Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW656
2007-02-14 14:56:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
OREL: VULNERABLE GOVERNOR CREATES OPPORTUNITIES
how-toVZCZCXRO7753 RR RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHVK RUEHYG DE RUEHMO #0656/01 0451456 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 141456Z FEB 07 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7475 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG 3747 RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 1903 RUEHYG/AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG 2165
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000656
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: OREL: VULNERABLE GOVERNOR CREATES OPPORTUNITIES
FOR OTHER PARTIES
MOSCOW 00000656 001.2 OF 003
-------
SUMMARY
-------
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000656
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: OREL: VULNERABLE GOVERNOR CREATES OPPORTUNITIES
FOR OTHER PARTIES
MOSCOW 00000656 001.2 OF 003
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (SBU) Meetings during an early-February visit to Orel
region suggested that a variety of factors could combine to
make the March 11 regional elections very competitive.
Rumored infighting in United Russia (YR) and an unpopular
YR-affiliated governor have allowed the Communist Party
(KPRF) to remain within striking distance of the
Kremlin-sponsored United Russia party. The second
Kremlin-approved party, Just Russia, appears to be benefiting
from heavy financing and is in the race as well. Smaller
parties and independent candidates are using door-to-door
appeals in an effort to overcome the advantages of the
majors. End Summary.
-------------- ---
United Russia: Burdened by an Unpopular Governor
-------------- ---
2. (SBU) United Russia currently holds 34 out of 50 seats in
the regional legislature and aims to retain its majority in
the March 11 regional election. Although the percentages
vary, local polls show YR with a mere three percentage point
advanta'oQocal observers, is Governor
Yegor Stroev, who has been in power for over 20 years, and is
now a United Russia member. Local journalist Sergey Tyurin
claimed that Stroev is perceived as not having successfully
cultivated a relationship with President Putin, to the
detriment of the region's economy. The local electorate,
according to Tyurin, is tired of a Governor who promises, but
does not deliver.
3. (SBU) Stroev's unpopularity has reportedly led to
infighting within United Russia. United Russia leader and
First Deputy Governor Pavel Merkulov, who suffered a surprise
defeat in the 2006 Orel mayoral election, alluded to the
problems caused within the party by the Governor in telling
us that United Russia would demand "accountability" from
Stroev as it went into the elections.
4. (SBU) In a separate meeting, the NGO "Civic Resource"
President Yelena Kastornova did not think that a poor track
record necessarily complicated YR's efforts to remain on top.
Other parties were promising a lot, she said, but United
Russia would reap the benefits associated with stability. In
a February 8 meeting, Patriots of Russia Chairwoman Yelena
Krachnakova conceded that some had done well under United
Russia, but asserted that they were a minority: only twenty
percent of likely voters.
--------------
KPRF: Looking to Capitalize
--------------
5. (SBU) In the March 2006 mayoral election, Aleksandr
Kasyanov unexpectedly and narrowly won on the KPRF ticket
taking 29 percent of the vote to Merkulov's 26 percent. At a
meeting with civil society and human rights activists, the
"United Europe" Institute's Dmitriy Krayukhin attributed
Kasyanov's win, despite the heavy use of administrative
resources for Merkulov, to the Governor's unpopularity and
the support of civil society activists, the press, and the
KPRF rank-and-file. While ruing the need to work with the
KPRF, Krayukhin thought it was the only option for those
wanting to create a true opposition to YR and Stroev, since
all other parties were co-opted and the "against all" option
had been removed from the ballot.
6. (SBU) Although KPRF has only five deputies in the current
regional legislature, many interlocutors in Orel described
the region as "red." They note that KPRF Chairman Gennadiy
Zyuganov is a native son and that KPRF voters are disciplined
and hence much coveted by other parties. KPRF's Vasiliy
Ikonnikov told us separately that local businesspeople who
are out of favor with United Russia were now financing the
KPRF. Many observers predicted that the KPRF as a result
would run a close second to YR in March.
--------------
A Just Russia: Bringing in the Cash
--------------
7. (SBU) Although Just Russia has negligible poll
recognition, no one doubts that it will finish a strong third
MOSCOW 00000656 002.2 OF 003
thanks to generous campaign financing. The Orel party office
during our visit was swarming with young people collecting
stacks of campaign material to distribute. Just Russia is
paying approximately USD150 per week, more than one month's
average salary, to distribute campaign materials. Just
Russia's Marina Ivashina confirmed that all financing was
coming from Moscow. Just Russia is mounting a PR campaign
that will portray YR as a party that talks, while Just Russia
"does." Tyurin suggested that Just Russia would portray
itself as close to Putin in order to win votes.
-------------- --------------
SPS: Importing Strategists...and Localizing Its Message
-------------- --------------
8. (SBU) In a February 7 meeting, Sergey Tarasov and Oleg
Repin described SPS's message in Orel as "additional money
for pensioners and those who depend on federal assistance."
SPS, buoyed by its unexpected second place finish in Perm
(where it garnered 16 percent of the votes in the October
2006 election),has brought in campaign workers from all over
Russia to get its message across. It is relying largely on
face-to-face campaigning as media access is complicated to
access and expensive. The party's goal is to win in enough
regions to effect change at the federal level.
--------------
Smaller Parties and Independent Candidates:
Door-to-Door Canvassing
--------------
9. (SBU) The ballot also features LDPR (popularly predicted
to win its "usual" 10 percent),the Democratic Party of
Russia, Patriots of Russia, People's Will, and a host of
independents on the individual candidate lists. Most of
these parties are optimistic that they will get at least one
seat. They and independent candidates are focusing their
efforts on door-to-door canvassing with the expectation that
a personal connection will instill greater confidence in
prospective voters. Independent candidate Olga Kurmova, who
is running on a platform of helping families, children, and
older people, firmly defended her ability to vote
independently should she be elected. "United Europe"
Institute's Krayukhin was more cynical about the
independents, alleging that many were actually United Russia
proxies who are fearful of being tainted by association with
the Governor.
-------------- --------------
Yabloko: Off the Ballot, but on the City Council
-------------- --------------
10. (SBU) Yabloko's Konstantin Fedotov explained that his
party had not been registered, despite collecting a
sufficient number of signatures, because its documents had
not been bound together as required by law. Fedotov claimed
that Regional Election Commission Head Anatoliy Trofimov had
been willing to overlook the requirement and accept the
signatures the next day, but was preempted when the national
daily Kommersant reported Yabloko's exclusion. Trofimov
himself told PolOff that Yabloko had not submitted its
signatures on time. Fedotov further noted that litigation
would be pointless as inevitable court delays would render
the matter moot. "United Europe" Institute's Krayukhin
dismissed the idea that Yabloko's exclusion was politically
motivated. He pointed to what he said were Fedotov's local
government ties and claimed that Yabloko in Orel was in
reality an adjunct of United Russia.
11. (SBU) Fedotov confided that the Moscow branch of Yabloko
had refused to finance the party's Orel efforts. (Fedotov is
on the City Council and hopes to raise Yabloko's profile in
the region by undertaking high profile social projects and
supporting local businesses.)
--------------
The Governor: A Liability
--------------
12. (SBU) At a February 8 meeting with civil society
activists, the consensus was that Stroev was similar to an
"oriental despot." Orel oblast had fallen behind
economically; in part, participants surmised, because Stroev
was hostage to a circle of obsequious advisors. Immediately
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Stroev had been able
to rely on federal connections to ensure that pensions and
state factory salaries were paid, and had been able to
MOSCOW 00000656 003.2 OF 003
"order" that factories be built. The governor, however, was
unable to manage the realities of today's Russia, even with a
daughter in the Federation Council.
--------------
Comment
--------------
13. (SBU) The level of dissatisfaction in the oblast has
created real opportunities for parties other than United
Russia to believe they have a chance to get into power. None
of the parties is doing a remarkable job of distinguishing
itself from the pack. However, as the campaign progresses,
structural features -- like the festering dissatisfaction
with Governor Stroev -- could make this contest much closer
than YR's inherent advantages suggest it should be.
BURNS
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: OREL: VULNERABLE GOVERNOR CREATES OPPORTUNITIES
FOR OTHER PARTIES
MOSCOW 00000656 001.2 OF 003
--------------
SUMMARY
--------------
1. (SBU) Meetings during an early-February visit to Orel
region suggested that a variety of factors could combine to
make the March 11 regional elections very competitive.
Rumored infighting in United Russia (YR) and an unpopular
YR-affiliated governor have allowed the Communist Party
(KPRF) to remain within striking distance of the
Kremlin-sponsored United Russia party. The second
Kremlin-approved party, Just Russia, appears to be benefiting
from heavy financing and is in the race as well. Smaller
parties and independent candidates are using door-to-door
appeals in an effort to overcome the advantages of the
majors. End Summary.
-------------- ---
United Russia: Burdened by an Unpopular Governor
-------------- ---
2. (SBU) United Russia currently holds 34 out of 50 seats in
the regional legislature and aims to retain its majority in
the March 11 regional election. Although the percentages
vary, local polls show YR with a mere three percentage point
advanta'oQocal observers, is Governor
Yegor Stroev, who has been in power for over 20 years, and is
now a United Russia member. Local journalist Sergey Tyurin
claimed that Stroev is perceived as not having successfully
cultivated a relationship with President Putin, to the
detriment of the region's economy. The local electorate,
according to Tyurin, is tired of a Governor who promises, but
does not deliver.
3. (SBU) Stroev's unpopularity has reportedly led to
infighting within United Russia. United Russia leader and
First Deputy Governor Pavel Merkulov, who suffered a surprise
defeat in the 2006 Orel mayoral election, alluded to the
problems caused within the party by the Governor in telling
us that United Russia would demand "accountability" from
Stroev as it went into the elections.
4. (SBU) In a separate meeting, the NGO "Civic Resource"
President Yelena Kastornova did not think that a poor track
record necessarily complicated YR's efforts to remain on top.
Other parties were promising a lot, she said, but United
Russia would reap the benefits associated with stability. In
a February 8 meeting, Patriots of Russia Chairwoman Yelena
Krachnakova conceded that some had done well under United
Russia, but asserted that they were a minority: only twenty
percent of likely voters.
--------------
KPRF: Looking to Capitalize
--------------
5. (SBU) In the March 2006 mayoral election, Aleksandr
Kasyanov unexpectedly and narrowly won on the KPRF ticket
taking 29 percent of the vote to Merkulov's 26 percent. At a
meeting with civil society and human rights activists, the
"United Europe" Institute's Dmitriy Krayukhin attributed
Kasyanov's win, despite the heavy use of administrative
resources for Merkulov, to the Governor's unpopularity and
the support of civil society activists, the press, and the
KPRF rank-and-file. While ruing the need to work with the
KPRF, Krayukhin thought it was the only option for those
wanting to create a true opposition to YR and Stroev, since
all other parties were co-opted and the "against all" option
had been removed from the ballot.
6. (SBU) Although KPRF has only five deputies in the current
regional legislature, many interlocutors in Orel described
the region as "red." They note that KPRF Chairman Gennadiy
Zyuganov is a native son and that KPRF voters are disciplined
and hence much coveted by other parties. KPRF's Vasiliy
Ikonnikov told us separately that local businesspeople who
are out of favor with United Russia were now financing the
KPRF. Many observers predicted that the KPRF as a result
would run a close second to YR in March.
--------------
A Just Russia: Bringing in the Cash
--------------
7. (SBU) Although Just Russia has negligible poll
recognition, no one doubts that it will finish a strong third
MOSCOW 00000656 002.2 OF 003
thanks to generous campaign financing. The Orel party office
during our visit was swarming with young people collecting
stacks of campaign material to distribute. Just Russia is
paying approximately USD150 per week, more than one month's
average salary, to distribute campaign materials. Just
Russia's Marina Ivashina confirmed that all financing was
coming from Moscow. Just Russia is mounting a PR campaign
that will portray YR as a party that talks, while Just Russia
"does." Tyurin suggested that Just Russia would portray
itself as close to Putin in order to win votes.
-------------- --------------
SPS: Importing Strategists...and Localizing Its Message
-------------- --------------
8. (SBU) In a February 7 meeting, Sergey Tarasov and Oleg
Repin described SPS's message in Orel as "additional money
for pensioners and those who depend on federal assistance."
SPS, buoyed by its unexpected second place finish in Perm
(where it garnered 16 percent of the votes in the October
2006 election),has brought in campaign workers from all over
Russia to get its message across. It is relying largely on
face-to-face campaigning as media access is complicated to
access and expensive. The party's goal is to win in enough
regions to effect change at the federal level.
--------------
Smaller Parties and Independent Candidates:
Door-to-Door Canvassing
--------------
9. (SBU) The ballot also features LDPR (popularly predicted
to win its "usual" 10 percent),the Democratic Party of
Russia, Patriots of Russia, People's Will, and a host of
independents on the individual candidate lists. Most of
these parties are optimistic that they will get at least one
seat. They and independent candidates are focusing their
efforts on door-to-door canvassing with the expectation that
a personal connection will instill greater confidence in
prospective voters. Independent candidate Olga Kurmova, who
is running on a platform of helping families, children, and
older people, firmly defended her ability to vote
independently should she be elected. "United Europe"
Institute's Krayukhin was more cynical about the
independents, alleging that many were actually United Russia
proxies who are fearful of being tainted by association with
the Governor.
-------------- --------------
Yabloko: Off the Ballot, but on the City Council
-------------- --------------
10. (SBU) Yabloko's Konstantin Fedotov explained that his
party had not been registered, despite collecting a
sufficient number of signatures, because its documents had
not been bound together as required by law. Fedotov claimed
that Regional Election Commission Head Anatoliy Trofimov had
been willing to overlook the requirement and accept the
signatures the next day, but was preempted when the national
daily Kommersant reported Yabloko's exclusion. Trofimov
himself told PolOff that Yabloko had not submitted its
signatures on time. Fedotov further noted that litigation
would be pointless as inevitable court delays would render
the matter moot. "United Europe" Institute's Krayukhin
dismissed the idea that Yabloko's exclusion was politically
motivated. He pointed to what he said were Fedotov's local
government ties and claimed that Yabloko in Orel was in
reality an adjunct of United Russia.
11. (SBU) Fedotov confided that the Moscow branch of Yabloko
had refused to finance the party's Orel efforts. (Fedotov is
on the City Council and hopes to raise Yabloko's profile in
the region by undertaking high profile social projects and
supporting local businesses.)
--------------
The Governor: A Liability
--------------
12. (SBU) At a February 8 meeting with civil society
activists, the consensus was that Stroev was similar to an
"oriental despot." Orel oblast had fallen behind
economically; in part, participants surmised, because Stroev
was hostage to a circle of obsequious advisors. Immediately
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Stroev had been able
to rely on federal connections to ensure that pensions and
state factory salaries were paid, and had been able to
MOSCOW 00000656 003.2 OF 003
"order" that factories be built. The governor, however, was
unable to manage the realities of today's Russia, even with a
daughter in the Federation Council.
--------------
Comment
--------------
13. (SBU) The level of dissatisfaction in the oblast has
created real opportunities for parties other than United
Russia to believe they have a chance to get into power. None
of the parties is doing a remarkable job of distinguishing
itself from the pack. However, as the campaign progresses,
structural features -- like the festering dissatisfaction
with Governor Stroev -- could make this contest much closer
than YR's inherent advantages suggest it should be.
BURNS