AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HAMAS VISIT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000828

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2017
TAGS: PREL KPAL EAID IS LE SY IZ SA RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES HAMAS VISIT, SYRIA, AND IRAQ
WITH DFM SALTANOV

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4(B & D).


1. (C) Summary: Deputy Foreign Minister Saltanov told the
Ambassador February 27 that the MFA saw Hamas as evolving in
its views on Israel following a February 26-27 Moscow visit
by Hamas Politburo Chief Mishal. While Mishal was not
willing to directly address publicly the question of
recognizing Israel, Saltanov was encouraged by positive steps
in that direction in private meetings. According to
Saltanov, Mishal had told FM Lavrov that Hamas saw the Mecca
Agreement as opening the path to negotiations with Israel.
Saltanov said Russia believed that an end to the "blockade"
on assistance to the Palestinians would be a necessary part
of supporting the National Unity Government. Moscow had
coordinated its invitation to Hamas with Abu Mazen, but the
Israelis continued to be critical of Russia's engagement.
The Ambassador pressed Saltanov on Russian weapons sales to
Syria and Iran and Saltanov responded by claiming that
Russian end-user controls had been tightened. Putin's trip
to the Gulf and Saudi Arabia had been marked by consensus on
regional political issues and heightened interest in energy
cooperation. End Summary.
.
HAMAS VISIT
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2. (C) A four-member Hamas delegation led by Politburo
Chief Khaled Mishal met February 27 with Russian FM Lavrov,
following a February 26 meeting with DFM Saltanov. No other
meetings with Russian officials, including President Putin,
are planned. Saltanov told the Ambassador that the GOR had a
positive impression after the meetings and saw Hamas'
position on peace with Israel as "evolving." Saltanov did
not exclude that Hamas might continue to make sharp
statements publicly, but at least privately there were
positive signs. Mishal told the Russians that he viewed the
February 8 "Mecca Agreement" on a National Unity Government
(NUG) as an opening which could lead to a path of
negotiations with Israel because the Agreement provided a
platform for such talks.


3. (C) Saltanov said the MFA pressed Mishal for clarity on
"the most important question -- was Hamas prepared to
recognize Israel." Mishal would not directly answer, but he
underlined that Hamas was willing to accept the Arab League's
2002 Beirut Summit decision that promised normal relations
with Israel as well as UN Security Council resolutions that
implicitly recognized Israel. Pressed by the Ambassador as
to whether Mishal was willing to express such views publicly,
Saltanov counseled patience and again underlined that Hamas
was evolving but was not likely to recognize Israel directly
so soon after the Mecca Agreement. This would be a careful
process, but Hamas would be moving forward, if by small
increments. (NOTE: In a February 27 press conference,
Mishal would not respond directly to a question on whether
Hamas would recognize Israel.)
.
QUARTET CONDITIONS
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4. (C) Referring to the "blockade" on assistance to the
Hamas-led government, Saltanov relayed Mishal's belief that
implementation of the Mecca Agreement should be sufficient to
allow the resumption of aid to the Palestinian Authority.
Saltanov noted that Russia's views on ending the assistance
ban paralleled the views of the seven Muslim like-minded
countries who met in Pakistan on February 25; in Russia's
view, relaxation of the ban depended in the first place on
Hamas fully honoring the Mecca Agreement and working with Abu
Mazen to establish the NUG. According to Saltanov, Mishal
had promised that Hamas would be "non-discriminatory" in
forming a government and would seek out "internationally
recognized persons." Further Russian aid to the Palestinians
would be held in abeyance, according to Saltanov, who
stressed his hope that the Europeans would be able to further
refine the temporary international mechanism at a March 13
Brussels meeting.
.
COORDINATION WITH ABU MAZEN AND ISRAEL
--------------


5. (C) Saltanov said that Russia had been encouraged by PA
President Abu Mazen to pursue continued engagement with
Hamas. Abu Mazen was pleased by Moscow's support for the
Mecca Agreement. The Israelis (with whom Saltanov met in
Jerusalem last week before the Hamas invitation was made
public) continued to be critical of Russia's approach.
Saltanov said the Israelis were unrealistic about what Hamas
would be willing to do in the immediate aftermath of the
Mecca Agreement. In his view, the Israelis were making a

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serious mistake by not recognizing the dangers of the
situation, not only on their borders, but in the broader
Middle East. Saltanov did note that the Russians had acted
on an Israeli suggestion to use their influence with Hamas to
urge a reduction in violence and had pressed Hamas on Kassam
rocket attacks.


6. (C) Saltanov said Russia strongly supported the
Secretary's efforts to encourage talks between PM Olmert and

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Abu Mazen. Moscow saw it as a success that the two met at
all, and that they had agreed to meet again. Saltanov
briefly noted that the question of the Israeli soldier held
prisoner by Hamas remained outstanding. He said Lavrov had
pressed Mishal on this issue, but had been careful not to get
into the details, so as not to obstruct the effort of
Egyptian Intelligence Chief Omar Soliman.
.
SYRIA
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7. (C) Saltanov told the Ambassador that both Mishal and
Abu Mazen had contended to the Russians that Syria was
playing a helpful role in encouraging the Mecca Agreement and
forming the NUG. The Ambassador emphasized the dangers to
regional stability of Russian weapons sales to Syria (and
Iran),noting outstanding U.S. concerns and pointing to
Congressman Lantos' focus on this issue in all his meetings
during last week's visit. Saltanov did not directly defend
the sales, but said that Russia had put better end-user
controls in place, and would welcome any concrete information
that such controls were not be followed.
.
IRAQ
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8. (C) Saltanov was aware of the mid-March subministerial
conference in Baghdad of Iraq's neighbors and P-5/G-8
members, but had not yet received an invitation from the
Iraqis. Russia had long supported such a conference; it
would not only allow increased international support for the
Iraqi government, it would also provide an opportunity to
engage with Syria and Iran on Iraqi security.
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PUTIN IN THE GULF
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9. (C) Saltanov, who had accompanied President Putin during
his mid-February visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Jordan,
said that the meetings in Riyadh had been particularly
useful. The Saudis had offered their strategic perspective
on the region and both Moscow and Riyadh shared the view that
more needed to be done to resolve regional conflicts. Much
of the discussions in Qatar and Saudi Arabia had been focused
on energy, but there had been no concrete projects agreed to
in the leaders' talks. However, a parallel business forum
had spurred discussions on bilateral investments and joint
projects in third countries. Saltanov also noted continuing
interest in the Gulf (and in Egypt) in developing peaceful
nuclear energy programs.
BURNS