DEMARCHES ON POTENTIAL S-300 SALE TO IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005971

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2017
TAGS: PREL IR RS
SUBJECT: DEMARCHES ON POTENTIAL S-300 SALE TO IRAN

Classified By: DCM Daniel Russell for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: In response to multiple demarches from the
DCM, senior MFA officials have alluded to, but not confirmed
a potential sale of the S-300 air defense system to Iran
based on an unspecified contract which predated UNSCR 1737.
When challenged that a Russian Government agency has publicly
stated that an S-300 sale is not now taking place or under
consideration, the MFA officials implied that the public
statement was accurate today, but might not be in the future.
MFA officials refused to be pinned down on a timetable for a
potential sale or delivery. It was clear from the
conversations that the Russians believe Iran made this
potential sale public at this time to tweak the U.S. In any
event, the MFA officials reiterated that the S-300 was a
defensive weapons system and its transfer would not violate
international sanctions regimes. They also claimed that the
U.S. should not haven been surprised since President Putin
referred to an existing S-300 contract with Iran in a
December 2006 telephone conversation that preceded UNSCR

1737. End Summary.


2. (C) On December 27, the DCM raised U.S. objections to the
transfer of the S-300 air defense missile system to Iran with
MFA Security Affairs and Disarmament Department Director
Anatoliy Antonov, in the absence of Deputy Foreign Minister
Kislyak. The DCM reiterated our concern that the supply of
this system would undercut the objectives of UNSCR 1737 and
increase risks to coalition assets in the region. Antonov
acknowledged our multiple approaches about longstanding
concerns on the transfer of this weapons system to Iran, but
said:

-- The U.S. should have not been surprised by news of a
possible Russian sale of S-300s to Iran: "We're not trying to
hide anything from you." Antonov claimed that President
Putin had mentioned an existing contract with Iran with the
President in a call months ago.

-- The S-300 is defensive in nature. Antonov acknowledged
the S-300 was indeed a relatively sophisticated system, but
argued it had no offensive capability; therefore, it was not
destabilizing. Acknowledging UNSCRs and shared goals
vis-a-vis Iran's nuclear program, Antonov nonetheless
reiterated the legalistic view that the transfer of a
defensive conventional arms system violated no international
sanctions regime.


3. (C) Antonov did complain that he did not understand why
the Iranians had chosen to make the sale public at this time,
"except to tweak Washington." On the timing of a potential
S-300 sale or delivery, Antonov would not be pinned down,
saying only that it was not imminent.


4. (U) Later the same day (December 27),Russia's Federal
Military-Technical Cooperation Service (FSVTS) publicly
denied the existence of current plans to supply Iran with the
S-300. The FSVTS statement read, "the delivery of S-300
systems to Iran, which has arisen in the press, is not
currently taking place, is not being considered, and is not
being discussed at this time with the Iranian side." (FSVTS
is formally responsible for military-technical cooperation
and reports through First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov
to the President; FSVTS's current relationship with
Rosoboronexport is unclear, following the latter's
subordination to the Military Industrial Commission in 2006.)


5. (C) On December 28, DCM again raised the S-300 transfer
separately with Antonov and with MFA North America Department
Director Neverov, pointing out the obvious contradictions
between Antonov's initial private comments and the subsequent
FSVTS public statement. Antonov stated that he stood by what
he had said the previous day. On the FSVTS statement, he
said that it must be read "carefully" pointing to the present
tense and use of the "current." Antonov refused to be pinned
down on any details or any timeframe for a forthcoming S-300
sale or delivery.


6. (C) DCM delivered our points separately to Neverov, who
clarified to which presidential telephone call Antonov had
referred. The call took place on December 23, 2006. Neverov
claimed that, in response to the President's request for
Russian support of draft UNSCR 1737, Putin said Russia would
be ready to support 1737, but pressed for an understanding
that the resolution would cover contracts signed after its
adoption but not before. Neverov claimed that Putin
specifically referred to an existing contract on S-300s for
Iran, stating that there had been no deliveries yet, but that
if things went well, in terms of both relations with Iran and
managing its nuclear aspirations, Russia would proceed and be
within its full rights to do so.


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7. (C) Comment: Beyond the presumptions that the Iran's S-300
announcement surprised Moscow and FSVTS did not bother with
interagency coordination before going public, the Russian
Government's lack of clarity does not inspire confidence. We
tend to doubt that Antonov, one of the MFA's senior arms
control/arms sales experts and most careful diplomats, would
get his facts wrong with us on this sensitive issue. Our
assumption is that there is an existing umbrella contract for
S-300 deliveries, but the timing of a sale and delivery has
not yet been worked out.
RUSSELL