RUSSIA-GEORGIA: TINY STEPS FOR LITTLE FEET

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000599

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2017
TAGS: PREL ETRD PBTS MARR MOPS GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA: TINY STEPS FOR LITTLE FEET

REF: A. MOSCOW 405 B. MOSCOW 245

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
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1. (C) On January 22 Putin sent his ambassador back to
Georgia with fanfare. On February 5-6 the two countries held
constructive talks on restoring direct air links, with other
talks soon to begin on restoring sea freight connections.
The newly re-staffed Russian embassy in Tbilisi includes visa
officers, though only Putin can give the go-ahead to start
issuing visas again. Russia has softened its hard tactical
line on Abkhazia (Georgian forces in the Upper Kodori Valley)
and South Ossetia (favoring direct one-on-one talks between
Georgia and the separatists). The Russians are happy that
Georgian rhetoric toned down after outspoken DefMin
Okruashvili was sacked. Georgia has also rescinded onerous
procedures Okruashvili instituted for the transit of Russian
personnel and military overflights. However, rolling back
unilateral Russian sanctions and taking small steps elsewhere
do not comprise a Russian rapprochement with Georgia, nor are
they meant to. Rather, Russia's all-stick-no-carrot tactics
failed to produce results, and Putin is pulling back to give
Russia more room for tactical maneuver with Georgia. End
Summary.

"My President Follows These Issues Very Closely"
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2. (C) On January 18 President Putin summoned to the Kremlin
his Ambassador to Tbilisi, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, who had been
languishing in a corner of the MFA since he left Georgia last
September. Russia had recalled Kovalenko to protest the
detention of Russian servicemen on espionage charges -- the
first action in a series of harsh sanctions and a press
campaign against Georgia and Georgians. Now, with cameras
rolling in the Kremlin, Putin was making a point of sending
Kovalenko back to Tbilisi. Kovalenko arrived January 22.


3. (C) Russia then began a further series of small steps.
Productive Civil Aviation negotiations took place in Moscow
February 5-6 on resumption of direct air links. As a result,
only one issue remains outstanding -- Georgian payment of
debt owed for non-payment of air navigation fees. The
Georgians agreed in principle to pay, according to MFA 4th
CIS Department Principal Deputy Director Dmitriy Tarabrin,
but wanted to have agreement on the debt's value before
signing the protocol. A second round will be held in Tbilisi
at the end of February. Also scheduled for February are
negotiations on resuming sea freight links, and postal links
are expected soon as well.


4. (C) All this, according to Tarabrin, is part of the "plan"
for relaxing sanctions approved by Putin. Tarabrin said that
even had the Georgians wanted to sign the air links protocol,
the Russians would not have been ready -- because they need
Putin's personal approval to proceed with each step after all
the problems and technical underbrush are cleared away. "I
am revealing no great secret," Tarabrin said, "if I tell you
that our President takes a close interest in these issues."
Tarabrin noted that visa issuance to Georgians, suspended
last September, will also resume -- but only when Putin
himself gives the order.


5. (C) Putin is also clearly behind the MFA's new flexibility
on "frozen conflicts." 4th CIS Department Director Kelin
signaled on January 31 that Russia was dropping its previous
demand that all Georgian forces withdraw from the Upper
Kodori Valley, which Russia had previously held was mandated
by UNSCR 1716 (Ref. A). Now, Kelin said, an Interior
Ministry force could stay as long as the presence was reduced
enough to preclude offensive action against Abkhazia -- he
said 200 would be acceptable to Russia vice the 500 there
now. Kelin also made no mention of previous Russian demands
for withdrawal of the Georgian-backed "Abkhaz
Government-in-Exile," which now administers Upper Kodori for
the Georgian Government. Tarabrin clarified on February 7
that Russia has been reassured by the success of joint
UNOMIG/PKF patrols in Upper Kodori. However, Russia (and the
Abkhaz) are still bothered by the "G-i-E" in expectation that
Georgia will try to drag it into the negotiating process as
equivalent to the de facto separatist authorities, a move
that could cause negotiations to collapse, in his view.
Tarabrin emphasized that only the separatists -- and not the
"G-i-E" -- are recognized as a party to the negotiations.
(This is probably behind the Russian insistence that
separatist Abkhaz "FM" Shamba travel to the UN.)


6. (C) On South Ossetia, Russian negotiator Yuriy Popov told
us February 2 that Russia will not object to direct

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one-on-one dialogue between Georgian negotiator Antadze and
his South Ossetian interlocutor Chochiyev. Russia had
previously opposed the idea, and even now was dropping its
objections only partially. In Russia's view, the dialogue
could not be in the "Authorized Delegations" format requested
by Tbilisi, but rather as a dialogue between two Co-Chairs of
the Joint Coordinating Commission, the current negotiating
format that Georgia wants to change. The dialogue must not
deal with certain issues such as police and security, but
should rather concentrate on issues such as preparing for a
meeting between President Saakashvili and South Ossetian
separatist leader Kokoity.

But There is a Limit
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7. (C) Georgian Ambassador to Russia Irakli Chubinishvili
took note of the Russian steps, as well as the virtual
cessation of deportations of Georgians. On the Georgian
side, he had personally been involved in taking some small
steps such as canceling the onerous requirements imposed by
former DefMin Okruashvili on Russian overflights of military
planes en route to Armenia -- all paperwork to be translated
into Georgian, advance notice beyond that required by
agreement, etc. He was also involved in the Russian request
that the Georgian government give Russia the building once
used as the headquarters of the Group of Russian Forces in
the Transcaucasus and later by the Georgian Ministry of
Defense (which has since moved out). The Russians want the
building to be their grand new Embassy in Tbilisi.


8. (C) But these steps do not necessarily herald a thaw,
Chubinishvili told us. There is no sign that the Russians
are preparing to roll back their serious economic sanctions
-- the bans on mineral water, Georgian wine, and all
agricultural products; and the closure of the one legal land
border between Russia and Georgia. If the bans on water and
wine are lifted, he said, it will be entirely due to Russian
internal dynamics (brand loyalty, nostalgia, maneuvering
among distribution companies, and -- in the case of Borjomi
water -- connection with oligarchs Badri Patarkatsishvili and
Boris Berezovskiy) rather than to rapprochement with Georgia.
The border closure will maintain friction over Russia's WTO
membership; Georgia retains its bilateral objection to Russia
over Russia's maintenance of open borders with separatist
entities without Georgian customs presence.


9. (C) Rather, Chubinishvili said, he expects a "quiet" 2007,
with few further developments. He also expects a "difficult"
2008, owing to elections in both Russia and Georgia. But he
warned that Abkhazia could prove a flashpoint. He believed
that Russia and Georgia have achieved a symmetrical but
dangerous stand-off: Russia will recognize Abkhaz
independence if Georgia attempts to use force against
Abkhazia; conversely, Georgia will use armed force if Russia
recognizes Abkhaz independence. This is a not entirely
stable balance, he warned, because the situation in Gali
(Abkhaz controlled but ethnically Georgian) is deteriorating.
The Georgian farmers are emboldened. In previous years,
they bore with resignation the rapine -- by Abkhaz and
Georgian mafias alike -- of the mandarin and hazelnut
harvests, their main cash crops. Not any more.
Chubinishvili believes the Georgian farmers were behind
recent murders of Abkhaz officials (which took place during
mandarin season).

Comment
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10. (C) In our view, Putin has decided that Moscow's
all-stick-no-carrot policy has left the Kremlin with no room
for maneuver: it has used up all its levers without gaining
any leverage. This is far from heralding a thaw, as Putin's
ire with Saakashvili is not likely to be slaked so quickly.
Nor do Russia's softer positions on frozen conflicts
represent a desire to resolve them, or at least to resolve
Abkhazia. As we reported in Ref B and previously, Russia's
maneuvers on the conflicts are aimed at preserving the status
quo, and we do not believe that has changed. What has
changed is the tone of the discourse, and that could lead to
reduced threat of conflict, as well as to some useful steps
forward on less sensitive issues.


BURNS