ROP STAFFING CONSTRAINTS PRESENT CHALLENGE FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUSCAT 000387

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, ISN/ECC/VPSAROS
AMMAN FOR JIRVINE
USDOE/NNSA FOR WKILMARTIN
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR THORTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2017
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL KNNP KSTC MU
SUBJECT: ROP STAFFING CONSTRAINTS PRESENT CHALLENGE FOR
MEGAPORTS, CSI


Classified By: Ambassador Gary A. Grappo for Reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) Summary: Oman currently participates in two USG
security programs designed to scan containerized cargo in
overseas ports. The Department of Energy's (DOE) Megaports
initiative and the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
Container Security Initiative are scheduled to begin linked
operations in Oman as early as June 2007. ROP contacts are
concerned, however, that the programs will place additional
burdens on already stretched and limited Omani human
resources. End summary.

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Megaports - Imminent Deployment
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2. (SBU) The DOE's Megaports initiative is scheduled to begin
phase I of operations at Port of Salalah by the end of June

2007. Megaports will run in conjunction with DHS's Container
Security Initiative (CSI),which has been in operation at the
port since mid-2005. Once Megaports installation is
complete, Oman will have the ability to inspect containerized
cargo through an Integrated Container Inspection System
(ICIS) including both non-intrusive imaging (NII) equipment
and radiation portal monitors (RPM). ROP Customs will have
primary, front-line responsibility under both programs for
scanning U.S.-bound and other cargo for weapons, contraband,
and nuclear and other radioactive material of proliferation
concern.

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ROP Human Resource Constraints
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3. (C) Mid-ranking officers in ROP Customs working directly
with both programs tell poloff that Customs' human resource
constraints may significantly limit the ROP's ability to
adequately staff the Megaports and CSI initiatives, and that
the programs may end up straining existing capacity. Noting
that the success of both programs depends in large part on
the ability of front-line inspectors to conduct the requisite
scanning, these contacts claim that staffing levels in ROP
Customs have not risen to meet the demands of these new
security commitments or the brisk growth of Oman's ports.
Further, they report that they are unaware of any plans to
systematically increase the number of ROP Customs inspectors,
or to accelerate the pace of staff recruitment, in the near
future.


4. (C) According to these officials, the number of Customs
personnel assigned to Port of Salalah is barely sufficient to
handle the current workload. Currently, there are 25 Customs
officials at the Port, including three officers, split among
four shifts. Each shift of at most twelve individuals is
responsible for a wide range of responsibilities, including:
collecting tariffs; completing clerical and administrative
work; checking containers entering the port by truck; and
inspecting general, non-containerized cargo brought by dhow
from East Africa. (Note: Contacts at the Port suspect that
the dhows may be involved in smuggling illicit cargo,
including drugs, and deserve more scrutiny than they
currently receive. End note.) U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) personnel assigned to Port of Salalah with
the CSI program tell poloff that while Omani customs
personnel are cooperative, they generally view requests to
scan U.S.-bound cargo at the present rate of 20-30 containers
per week as an additional and unwanted responsibility -- one
that likely will increase once Megaports comes on line.


5. (C) The additional strain that the fully operational
Megaports initiative may place on a staff already stretched
thin, ROP contacts opine, is particularly challenging in the
context of Port of Salalah's rapid growth. Port of Salalah
presently handles a volume of 2.8 million containers per year
through four berths, making it one of the top transshipment
ports in the world. Gary Lemke (protect),the Chief
Operating Officer of Salalah Port Services, the private
company managing the port, told poloff that two additional
berths should be operational by the first quarter of 2008,
and that he expects a total of nine berths in operation by

2011. Officials in the office of the Under Secretary of the
Ministry of Transportation and Communication, the Ministry
responsible for the operation and development of Oman's
ports, anticipate that Salalah's initial two berth expansion

MUSCAT 00000387 002 OF 002


should increase volume by more than 50% to 4.5 million
containers per year in 2008. Further, they expect the port
regularly will handle eight million containers a year within
the next decade. Given the rate of the port's expansion,
according to our contacts, a concomitant increase in trained
customs personnel is necessary.


6. (C) The ROP's rotational schedule, however, which shifts
personnel among four different posts in Oman's Dhofar
governorate for an average tour of one year, may make it
difficult to keep personnel trained on the Megaports and CSI
equipment in Salalah. One inspector with NII training
recently was shifted from the port to a border post that does
not have the same equipment. Contacts also report that
currently only three of Port of Salalah's 25 customs
officials have been trained in how to operate the NII
equipment, and only one is on duty on any given shift.
(Note: A program manager for W.J. Towell, the locally-based
company with which the government of Oman has contracted for
continuing maintenance of the equipment and training, told
poloff that a minimum of two trained personnel is recommended
to run and operate the type of equipment installed in
Salalah. He added that while Towell has trained a total of
65 customs officials since 2005, most of them have been
assigned to posts without NII equipment. End note.)


7. (C) Comment: Oman has displayed the political will at
senior levels to partner with the USG on port security
initiatives. In December 2006, the Omani government agreed
to deepen its cooperation on transportation security by
participating in the DOE and DHS's Secure Freight Initiative
(SFI). Despite this commitment, human resource constraints
in ROP Customs may effectively cap the number of containers
that can be inspected, and thus frustrate USG goals to scan
an increasing amount of U.S.-bound containerized cargo
through Megaports and CSI. Sustained and coordinated
assistance to ROP Customs from DOE, DHS and the Department of
State's EXBS program for staff training and professional
development, as well as organizational capacity building, may
be required in order to meet future program objectives. In
the short term, Post will make some informal approaches to
Omani Customs and other organizations to determine how they
plan to address the problem. End comment.
GRAPPO