GOK and
noted its willingness, thus far, to primarily engage the GOK
outside the public eye on this issue. However, he also
reminded Wetangula of the approaching ICTR completion
deadlines (2008 for trials, 2010 for appeals) and explained
the mounting pressure within the U.N. to see the ICTR
successfully meet these deadlines. He noted that Member
State cooperation viz. ICTR fugitives would likely be a key
topic at the ICTR's June report to the UNSC, and this could
increase public and UNSC pressure on the GOK to act.
Williamson explained that a key obstacle to the successful
completion of the ICTR's mandate is the 18 fugitives still at
large. Alleged genocidaire Felicien Kabuga, believed to be
hiding in Kenya, tops this fugitive list. Ambassador
Williamson noted that ICTR investigators have good reason to
believe that Kabuga is present in Kenya. He encouraged the
GOK to cooperate with the ICTR and to investigate and execute
all possible leads.


4. (C) "I wish I knew where he is," Wetangula responded, "I
would love to get him." Wetangula said he had "shared a
house" with Kagame in Kenya in his student days, was friends
with many of the GOR's current Ministers, and had been a
friend of some well-known genocide victims. He noted that
Kabuga's wealth, his ability to "change his appearance," and
the likelihood he owned multiple homes are all obstacles to
his apprehension. Kabuga could skip across Kenya's porous
borders if a search grew hot, he suggested. Wetangula also
noted the USD 5 million Rewards for Justice offer for
Kabuga's apprehension, stressing how much this would mean to
the average Kenyan, but also recalled a brutal murder two
years ago in Kenya likely intended to warn anyone against
turning in Kabuga. Wetangula suggested that officials from
Kenya's former government may have sheltered Kabuga, but
doubted current officals were involved.

Security Minister: You Have No Proof, He's Not Here
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) Ambassador Williamson secured a meeting with
Minister for Internal Security and Provincial Administration
John Michuki, whose ministry has direct responsibility for
action on the GOK's obligation to arrest Kabuga. This
meeting presented a unique opportunity to urge the GOK
(through a senior Minister who has the President's ear) to
improve its cooperation with the ICTR, particularly on this
case.


6. (C) Ambassador Williamson, accompanied by Deputy Chief of
Mission Pamela Slutz, reiterated that Kabuga's apprehension
remains central to ICTR's successful completion and that
there will likely be mounting pressure both publicly and
within the UNSC for the GOK to act. Michuki acknowledged
that bringing Kabuga to justice would send the proper signal
to would-be wrong-doers. However, he then attempted to avoid
the issue by speaking at length on the need for general

conflict prevention, particularly in Somalia.


7. (C) After Williamson's redirection, Michuki denied
Kabuga's presence in Kenya and challenged the ICTR to produce
concrete evidence to the contrary. He assured Williamson
that Kabuga could not be in Kenya without the GOK knowing
about it, and "guaranteed" that the GOK would catch him if he
were. He said if the GOK wants to arrest someone, no one can
hide in Kenya. (Note: This last statement confirms the USG
belief that Kabuga's apprehension in Kenya is primarily an
issue of will, not capacity. Also, during the conversation
Michuki mentioned that he "knew" Kabuga and had hosted Kabuga
in Nairobi in 1987, after meeting him in Rwanda the year
before when Michuki's sister-in-law was serving as the Kenyan
Ambassador. End Note.) Michuki expressed grave
"disappointment" that the ICTR continues to make such
allegations but fails to offer Kenya any proof of Kabuga's
whereabouts. Williamson said he would pass this message on
to ICTR Chief Prosecutor Hassan Jallow. Michuki even implied
that the ICTR, and Jallow in particular, targets these
allegations at Kenya only to justify renewing the
Prosecutor's employment contract.

Diplomatic Support, Anecdotes, Views
--------------


8. (SBU) During meetings with several heads of diplomatic
missions in Nairobi, Ambassador Williamson heard a common
refrain of support for the ICTR and efforts to pressure the
GOK for greater cooperation with the Tribunal. Ambassador
Williamson met with the Dutch, German, and Norwegian
Ambassadors and the Acting British High Commissioner to
strategize on how best to pressure the GOK. There was
general agreement that Kabuga enjoys the protection of
influential individuals in Kenya and that this remains a
significant obstacle to Kabuga's arrest. Dutch Ambassador
Laetitia van den Assum said Michuki is believed to know where
Kabuga is. Frustrated by the GOK's lackluster response to
diplomatic pressure, she suggested the time may come for a
"not so gentle approach," meaning one that is more public and
robust. She also said Fonmin Tuju told an EU delegation that
"there is no official decision to shelter Kabuga," adding
that he did not know Kabuga's whereabouts. Tuju became
extremely angry when the Greek Ambassador accused him of
knowing who the business people are who shelter Kabuga, she
added. Ambassador van den Assum stressed that the current
government "protects Moi" (and by extension those close to
Moi, such as Kabuga).


9. (SBU) Norwegian Ambassador Elisabeth Jacobsen advocated
continued pressure on the GOK to honor its international
obligations to arrest Kabuga and queried what role local
media should play in raising awareness and mounting pressure
on the GOK. Ambassador Williamson encouraged the missions to
raise this issue with the GOK whenever the opportunity
presented itself. UK Acting High Commissioner Ray Kyles
suggested that former President Moi's son Gideon likely knows
where Kabuga is, and that Gideon Moi's enemies might want to
embarrass him. German Ambassador Walter Lindner was strongly
supportive, but feared that without concrete intelligence it
would be difficult to exert sufficient pressure on the GOK.
As the representative of the current EU presidency, he
promised to raise the issue with Wetangula at a planned
meeting the next day and at future meetings. Several
Ambassadors mentioned the GOK's concern not to be embarrassed
in an election year on the subject. (Note: Diplomatic
pressure on the GOK concerning Kabuga will continue to be
coordinated within the Like-Minded Donors group and the
Friends of the ICTR. End Note.)


10. (C) COMMENT: Despite the progress at the working level
and information sharing between ICTR and GOK investigators in
the Joint Task Force, without the necessary political will to
bring an end to Kabuga's safe haven in Kenya there is scant
chance of his being arrested here. In this election year, it
is even less likely that the GOK will take any significant
action against him. President Kibaki recently allied himself
with Moi to win Rift Valley votes in the upcoming national
elections, expected in December. President Kibaki will not
risk alienating a useful ally by disrupting a significant
financial interest. Kabuga could also be valuable to the
current regime as a source of campaign finance in a tight
election race. Fear of what Kabuga might say in an ICTR
trial may also inhibit GOK action. Conceivably, a re-elected
and term-limited Kibaki may feel less beholden to Kabuga and
his protectors, or a victorious opposition candidate might
have less interest in sheltering Kabuga. We will continue to
coordinate our diplomatic efforts with other concerned
diplomatic missions to encourage the GOK to honor its
international obligations.



11. (U) Ambassador Williamson has reviewed this cable.
RANNEBERGER