RUSSIA: LIBERAL PARTIES STRUGGLE TO STAY IN GAME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000644

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SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2017
TAGS: PGOV KDEM PHUM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: LIBERAL PARTIES STRUGGLE TO STAY IN GAME

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

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Summary
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1. (C) Political observers believe that the prospect of a
liberal political party winning representation in the State
Duma is slim, but statistically possible. However, local
efforts by ruling party officials to remove the
liberal-minded Union of Rightist Forces and Yabloko from some
ballots in the March regional elections have raised concerns
over the ability of these parties to compete. Party leaders
and other election watchers peg the removal of SPS from four
regional elections to a combination of machinations by
regional United Russia leaders and incompetence --or
machinations of its own-- by the SPS leadership. Observers
express more concern over the exclusion of Yabloko from St.
Petersburg, where the party is an opposition powerhouse.
While Yabloko has appealed its exclusion to the Supreme
Court, its party chief dismissed the prospect of fair
elections, told us he remained open to cooperation with
Putin's successor, vilified the Other Russia opposition, and
urged the U.S. to "leave Russia alone." The Ambassador will
continue to underscore U.S. concern over the use of
technicalities to exclude parties from the March elections
with senior GOR officials, including in upcoming meetings
with the Election Commissioner and President's Chairwoman for
Human Rights. End summary.

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Statistical Window of Opportunity
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2. (C) The United Russia-contracted Center for Political
Technologies (CPT) maintains that statistically there is
still an opportunity for a liberal "democratic" party to
cross the seven percent threshold into the Duma in December
2007, but concedes the likelihood is slim. CPT Deputy Boris
Makarenko said that recent polling data reveal that the
parameters of the Duma election remain largely the same as
three months ago: United Russia can expect to win about 40-50
percent, with the Communists securing 7-10 percent,
Zhirinovskiy pulling in around seven percent (while
capitalizing on his high popularity amid young voters, who
enjoy his entertainment value),and the new political
combination "Just Russia" attracting anywhere from 7-25
percent. Both Makarenko and ruling party spinmeister Gleb
Pavlovskiy told us that there is still room for a
"democratic" party to draw away some of those liberal ruling
party voters (who constitute up to a third of United Russia's
supporters in Moscow),who are dissatisfied with the
government's performance. In a slick briefing provided to
the Kremlin on voting scenarios, Pavlovskiy labeled the
"catastrophic" electoral outcome as one in which five parties
broke into the Duma, including a rightist party, leaving
United Russia with only 30 percent of the vote.


3. (C) Makarenko spelled out scenarios that would increase
the chance of a "liberal" win in the Duma: the unification of
SPS and Yabloko, despite bitter personality divisions at the
top; a decision by Yabloko to withdraw entirely from the
race; or a strong showing by SPS in the March regional
elections, which would add to the momentum of its
surprisingly strong second place showing in Perm in December

2006. SPS Chairman Nikita Belykh and SPS leader Boris
Nemtsov separately told us that they will make a final run at
unification with Yabloko Chairman Grigoriy Yavlinskiy
following the March elections, but were pessimistic he would
compromise. However, SPS eminence Anatoliy Chubais ruled out
any merger, telling the Ambassador that "my best friend"
Yavlinskiy "would not take yes for an answer" and had
rejected unification despite SPS ceding to all of the Yabloko
leader's terms. SPS leaders were circumspect in predicting
success in the December Duma elections, with Nemtsov
predicting that SPS would fail in its bid unassisted, or
would just reach the seven percent threshold if nudged
forward by the Kremlin. Political opposites, such as
Pavlovskiy and Ekho Moskviy Editor Vennediktov, agree that
the Kremlin -- meaning Putin -- has no objection to a liberal
party reaching the Duma.

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Being Closed by United Russia Interference?
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4. (C) SPS Chairman Belykh told us that his relations with
the Kremlin were "neutral" and downplayed speculation of a
Presidential Administration hand in manipulating the
registration of parties at the regional level. However, at a

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February 6 press conference, he explicitly traced SPS's
inability to get on the ballot for March 11 elections in the
Republic of Dagestan and the regions of Vologda, Pskov,
Samara, and Tyumen to the machinations of local authorities
in areas where the Kremlin-sponsored party United Russia (YR)
reigns. In his remarks, Belykh asserted:

-- that in Pskov region the regional electoral commission
found that two SPS candidates were allegedly members of
another party (dual membership is forbidden by law),other
candidates had submitted "incorrectly-completed" forms and,
allegedly, that several SPS candidates had withdrawn under
duress;

-- that the Samara regional election commission (REC) had
disqualified the party for "errors in documentation," without
specifying the errors (Note: The CEC subsequently overruled
the REC and reinstated SPS in Samara.);

-- that Vologda region authorities had pressured SPS
candidates into withdrawing;

-- that Dagestan SPS representative Magomed Omarmagomedov has
yet to be found since he disappeared in early January;

-- that money submitted by SPS in lieu of signature lists had
not been deposited in time to qualify the party for
participation.


5. (SBU) SPS has reportedly appealed to the relevant regional
courts in all four of the five regions and Belykh has sent a
letter urging Putin to initiate an amendment that would
prohibit the removal of registered parties from regional
ballots. (Belykh allowed that SPS employees may have sent
the deposit to the wrong bank account in Tyumen. The party
is investigating, he said.)


6. (C) In addition to interference by local YR officials,
Belykh traced SPS's difficulties in the five regions to the
efforts of YR Duma deputies Aleksandr Moskalets, Andrey
Vorobyev, and Boris Vinogradov who, he said, traveled to the
regions in order to pressure local YR pols to remove SPS from
the ballot. Belykh believed YR's heavy-handed behavior was
prompted by a fear that competition from SPS and the
recently-created "second" Kremlin party "Just Russia" could
mean that YR would not poll as well as it had predicted. YR
Chairman and Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov rejected Belykh's
allegations. Pavlovskiy reacted cynically, telling us that
Belykh was no newcomer to politics and engaged in many of the
same tactics in areas where SPS had a stronger political
structure. Golos Director Liliya Shebanova noted
even-handedly that SPS was very weak in the regions where it
had been disqualified (in contrast to Yabloko's being
stripped from the ballot in its stronghold of St.
Petersburg),with 2003 Duma returns in the five regions below
the party's countrywide average of four percent. (In 2003,
for example, SPS received only 2.1 percent of the vote in
Tyumen, where the deposit was not paid on time this time
around.)

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SPS Games; Yabloko's Grievance
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7. (SBU) In a February 7 conversation, SPS regional election
campaign manager, Duma Deputy Anton Bakov, conceded that SPS
claims were exaggerated, noting that the party had not even
transferred the deposit necessary to qualify the party for
the Tyumen elections. "We didn't have enough money to pay a
deposit everywhere," Bakov said. Belykh's press conference
comments about Tyumen were designed to put YR on the
defensive and spare his cash-short party the expense of a
campaign in a region where its chances were slight. SPS's
efforts in Dagestan had become entangled in clan politics,
Bakov said. Belykh agreed, telling us: "we picked the wrong
clan leader." Bakov was philosophical about Omarmagomedov's
disappearance, noting that "hundreds of people disappear
every year in Dagestan."


7. (C) Bakov insisted, however, that the intimidation by YR
Duma deputies of their regional confederates described by
Belykh was true. SPS could not prove that Deputies
Moskalets, Vorobyev, and Vinogradov had traveled to Pskov and
Vologda but, "in provincial Russian towns everyone sees
everything," and the deputies' presence could not be kept
secret.

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8. (C) Bakov dismissed the appeals process. If SPS gets
reinstated, he said, it will be because of "Anatoliy
Borisovich's (Chubais)" ability to cut a deal with the

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Kremlin.


9. (C) Ekho Moskvy journalist Yevgeniya Albats described
Central Election Commissioner (CEC) Aleksandr Veshnyakov,
whom she interviewed February 6, as sanguine about SPS's
problems but very disturbed about the liberal-democratic
party Yabloko's registration problems in St. Petersburg.
Foreshadowing Veshnyakov's February 8 decision to uphold the
exclusion of Yabloko, Albats noted that the Commissioner had
been "fighting for his survival" (Veshnyakov's term expires
in March and he is seeking re-appointment),and pressure may
be brought to bear on him. In a recent meeting with the
Ambassador, Federation Council International Relations
Committee Chairman Margelov, who hails from Pskov where
Yabloko was removed from the ballot, attributed the move to
the Governor's unhappiness over not being placed at the head
of the United Russia party list. The result, Margelov
maintained, was the Governor's decision to be hard on all
parties. Golos Director Shebanova and CPT Makarenko agreed
that the problems confronting Yabloko and SPS originated at
the regional level, and were not directed by the Kremlin.
However, they stressed that the failure of the Presidential
Administration to not signal forcefully that the tactical
exclusion of the rightist parties was unacceptable made it
culpable for the violations that occurred.

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Yabloko: Next Steps
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10. (C) With its appeal for reinstatement in St. Petersburg
rejected by the CEC, Yabloko is filing a appeal to the
Supreme Court. According to Moscow Yabloko Press Spokeswoman
Yevgeniya Delendorf, the court filing would be made on
February 13. Delendorf did not know when the Court would
rule, but she expected that Yabloko's final petition on the
St. Petersburg case would not be approved by the justices.
If so, Yabloko would feature on the ballots in Komi,
Krasnoyarsk, Murmansk, and Tomsk regions.

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Yavlinskiy Defiant, but Open to GOR Partner
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11. (C) In a recent meeting, Yavlinskiy dismissed the
upcoming election cycle as a cynical exercise, described his
participation as a humanitarian gesture to his party staff
and their families, and said that "like an old circus horse"
his party would perform in the elections -- if only to retain
the habits of democracy. Yavlinskiy lashed out at the Other
Russia opposition, arguing that they were "100 percent
responsible" for creating Putin's Russia, since their
accommodation of Yeltsin's undemocratic policies fatally
compromised the development of institutions in post-Soviet
Russia. Venting at the collection of oppositionists under
the Other Russia tent, Yavlinskiy called them "liars and
thieves, who are romancing nationalists and fascists."
Despite his denunciation of Putin, Yavlinskiy held out the
possibility of ultimately compromising with his successor, if
there were any indications that the next Russian president
was prepared to return to a more democratic path. As for the
appropriate U.S. role in encouraging democracy in Russia,
Yavlinskiy responded that America should "leave Russia alone"
and, alluding to Iraq and Abu Ghraib, "put its own house in
order."

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Comment
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12. (C) The cumulative amendments to the electoral law make
it easy for political parties to be excluded from
participation on technicalities, and the developments of the
last several weeks have underscored that regional leaders
have sought recourse to the legislation to remove rivals from
the ballot under dubious circumstances. The Ambassador has
raised this issue repeatedly in meetings with the senior GOR
leadership and will do so again in upcoming meetings with the
Election Commissioner and the President's Chairwoman for
Civil Society and Human Rights, underscoring our particular
concern over the removal of Yabloko from the St. Petersburg
March ballot.
BURNS