Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MUSCAT435
2007-05-02 12:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:
NEW WAY FORWARD ON IRAQ -- OMAN
how-toVZCZCXRO3164 PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR DE RUEHMS #0435 1221225 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 021225Z MAY 07 FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8172 INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000435
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/RSAT, NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2017
TAGS: MARR MAPS MOPS PREL PTER IZ MU
SUBJECT: NEW WAY FORWARD ON IRAQ -- OMAN
REF: A. STATE 54925
B. MUSCAT 414
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)
(C) Oman remains very concerned about instability and
sectarian violence in Iraq, which it fears could spread
elsewhere in the region. In response to our requests, Oman
has heightened its engagement with the Iraqi government,
including by hosting the recent visit of Iraqi PM al-Maliki
(ref B). During this visit, however, Maliki did not request
any Omani assistance, and the Omanis volunteered none.
Moreover, senior Omani officials continue to assert that
additional military action in Iraq will not quell the
insurgency unless the Iraqi government does more to promote
political reconciliation. Given this context and Oman's
traditional reluctance to become involved in foreign
conflicts (particularly independent of its GCC partners),
post does not believe that the Omani government would be
willing to contribute troops or other direct support to
further the President's new strategy in Iraq.
GRAPPO
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR PM/RSAT, NEA/ARP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/02/2017
TAGS: MARR MAPS MOPS PREL PTER IZ MU
SUBJECT: NEW WAY FORWARD ON IRAQ -- OMAN
REF: A. STATE 54925
B. MUSCAT 414
Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 (b, d)
(C) Oman remains very concerned about instability and
sectarian violence in Iraq, which it fears could spread
elsewhere in the region. In response to our requests, Oman
has heightened its engagement with the Iraqi government,
including by hosting the recent visit of Iraqi PM al-Maliki
(ref B). During this visit, however, Maliki did not request
any Omani assistance, and the Omanis volunteered none.
Moreover, senior Omani officials continue to assert that
additional military action in Iraq will not quell the
insurgency unless the Iraqi government does more to promote
political reconciliation. Given this context and Oman's
traditional reluctance to become involved in foreign
conflicts (particularly independent of its GCC partners),
post does not believe that the Omani government would be
willing to contribute troops or other direct support to
further the President's new strategy in Iraq.
GRAPPO