Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW78
2007-01-11 14:56:00
SECRET
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
ISKANDER-E MISSILE FOR LIBYA: RUSSIA HEDGES ON
VZCZCXRO5676 OO RUEHTRO DE RUEHMO #0078 0111456 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 111456Z JAN 07 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6303 INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1921 RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
S E C R E T MOSCOW 000078
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI, AND ISN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL MCAP KNNP LY UK RS
SUBJECT: ISKANDER-E MISSILE FOR LIBYA: RUSSIA HEDGES ON
TECHNICAL EXPERTS MEETING (C)
REF: STATE 2381
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells.
Reasons 1.4 (B/D).
S E C R E T MOSCOW 000078
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI, AND ISN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL MCAP KNNP LY UK RS
SUBJECT: ISKANDER-E MISSILE FOR LIBYA: RUSSIA HEDGES ON
TECHNICAL EXPERTS MEETING (C)
REF: STATE 2381
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells.
Reasons 1.4 (B/D).
1. (S) On January 11 we conveyed to the MFA U.S interest
(ref) in a technical experts meeting in Moscow before January
29 to discuss issues relating to Libya's possible purchase of
the Iskander-E missile. Sergey Petlyakov, Chief of the Arms
Technology and Transfer Division of the Foreign Ministry's
Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, told us that
it would be difficult to arrange such a meeting before the
end of the month.
2. (S) In addition to the short time-frame, Petlyakov said
it was his understanding that only 3-4 experts at the
Konstruktorskoye Byuro Mashinostroyeniya (KBM) had access to
the technology required to modify the Iskander-E missile
because of the firm's strict compartmentalization policy.
KBM management might be reluctant to have its experts engage
in such "risky" discussions due to the possibility of
inadvertent disclosure of classified data. We noted that we
were only asking Russia to provide the same level of
transparency that we provided to it when Russia raised
similar concerns about the U.S. ATACMS system exported in
1996.
3. (C) Petlyakov promised to raise our request with DFM
Kislyak and other senior officials and get us a reply by next
week.
4. (U) Minimize considered.
RUSSELL
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR T, VCI, AND ISN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL MCAP KNNP LY UK RS
SUBJECT: ISKANDER-E MISSILE FOR LIBYA: RUSSIA HEDGES ON
TECHNICAL EXPERTS MEETING (C)
REF: STATE 2381
Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells.
Reasons 1.4 (B/D).
1. (S) On January 11 we conveyed to the MFA U.S interest
(ref) in a technical experts meeting in Moscow before January
29 to discuss issues relating to Libya's possible purchase of
the Iskander-E missile. Sergey Petlyakov, Chief of the Arms
Technology and Transfer Division of the Foreign Ministry's
Department of Disarmament and Security Affairs, told us that
it would be difficult to arrange such a meeting before the
end of the month.
2. (S) In addition to the short time-frame, Petlyakov said
it was his understanding that only 3-4 experts at the
Konstruktorskoye Byuro Mashinostroyeniya (KBM) had access to
the technology required to modify the Iskander-E missile
because of the firm's strict compartmentalization policy.
KBM management might be reluctant to have its experts engage
in such "risky" discussions due to the possibility of
inadvertent disclosure of classified data. We noted that we
were only asking Russia to provide the same level of
transparency that we provided to it when Russia raised
similar concerns about the U.S. ATACMS system exported in
1996.
3. (C) Petlyakov promised to raise our request with DFM
Kislyak and other senior officials and get us a reply by next
week.
4. (U) Minimize considered.
RUSSELL