Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5869
2007-12-19 15:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

GOR EFFORTS TO ADVANCE MULTIPOLAR WORLD IN

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #5869/01 3531509
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191509Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5924
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4341
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY 0315
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1144
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005869 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON RS
SUBJECT: GOR EFFORTS TO ADVANCE MULTIPOLAR WORLD IN
RUSSIA-INDIA-CHINA PARTNERSHIP

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for
reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005869

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON RS
SUBJECT: GOR EFFORTS TO ADVANCE MULTIPOLAR WORLD IN
RUSSIA-INDIA-CHINA PARTNERSHIP

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for
reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. Summary: While Russian officials view the October
ministerial in Harbin as a "pivotal event" in accelerating
the formation of a Russia, India, and China (RIC) triangle,
fundamental differences in strategic vision, mutual distrust,
and differing relations with the U.S. significantly limit
Russia's ability to make RIC an important component of FM
Lavrov's multipolar world. While Russia will continue to
play all angles in checking perceived American unilateralism,
RIC appears to be more about process than substance and a
poor substitute for Moscow's lack of long-term strategic
vision, especially vis-a-vis China. End summary.

RIC Ministerial in Harbin a "Pivotal" Event
--------------


2. (C) Dmitry Zhirnov, China Desk Deputy Chief and MFA
Troika specialist, underscored that the October ministerial
in Harbin, China, was a "watershed moment" in the development
of RIC. Although RIC foreign ministers have met on seven
previous occasions since 2002, the Harbin ministerial was the
first time the foreign ministers gathered only to discuss
trilateral cooperation.


3. (C) Zhirnov said that RIC foreign ministers made a
decision in Harbin to shift from "pure rhetoric to concrete
cooperation, but spelled out an agenda that was long on
process but short on substance:

-- Establish a coordination mechanism: RIC foreign ministers
agreed to establish a coordination group at the MFA working
level (department director) that would meet "frequently" to
prepare for ministerials and monitor the implementation of
decisions on specific issues. The coordination mechanism
also aims to establish common approaches and strategies for
the "democratization" of international affairs and the
achievement of greater respect for international law and
collective action. Zhirnov conceded that the coordination of
views on issues of global concern would largely be confined
to the issuance of general statements, but maintained that
Russia would nonetheless use this group to highlight and
promote the need for greater multilateral diplomacy.


-- Collaborate on concrete projects: the relevant ministries
of each country will meet regularly to develop specific
proposals for further cooperation in the spheres of
agriculture, emergency situations, and public health. Also,
academics and business leaders from each country will
continue to meet regularly to deepen the cultural and
economic ties. Moscow recently hosted an "academic circle"
on possible ways to advance RIC, and New Delhi plans to host
a conference on regional investment projects for
entrepreneurs in December.

-- Strengthen cooperation with SCO: the foreign ministers
underscored the importance of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) in the context of addressing the
challenges in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Although India
is an official observer in the SCO, Zhirnov said the Indian
foreign minister agreed India would work with Russia and
China in the SCO as if it were a "de facto member" to tackle
the resurgence of the Taliban and violent extremism, drug
trafficking, and political instability in Afghanistan.


4. (C) MFA International Institutions Section Chief Timur
Avyazov and MFA North America Department multilateral
cooperation specialist Mark Rybakov acknowledged that Russia
is the "catalyst" in RIC -- and in the less-developed
Brazil-Russia-India-China (BRIC) partnership initiative.
However, they insisted that China and India similarly view
RIC as a project with "strong potential." In economic terms
alone, the combined economic activity of the three countries
represents 24.4 percent of the world GDP (China makes up 15.5
percent of this figure).

American "Unilateralism" Tops RIC Agenda
--------------


5. (C) Despite MFA protestations that RIC is not
anti-American and that the U.S. was not mentioned during the
Harbin ministerial, Zhirnov acknowledged that "everyone in
the room knew what country we were talking about." Zhirnov
said that a fundamental concern of Russia, China, and India
continues to be the "unilateral" U.S. approach to foreign
affairs, and RIC emerged in part as a response to this common
concern.


6. (C) Leading experts such as MGIMO Vice Rector Aleksey

Bogaturov agree that the "glue" in RIC is the "anti-American
factor." Analysts tell us that the perceived reluctance of
the U.S. to accept Russia as an equal member of the "club"
has prompted Russia to seek stronger political ties with
India and China, if only "as an insurance policy" against
further deterioration in relations with the West. Economic
interdependence and the sweeping trends of globalization
preclude the possibility of a sever in ties between Russia
and the West, but analysts say fundamental disagreements over
political and security-related issues have "forced" the GOR
to show the U.S. and EU that Russia "has options." In this
respect, RIC, much like SCO, the Cooperation and Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO),and other regional groupings
serve as a "signal" that the U.S. cannot continue to encroach
on Russian national and strategic interests -- particularly
in Russia's neighborhood -- without facing some kind of
reaction.

...And There Isn't Much Else There
--------------


7. (C) There is little reason to believe that the ground
realities that doomed former Prime Minister Primakov's
Russia-India-China "triangle" have changed, with most experts
assessing that the current version of RIC remains a moribund
project. Concern over U.S. foreign policy on certain issues
is hardly a worthwhile rallying call and it is doubtful that
Russia will be able to push China and India into a
Moscow-driven strategic partnership. There are at least
three fundamental obstacles to further development of
Russia's RIC concept:

-- Differences in strategic vision: Russia in Global Affairs
Editor Fedor Lukyanov told us that India, China, and even
Russia recognize U.S. leadership on key foreign policy
concerns, but, unlike Russia, China and India have little
desire to take on the responsibilities and commitments of a
global power. New Eurasia Foundation President Andrey
Kortunov added that there is still a significant gap between
the aspirations and capability of Russian foreign policy;
India and China, if only for historical reasons, do not have
this problem.

-- Competition versus cooperation: Even MFA officials agreed
that the degree of distrust between China and India is
considerable and acknowledged the "regrettable but intense"
competition between Russia and China for resources and
influence in Central Asia. Several analysts, including
IMIMO's Sergey Oznobishov and Council for National Strategy's
Stanislav Belkin, argued that, despite the rhetoric, Russia
views China as more of a long-term threat than the U.S.
Accordingly, the GOR aims to use RIC as a mechanism for
keeping Russia's "enemy" close to its side.

-- Bilateral relationships with the U.S.: Perhaps most
importantly, Russian analysts posit that each member of RIC
values its bilateral relationship with the U.S. more than
their trilateral relationship. The MFA told us that the GOR
is fully aware that China and India remain unwilling to
sacrifice their political, economic, and (especially with
India) security relationships with the U.S. Bogaturov and
analyst Vitaly Portnikov added that although Russian leaders
would never admit it, the GOR will not take any serious step
to undermine Russia's long-term ties with the U.S.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Russian's oft-repeated calls for the "democratization
of international relations" and the recognition of multiple
poles in international affairs are primarily an expression of
Russia's deep dissatisfaction with the perceived unequal
relationship with the West. At best, the RIC concept is a
continuation of Russia's diplomatic tradition to play all the
angles: develop closer relations with anybody and everybody,
especially those not firmly tied to the West. In its efforts
to counterbalance the U.S. and Europe, Russia's approach to
both RIC and SCO seems short-sighted; the long-term rise of
China could easily lead to these two organizations being
driven from Beijing rather than Moscow.
BURNS