Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MUSCAT919
2007-09-29 07:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON MEETING WITH OMANI

Tags:  PREL IR IZ MU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHMS #0919/01 2720707
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290707Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8808
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000919 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2017
TAGS: PREL IR IZ MU
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON MEETING WITH OMANI
MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

REF: MUSCAT 870

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alfred F. Fonteneau for Reasons 1.4 (b
, d)

------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000919

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2017
TAGS: PREL IR IZ MU
SUBJECT: ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. FALLON MEETING WITH OMANI
MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

REF: MUSCAT 870

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alfred F. Fonteneau for Reasons 1.4 (b
, d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusef bin
Alawi discussed both Iraq and Iran during a September 19
meeting with CENTCOM Commander Admiral William J. Fallon.
Bin Alawi noted the many challenges facing efforts to
stabilize Iraq, including competing factions and militia
groups, but remained optimistic and encouraged U.S. moves to
transfer greater responsibility for security to the
government of PM Maliki. The Minister claimed that Iran
wanted to help end violence in Iraq and advocated "enhanced"
dialogue between Washington and Tehran. He conceded that
getting the Iranians to be more cooperative on its nuclear
program and other issues would be difficult, but asserted
that serious engagement with Tehran would likely yield
positive results. End Summary.

--------------
IRAQ
--------------


2. (C) Admiral Fallon, CENTCOM Commander, met September 19
in Muscat with Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusef
bin Alawi. Turning first to the situation in Iraq, Bin Alawi
said he found the recent Congressional testimony of General
Petraeus to be "very informative." He stated that he tried
to remain optimistic about the future of Iraq, but added that
several difficult challenges remained. He questioned, for
example, the loyalties of some of the officers of the Iraqi
security forces, and reiterated his view that PM Maliki
needed to act and see himself as the leader of all Iraqis,
rather than of only certain groups. Bin Alawi also lauded
remarks by President Bush on the gradual change in role of
the U.S. military in Iraq, commenting that this would help
make the Iraqi government realize that it must stand more on
its own.


3. (C) According to bin Alawi, there is much concern and
"re-examining" within the GCC, and in Kuwait in particular,
about Iraq. Any "vacuum" created by a withdrawal or
repositioning of U.S./coalition forces, he warned, would have
to be filled by legitimate local officials, although
competing factions and militias would make this difficult.

Bin Alawi noted that Iran maintained "strong" relations with
certain Iraqi groups, but claimed that Tehran was looking for
stability in Iraq and had tried to quell violence in the
southern region by appealing to Muqtada al-Sadr and his
followers for restraint. He further opined that the Iraqi
government should seek to reach an agreement with Shi'a
militia leaders, rather than send security forces to directly
confront the armed groups, in order to avoid further
bloodshed.


4. (C) Bin Alawi emphasized that both the U.S. and Iran
supported PM Maliki and his efforts to improve security.
While commenting that Maliki was at times problematic, bin
Alawi added that replacing him would be very difficult as
there was no other PM candidate acceptable to the majority of
Iraqis. In any case, bin Alawi continued, the Iraqis should
take care of their own day-to-day matters and quarrels and
look less to the outside for help. He also expressed
approval for coalition attempts to engage tribal leaders -
particularly in Anbar province - to fight al-Qa'eda, noting
that the Sultanate had employed a similar tactic in defeating
a communist-led rebellion in southern Oman in the 1970s. Bin
Alawi further stated that the GCC would benefit from more
"clarification" on U.S. plans for Iraq, though he added that
"no one" thought that a reduction in the U.S. presence in
Iraq would signal a lessening of U.S. interests there.

--------------
IRAN
--------------


5. (C) Asked by Admiral Fallon how the U.S. could move ahead
with Iran, bin Alawi replied that the U.S.-Iran dialogue
started in Baghdad should be "enhanced" so as to include
officials who are closer to decision-makers in their
respective capitals. Admiral Fallon responded that Tehran
had so far sent only intelligence and security officials to
the talks, rather than real diplomats. After a pause, bin
Alawi stated that the Iranian government administrative

MUSCAT 00000919 002 OF 002


system was inefficient and complex, and conceded that getting
Tehran to be more cooperative would "not be easy." But he
emphasized that engaging top Iranian officials would likely
eventually yield positive results.


6. (C) Turning briefly to Iran's nuclear program, bin Alawi
said that he earnestly hoped the matter would be resolved
peacefully. He explained that regional security issues had
long been a source of discussion between Gulf countries and
Iran, even during the time of the Shah, and that the Iranians
always understood that they needed to reach an accommodation
with their neighbors. Bin Alawi recalled a conversation he
had in the 1980s with former Iranian President Rafsanjani
during which he firmly stated that Oman would not change its
cooperative relationship with the West even under pressure
from Tehran. Rafsanjani had responded, according to bin
Alawi, that Iran was not seeking any such change and would
not attempt to impose its views on Oman. Bin Alawi stated
that he talked with current Iranian President Ahmadinejad,
but commented that "his school of thought is small" and that
many in the Iranian leadership did not share his views.


7. (C) Bin Alawi concluded the meeting by thanking Admiral
Fallon for his visit. The Minister added that he hoped to
visit CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa in the near future for
further discussions.


8. (U) Admiral Fallon has reviewed this message.
FONTENEAU