THE CHECHEN PRESIDENCY: KADYROV PROPOSES, BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000673

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/15/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR PTER MOPS RS
SUBJECT: THE CHECHEN PRESIDENCY: KADYROV PROPOSES, BUT
PUTIN DISPOSES

REF: 06 MOSCOW 12159

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, seeking to be
president, is pushing hard against President Alu Alkhanov.
Kadyrov aims either to force Alkhanov to make way for him and
resign, or to persuade Putin to remove Alkhanov. Press
articles inspired by one or another side appear frequently
but should be taken as propaganda, not reportage. Nor do
officials who claim to have insight know what is in Putin's
mind. One apparent attempt to forge peace last November
broke down. At that time, Chechen security forces loyal to
Kadyrov killed Alkhanov supporter FSB Lt. Colonel Movladi
Baysarov in Moscow. This appears to have frozen any
resolution while the dispute rekindled. Now Putin must
decide. He has backed Kadyrov without reservation so far,
but must weigh the effects on regional stability as well as
domestic and international politics. End Summary.

"You Would Find the Conversation a Trifle One-Sided"
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Chechen politics -- always murky, dirty and bloody --
are marked by unity in the face of outside attack and
dissension once outside pressure is gone. Russian pressure
on Chechnya is disappearing as the separatist threat fades,
and Chechnya's leaders are going back to their internal power
struggles. As we reported (Reftel),by November of last year
Chechen PM Ramzan Kadyrov, newly turned 30 -- the minimum age
to be president of Chechnya -- thought he had President
Putin's agreement to step up to the presidency.


3. (C) But Putin first demanded peace between Kadyrov and
current Chechen President Alu Alkhanov, according to
Aleksandr Machevskiy of the Presidential Administration and,
separately, Duma Deputy Gadzhi Makhachev (strictly protect
both). Alkhanov was the figurehead of opposition to Kadyrov
whose secret strong men were "East" Battalion commander Sulim
Yamadayev and "West" Battalion commander Said-Magomed
Kakiyev. Kadyrov talked to Gadzhi Makhachev in October of
"getting rid" of Baysarov. Machevskiy strongly implied that
the peace deal included a sanction for Kadyrov to assassinate
former Chechen commander Movladi Baysarov, the overt face of
the opposition -- a man hitherto protected by his status as
an FSB Lieutenant Colonel. Baysarov was gunned down last
November 18 by Chechen security forces with Moscow police
looking on. Officially, he was shot while resisting arrest.


4. (C) The assassination -- with Chechen thugs blasting away
on a main Moscow thoroughfare -- may have made Kadyrov too
hot to be promoted. In contrast to Machevskiy, who told us
the assassination did not bother him at all, Putin appears to
have shelved plans to make Kadyrov president of Chechnya,
despite earlier promises. As Machevskiy put it December 21,
"That was yesterday; this is today."

Every Trick in the Book
--------------


5. (C) Kadyrov did not give up. Early this month Kadyrov
resumed his pressure on Alkhanov to resign. His henchmen's
public criticism included a charge of sacrilege against Kunta
Haji, the founder of Kadyrov's brotherhood within Qadiri
Sufism. The charge was not only meant to arouse public ire
against Alkhanov and Kakiyev, who are adepts of the rival
Naqshbandi sect, but also to split off their ally Sulim
Yamadayev, whose family belongs to the Kunta Haji sect.
Sulim's brother Ruslan told us February 13, however, that he
and his brother recognized the charge as a cheap political
ploy. Kadyrov is also insisting on holding a conference with
Russian and international NGOs at the end of February, in an
apparent effort to seek credibility.


6. (C) Though the renewed power struggle is gaining heat, the
strong press play it is receiving should be treated with
extreme caution. Both sides are inserting attack articles in
Russia's notoriously corrupt press. For example, on January
23 Moscow businessman Malik Saidullayev, who bitterly opposes
Kadyrov and tried to run against his father for Chechnya's
presidency in 2004, detailed to us the killing of Baysarov --
in a conversation filled with some facts and a lot of
fantasy. He charged that senior associates of Kadyrov
(including Adam Delimkhanov, Kadyrov's right-hand man and
Deputy PM for the Force Ministries) actually fired the shots.
This may be true, but the fact that Saidullayev's charges
appeared almost verbatim in the February 12-14 edition of
"Novaya Gazeta" makes it probable that he paid for the

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article, whose other content must be suspect.

Only Putin Decides
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7. (C) Ruslan "Khalit" Yamadayev (Protect),a Duma deputy who
began our February 13 conversation by protesting that all
reports of discord were inventions of the mass media and its
Western masters, soon lamented the "terrible" state of
affairs. "I can't even contact one part of my own leadership
without irritating the others," he said. He believed the
situation could not continue much longer without a resolution
from Putin. He said Putin's word would be final with the
Chechen people, who are tired of war and just want a normal,
stable life. "If Putin says to Alkhanov, 'I want you in the
MVD' (Ministry of Internal Affairs) and makes Ramzan
President, the Chechen people will accept that. If Putin
tells Ramzan to resign and go study in some institute, the
people will accept that. If he sits both of them down and
tells them he needs them both, the people will accept that.
And if Putin tells them both to leave and brings in some sort
of Jew or Avar, they will accept that, too."


8. (C) The Presidential Administration's Machevskiy was more
categorical: "Alkhanov had his chances," he told us, "but he
lost them." He expected Kadyrov to be named President soon.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Our assessment is that Machevskiy was pretending to
know more than he really did, while Yamadayev knew more than
he let on. One thing is clear: the decision is with one
man, Putin. Anyone he has told of that decision would keep
very silent about it. Putin must weigh three factors in
making a decision:

-- Success in imposing stability in Chechnya has depended
heavily on Putin's unqualified backing for Kadyrov and
defense of everything Kadyrov does. If Putin starts
qualifying that support, what will the effects be on
Chechnya's stability?

-- Kadyrov, for all his effectiveness within Chechnya,
clearly has wider regional ambitions. As the Baysarov
assassination shows, he now views all of Russia as within his
field of operations. If this continues, what will be the
effects on stability in the wider North Caucasus?

-- Stability in Chechnya, however brutally it has been
imposed, has virtually taken the conflict off the
international agenda, and it is nowhere to be found on the
domestic political agenda for the 2008 elections. Putin will
assessing the likely effects of his decision in these two
vital areas.

At this point, we are making no predictions as to Putin's
thoughts.

BURNS