KOSOVO: SPECIAL ENVOY WISNER HEARS RUSSIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000628

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: SPECIAL ENVOY WISNER HEARS RUSSIAN
OPPOSITION TO KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Fresh from meetings in Pristina, Belgrade and
Vienna, Special Envoy for Kosovo Final Status Frank Wisner
held consultations in Moscow on February 9 to gauge Russian
opinion on Kosovo's independence and emphasize the need for
Contact Group unity. In meetings with DFM Titov (septel),
lawmakers, think tank experts and former Prime Minister
Yevgeniy Primakov, Wisner met a chorus of Russian opposition
to a settlement lacking Belgrade's consent. END SUMMARY.

KOSACHEV: NO DUMA SUPPORT FOR AHTISAARI
--------------


2. (C) Duma International Relations Committee Chairman
Konstantin Kosachev listened carefully to Wisner's argument
for continued U.S. and Russian cooperation in securing UNSC
endorsement of the Ahtisaari plan, but in a long rebuttal
outlined GOR grievances over the process and proposed
outcome. In 1999, he stressed, there was no agreement on an
independent and sovereign Kosovo, and Kosachev blamed the
West for conflating Milosevic's sins with the fate of Serbia.
The West, he claimed, seized on Kosovo as a mechanism for
foiling Milosevic, and by making Serbs "the bad guys" arrived
at the pretext for Kosovar Albanian independence: Kosovo
independence was the outcome of the U.S. "political project"
to oust Milosevic. The Duma did not support a solution
driven by an artificial timeline, and Kosachev pointed to
Cyprus as a precedent for delay. Kosachev termed Ahtisaari's
diplomacy a "show," designed to demonstrate that the UN
Special Representative was backed into a corner by Serbian
obstinacy. There was no good reason, Kosachev concluded, to
force the Serbs to accede, and the West had failed to
persuade the Serb leadership that its future was without
Kosovo.


3. (C) Kosachev elaborated on Duma concerns over the Kosovo
precedent, noting that Western arguments of its unique status
were unconvincing, particularly to leaders from the "frozen"
territories. "These people will use and abuse the Kosovo
situation for their own purposes." While the Abkhaz were
threatened militarily by Georgia, the Kosovars faced no
military threat from Serbia, which Kosachev said proved that
there was no need to rush to international judgment.
Kosachev emphasized that UNSCR 1244 was accepted by the Serbs
because it recognized the country's territorial integrity.
Along the way, the international community changed the rules
of the game, symbolized by the abandonment of the "standards
before status approach." Kosachev noted his visit to Serbian
settlements in Kosovo, highlighting the fears of the minority
population. Noting his invitation to Kosovar PM Ceku to
visit Moscow and their subsequent positive discussions in
December 2006, Kosachev argued that there was time to achieve
standards first.


4. (C) Kosachev pointed to Serbian government initiatives
to enhance economic development in Kosovo, reiterating that
there were solutions other than independence. Kosachev
sketched out three possible scenarios: Russian support for
the Ahtisaari plan, which he deemed unrealistic given
Belgrade's rejection of the proposal ("I exclude this
option"); a Russian and possibly Chinese veto of the
resolution, which would leave the problem festering; or
unilateral recognition of Kosovo by small countries and then
major powers, which would force Russia to recognize Abkhazia.
The latter, he commented, would open a Pandora's box of
international conflicts that would make Kosovo look easy in
comparison.


5. (C) Wisner answered each of Kosachev's charges,
highlighting that Milosevic's actions -- and not a Western
conspiracy -- had changed the course of history in Serbia;
Ahtisaari's plan was the product of creative diplomacy and a
Contact Group consensus that needed to be maintained; Kosovo
had made credible progress on standards, but now all
residents were the victim of uncertainty over the province's
future; under UNSCR 1244, Kosovo's future was consigned to
the international community and the EU, U.S. and Russia could
prevent its misuse as a precedent; and delay was incompatible
with the facts on the ground. Noting that Serbia could
decide its future, but could not undo its past, Wisner
reiterated the importance of U.S. and Russian leadership in
arriving at a final settlement to the Western Balkans. A
Russian veto would precipitate a crisis on the ground, and
unilateral recognition stripped the international community
of the people and resources to implement Kosovo's transition
to independence. It was time for Serbia, and the GOR, to
take the Ahtisaari medicine: it tasted bad, but was good for
the future of the Balkans. It was too late for new
architecture; too much time had passed since 1999 for new
initiatives to be launched, and Serbia had shown little

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initiative in dealing with the issue.


6. (C) Kosachev concluded that Kosovo was a zero-sum game,
whereby the United States would "win" independence for
Kosovo, while Russia was supposed to "lose" in its efforts to
defend the rights of Serbs, Abkhaz, South Ossetians, and
Transdnistrians. By asking Russia not to see the
similarities between Kosovo and Abkhazia, Russia was being
asked to "betray" the Abkhaz people. When Wisner reiterated
that this was not a zero-sum game, Kosachev answered that the
U.S. should not insist on Kosovo being unique. Wisner and
the Ambassador underscored international understanding of the
possible implications of Kosovo on the frozen conflicts, but
stressed that there were ways to address Russian concerns in
the drafting of a UNSCR resolution. Wisner concluded that
the U.S. and Russia had an obligation to maintain stability.

FEDERATION COUNCIL'S MARGELOV OFFERS CONCERNS
--------------


7. (C) In a meeting later that day, Mikhail Margelov,
Chairman of the Federation Council's International Affairs
Committee, outlined four concerns that Russia had regarding
the proposed Kosovo solution. First, the EU and NATO were
not offering enough incentives for Serbia or the Kosovo Serbs
to support the plan. "The European Union is suffering from
"expansion fatigue," and many doubt that it will actually
follow through to help Serbia." Without guarantees of
eventual incorporation and access to the EU,s labor market,
Serbia will resist. Second, any solution to the Kosovo
situation "must be 'win-win' for the U.S. and Russia. If
not, we will have an unhappy situation." Margelov said
Kosovo could be a very powerful issue in the upcoming Russian
election for the Communists, the Liberal Democratic Party,
and other nationalist parties. This would drive the centrist
parties towards this nationalist position. Third, the
solution would be easier for Russia to swallow if the
situation was made more attractive for Russian businessmen.
Ceku's recent visit to Russia had been successful when he
courted the Russian business community. Fourth, an
independent Kosovo would be an Islamic state in the middle of
Europe, a situation with which many European officials are
uncomfortable.


8. (C) Wisner thanked Margelov for his insights, and agreed
that we needed to find a solution that was in the Russian
comfort zone. Wisner reemphasized that a failed UNSC
resolution could lead to a violent situation in Kosovo, and
that NATO forces would "have their neck on the line."
History, he said, is moving us in the direction of an
independent Kosovo. He emphasized that the Ahtisaari plan
would not fracture neighboring states.

RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC ICON PRIMAKOV PREDICTS VETO
-------------- -


9. (C) Former Foreign and Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov,
now Chairman of the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
predicted the Russian Government would indeed veto a UN
Security Council Resolution that included a solution imposed
on Serbia. Emphasizing that he did not speak for the GOR and
was offering his own opinion, Primakov said the debate over
Kosovo touched on two important but not always mutually
supporting issues: territorial integrity of legitimate states
and national self-determination. Changing borders without
the consent of the affected state would open the door to
chaos, he said. Primakov predicted that if Kosovo gained
independence, the Albanian minorities of Macedonia,
Montenegro and perhaps even Greece would seek to join a new
"Albanian super state." This could lead to armed conflicts,
he said. In time, Primakov said, Albania and Kosovo would
merge.


10. (C) Wisner replied that one of the pillars of final
status was that Kosovo would not merge with other states or
regions. The international community, with a force on the
ground, could prevent that. He emphasized the need to find a
resolution now rather than later, saying that "eight years of
UN rule has created a system has led to a situation that is
coming apart." If Russia vetoed a UN Security Council
Resolution, Kosovo would likely erupt into violence. In this
case, the Security Council would meet under duress and be
forced to come up with a new resolution that would address
changed circumstances, and might be even worse for Serbia.
Wisner added that NATO forces on the ground do not want to be
put in the position of using force.

LUNCH WITH WISE MEN
--------------


11. (C) During a lunch hosted by Ambassador Burns, Wisner met

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with outspoken Kosovo commentators Aleksey Arbatov, Director
of the Center for International Security; Andrey Kortunov,
President of the New Eurasia Foundation; and Vyacheslav
Nikonov, President of Fond Politika. Wisner said Russia, the
U.S., and the EU had a responsibility to take care of
European crises. Failure in Kosovo would send consequential
signals to "mischief makers" around the world. From the U.S.
point of view, the Kosovo problem cries out for settlement.
He said the Ahtisaari proposal was the best resolution. Lack
of settlement could return the region to violence, he said.


12. (C) Arbatov and Nikonov agreed that recent Russian
sympathy for Serbia was entirely due to the 1999 U.S./NATO
bombing of Serbia, because Russians believed the Serbs were
treated unfairly. In domestic political terms, Nikonov
admitted that final status for Kosovo was not high on the
agenda for most Russians. Arbatov raised Russian concerns
over the Kosovo precedent, with Nikonov adding that the Duma
was prepared to make specific linkage between Kosovo and the
frozen conflicts. Wisner asked what would happen in places
such as Abkhazia if Kosovo became independent. Arbatov
speculated the Duma might work on a law to legally
incorporate new areas into the Russian Federation, including
those frozen conflict areas that might want union with
Russia.


13. (C) Arbatov said the best way forward was to defer
resolution indefinitely and use the time to integrate Serbia
into European economic institutions, possibly even NATO. If
Kosovo gained independence, Arbatov said, it would only
strengthen the hands of Serbian nationalists. Kortunov
stated that Serbia must not be bullied into any resolution.
He said Serbia "needed a light at the end of the tunnel" as
much as Kosovo did. Nikonov added that the protection of the
Serb minority was paramount. If the Kosovars created
problems, the Serbs would not be adequately protected,
Nikonov said. Wisner disagreed, saying a NATO force would
still be present and there would be no Albanian pogroms.


14. (C) Wisner added that Kosovo independence would not
create a perfect state, but a viable state with minority
protections and legally able to receive investment from
institutions such as the World Bank or European Development
Bank. Addressing economic incentives for Serbia, Wisner said
the door was open to Serbia, but they must walk through it.

ROUNDTABLE WITH THINK TANKERS
--------------


15. (C) Wisner capped the day of talks with a roundtable
discussion organized by the Council on Foreign and Defense
Policy, bringing together members of the Council specializing
in Kosovo. Nadia Arbatova, Director of Research Programs for
Russia in the United Europe, told Wisner that she and many of
her colleagues did not doubt that Kosovo would be
independent, but that she saw no need for an independent
Kosovo now. Many Russians feel that the Ahtisaari plan is
being rushed to the finish line for no apparent reason other
than getting it done. Wisner replied that it had been eight
years since Kosovo came under international jurisdiction, and
Ahtisaari's commission had been working for 14 months. As a
result, the international community could not be seen as
rushing to the finish line. Sergey Oznobishev, Director of
the Institute for Strategic Assessments, urged Wisner to find
a common approach, saying that if Russia falls out with the
U.S. and Europe on Kosovo, it could result in worsening
relations with the West.



16. (U) EUR/SCE cleared this cable.
BURNS