SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER ADMIRAL WILLIAM

S E C R E T MUSCAT 000870

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

CENTCOM FOR ADMIRAL FALLON FROM AMBASSADOR GRAPPO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL PTER MARR MASS MNUC MOPS OVIP KNNP
MU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CENTCOM COMMANDER ADMIRAL WILLIAM

J. FALLON'S VISIT TO OMAN

REF: A. MUSCAT 00416

B. MUSCAT 00829

Classified By: Classified By: AMBASSADOR GARY A. GRAPPO FOR REASONS 1.4
(B) AND (D)

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Welcome
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1. (C) Embassy Muscat and I warmly welcome your return to
Oman. Since your visit here four months ago, Oman continues
to be concerned with regional issues, especially events in
Iraq and Iran, participated in the June Gulf Security
Dialogue (GSD) meeting in Washington, D.C., and was struck by
a major tropical cyclone (from which it is still recovering).


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Regional Issues
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2. (C) Oman maintains a unique perspective on regional
concerns as compared to its GCC neighbors. The Omani
leadership is generally satisfied with its relationship with
Iran, prefering dialogue and cooperation on mutual maritime
security and other shared interests, rather than isolating
the regime in Tehran. It is less certain about the extent to
which Iran may pose a threat. Leaders in Oman,s military
and security services -) which take a more pragmatic view
than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) -- worry about
growing instability in the region resulting from expansionist
Iranian policies, which they fear could provoke a strong and
unsettling reaction from other states. However, they
increasingly argue that extremism and sectarianism in Iraq
pose an equal or greater danger to regional stability (and to
Oman) than does Iran.


3. (C) Oman remains generally supportive of our efforts to
promote security and political stability in Iraq, but is very
concerned that Prime Minister Maliki does not have effective
control over Iraqi security forces or the stature to lead the
country over the long-term. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict
continues to be a source of high-level interest; the Omani
government has cautiously welcomed the President,s proposed
Middle East peace conference to re-establish dialogue towards
finding a resolution, but would like to see inclusive
participation (i.e., Syria, Lebanon and other Arab and Muslim
countries).

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Gulf Security Dialogue
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4. (S/NF) Due in part to Gonu-related recovery operations,
no Ministry of Defense officials attended the last GSD
meeting held in June in Washington, D.C. MFA Under Secretary
Sayyid Badr al-Busaidi represented Oman at the talks and
repeated the MFA,s position that Iran is not a direct threat
to Oman and should be positively engaged by the international
community to change its behavior, rather than confronted with
sanctions, as this will only strengthen the hand of
hard-liners in Tehran. Currently, from an Omani perspective,
the hardware at the center of the GSD,s military pillar )
BADI and Patriot missiles ) does not hold much appeal to the
Omanis due to cost concerns -- Oman,s military budget is
small compared to the rest of the GCC -- and the
leadership,s opinion that an Iranian missile attack is
unlikely. Oman would instead like to modernize its military
capability, both defensive and deterrent (MLRS/ATACMS),to
help counter asymmetrical and other more likely threats. As
this Mission outlined in a recent review of GSD-related needs
(ref B),they are hoping for, and would in fact need, some
sort of creative or alternative financing through the GSD in
order to do so quickly.

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Tropical Cyclone Gonu
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5. (C) In early June, tropical cyclone (i.e. hurricane) Gonu
hit the northern and central coasts of Oman hard. While wind

and tidal damage was limited, heavy rains quickly overwhelmed
the numerous valleys/wadis and caused extensive flooding and
major damage to homes and infrastructure, particularly in the
Muscat area. The cost of total damage caused by the storm
exceeds USD 2 billion. Private estimates of the number of
dead and missing fall between 500 and 1,000 (though the
official figure was frozen at 49). Gonu was without recent
precedent and the rains and resultant flooding quickly
overwhelmed the capital area,s infrastructure and emergency
services. Flooding washed out several major roads in and out
of the capital, destroyed a number of bridges, temporarily
closed the airport, shut down both of the capital,s two
power stations and desalination plants, and compromised both
cellular and landline communication networks. Search and
rescue operations, as well as a major portion of the recovery
operations, were conducted by the Sultan,s Armed Forces and
the Royal Oman Police.


6. (C) Although the Embassy made several offers for
assistance (NAVCENT, in particular, was in a position to lend
immediate assistance if needed) before, during and directly
after the storm, the Government of Oman politely declined all
aid. Omani officials have told the Embassy the offers were
turned down for two primary reasons: a) the damage and loss
of life, while severe, were not catastrophic and Oman had
both the assets and personnel to conduct rescue and recovery
operations on its own; and b) the belief that foreign
assistance sometimes comes with a certain price tag --
including the need to divert Omani assets to coordinate and
work with foreign entities, and in the case of other nations
(not necessarily the U.S.),future political baggage. (Note:
It appears Oman accepted financial assistance from Saudi
Arabia and several other GCC countries, but declined all
other offers of aid. The USG donated USD 50,000 to a local
charity organization. End Note.)

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Impact of Gonu on Military Plans
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7. (S/NF) Post-cyclone recovery operations have gone very
well and most of the capital is back to normal operations.
However, the high cost of Gonu, along with declining FMF and
the skyrocketing cost of construction, will delay or cancel
future major acquisitions for the Sultan,s Armed Forces.
Royal Army of Oman (RAO) officers, for example, previously
told OMC that the RAO would be moving forward on
HIMARS/ATACMS as part of its artillery upgrade, but now do
not see this proceeding in the next few years. Furthermore,
while Omani officials are proud of their response to the
storm, they readily admit that there are a number of areas in
which they need to improve, such as interagency coordination
and communications. As such, Oman may be more interested in
attending or possibly hosting future Consequence Management
exercises.

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Your Meetings with Omani Officials
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8. (C) Your trip to Oman will occur at the beginning of
Ramadan and some of the officials you see may accordingly be
a bit distracted with ongoing family, religious and social
commitments associated with this period. Nevertheless, Omani
officials likely will want to receive an update on the
situations in Iraq, including the U.S. political response to
the recent Iraq report to Congress, and Afghanistan, as well
as on current U.S. thinking regarding Iran. As you recall
from your last visit, Sultan Qaboos remains concerned about
the Salafist doctrine being spread from Saudi Arabia, as well
as Shi,a expansionism out of Iran.


9. (U) In conclusion, the overall Oman-U.S.
military-to-military relationship remains solid. The
day-to-day interaction is candid and constructive, with a
strong spirit of cooperation on both sides. We look forward
to using your visit to strengthen this already sound
relationship.

GRAPPO