Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MUSCAT83
2007-01-28 10:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

SOMALI MIGRANTS ENTER OMAN THROUGH OPEN BORDER

Tags:  PARM PREL PHUM MOPS ETTC MNUC SO YE MU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0745
RR RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHMS #0083/01 0281058
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 281058Z JAN 07
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7712
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000083 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL PHUM MOPS ETTC MNUC SO YE MU
SUBJECT: SOMALI MIGRANTS ENTER OMAN THROUGH OPEN BORDER
WITH YEMEN

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo, reasons 1.4 b/d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000083

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL PHUM MOPS ETTC MNUC SO YE MU
SUBJECT: SOMALI MIGRANTS ENTER OMAN THROUGH OPEN BORDER
WITH YEMEN

Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo, reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) Summary: Emboffs recently visited sections of Oman's
border with Yemen, observing that much of the border lacks
fencing and generally is open to illegal traffic. Somali
immigrants continue to enter Oman along well-traveled
smuggling routes, though not in large numbers. Many of the
Somalis allegedly enter or transit Oman in search of
employment, and contacts say their presence is having a
negative effect on local security. End summary.


2. (C) During the week of January 15, poloff and the
Embassy's Defense Attache (DATT) conducted an unofficial tour
of the Oman-Yemen border between the ports of entry (POE) at
Sarfayt, located on Oman's coast, and al-Mazyunah,
approximately 140 kilometers inland. Emboffs carried out the
inspection to support a project of the Department's Export
Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS)
program, which will provide the Royal Oman Police (ROP) with
ground sensor equipment to monitor cross-border traffic and
help secure Oman's southeastern border. (Note: Post and EXBS
intend to hand over the equipment during an official ceremony
in Muscat in February. The equipment, which includes sensors
that detect heat, vibration, motion and magnetic fields,
forms one component of a broad package of assistance to help
Oman implement effective export control systems and prevent
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and
conventional weapons. End note.)


3. (C) In the course of discussions with ROP interlocutors in
Salalah and at the POEs, a mid-ranking police officer based
in Salalah informed emboffs that illegal migrants from
Somalia continue to enter Oman regularly. The officer told
emboffs that since the last quarter of 2006, the ROP has been
assisting in the deportation of approximately 150 Somalis per

month as part of an ongoing operation. He stated that on
January 14, for example, the ROP transferred 74 Somalis from
Arzaat prison near Salalah, where the ROP maintains a
detention center for illegal immigrants, into the custody of
Yemeni authorities. The officer added, however, that many of
the Somalis are repeat offenders, which makes it difficult to
assess the actual number of Somalis trying to enter Oman.
The source said that many of the deportees candidly tell him
that they are not detained by Yemeni authorities after their
return to Yemen, and therefore attempt to reenter Oman as
early as two days after their deportation.


4. (C) The officer told emboffs that he has been able to
determine two of the main routes for entry into Oman through
his conversations with Somali detainees. One is by sea, in
which Somalis travel by boat from Yemen to the secluded
beaches near the Omani towns of Dhalqut and Rakhyut. The
other is by land, moving from the Yemeni town of al-Gaydah up
through the relatively flat and open terrain near the Omani
town of al-Mazyunah. The source continued that once the
Somalis enter Oman, they use phone numbers passed through a
network of family and friends in Somalia to contact Omani
citizens, who drive them to onward destinations inside Oman
and elsewhere in the Gulf region.


5. (C) The officer added that while units from the ROP and
army collaborate to secure the border area, large stretches
of the border are wide open and difficult to patrol. The
border area north of the ROP-manned POE at Sarfayt is
mountainous with deep wadis (valleys),and largely
inaccessible by vehicle. He estimated that there are only
five kilometers of fencing along the approximately
140-kilometer border between Sarfayt and the POE at
al-Mazyunah. Emboffs confirmed that at present there is no
fencing or other barrier to stop cross-border traffic along
vast stretches of territory south of al-Mazyunah. Emboffs
saw evidence of frequent vehicular traffic across the desert
between Oman and Yemen within five kilometers of the POE at
al-Mazyunah, particularly through wadis that offer
substantial cover from ground-based observation. The ROP
officer stated that most Somalis enter Oman under the cover
of darkness, which, combined with the terrain, makes it
difficult to interdict them.


6. (C) The same source told emboffs that most of the Somalis
who enter Oman are very poor. He further stated that many
enter Oman in bad physical condition; some of the Somalis
taken into custody are without shoes. The source described
one detainee who had crossed the mountainous and desert
terrain of the border region with a broken leg, using
homemade crutches. ROP contacts at Salalah's Arzaat Prison
informed poloff on a previous trip to the region that many of
the Somalis who enter Oman have UN refugee status in Yemen.
They described the Somalis as primarily economic migrants

MUSCAT 00000083 002 OF 002


looking for work in Oman, or transiting the country for
employment in the UAE. All of emboff's ROP interlocutors
said that the influx of impoverished Somalis is having a
negative effect on the region's economy and security. The
ROP officer who spoke to emboffs on their trip to the border
claimed that some are involved in petty theft, likely
stealing from local households to help meet their basic
needs, and are denuding the area's frankincense trees in
order to harvest and sell the trees' sap. While he
acknowledged that some Somalis have had violent encounters
with police and army units, the officer said that the vast
majority appear to be unarmed and non-violent.


7. (C) The ROP officer added that the paths Somalis use to
enter Oman follow well-known smuggling routes for the
transporting of guns and cars between Yemen, Oman and the
UAE. The officer told emboffs that he is aware of at least
three instances during the past year in which the ROP has
interdicted Toyota Land Cruisers loaded with handguns and
other weapons of Russian and Chinese origin, entering Oman
from Yemen near al-Mazyunha. He and his colleagues believe
that many more such vehicles pass police and army checkpoints
undeterred, and that most of the smugglers head toward
lucrative markets in the UAE via Oman's section of the Empty
Quarter and the city of Ibri. While the source did not make
a direct connection between Somali immigrants and the gun
trade, he said that the combination of weapons, smugglers,
and poor and desperate people make the border region around
al-Mazyunha a dangerous and volatile area.


8. (C) Comment: Based on emboffs' observations and the
comments of ROP interlocutors, much of Oman's border with
Yemen is either unpatrolled or unprotected, and people and
goods appear to move freely across it. Contacts anticipate
that the instability in Somalia likely will lead to an
increase in the number of Somalis making their way overland
or by sea to Oman. The USG offer of ground sensors through
EXBS should help Oman strengthen its border security in this
area, though significant gaps likely will remain. End
comment.
GRAPPO