RUSSIAN ELITES AHEAD OF RULING PARTY CONFERENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005825

SIPDIS

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL ECON RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ELITES AHEAD OF RULING PARTY CONFERENCE

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: A cross-section of establishment analysts
and Putin critics approach the ruling party's December 17
convention convinced that it is time for liberals, the
Kremlin, and the West to come to grips with the changed
political landscape following the December 2 Duma elections.
With traditional liberalism in its death throes, they posit a
need for the Kremlin to reform itself and reverse a pendulum
that has swung too far in favor of state authority, with the
West forced to confront the reality of Putin's popularity and
the limits of western criticism. While there is talk of
intra-party reform, a recommitment to market reforms, and an
endorsement of party debate at the convention, it's difficult
to foresee the additional "surprises" hinted at by Putin,
given his preemptive endorsement of Medvedev for the
presidency on December 10. End Summary

Challenges posed by Liberalism's Defeat
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2. (C) Despite the election day irregularities, reported
upon widely in the Russian print media and internet,
establishment analysts and even critics of the government
argue that liberals, the Kremlin, and the West all need to
move on and come to grips with the decisive Putin win and new
political landscape. Liberals, Ekho Moskvy Editor Aleksey
Venediktov argued, will have to recognize that their
brand-name parties cannot be reconstituted and their 90's-era
leaders are "spent forces." The ruling party, he noted,
successfully usurped the platform of economic liberalism,
leaving opposition parties that traditionally championed
market reform (SPS) saddled with the public's neuralgia over
anything associated with the 1990's period of transformation
and deprivation. A former adviser to Gorbachev, Aleksandr
Tsipko agreed, describing those liberals championed by the

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West as "foreigners in their own country" and a "subculture
of perestroika," whose disdain of Russian patriotism and the
resurgence of Russian Orthodoxy alienated them from the
public. Nonconformism, editor of the independent
Nezavisimaya Gazeta Konstantin Remchukov concluded, was
decisively rejected by Russia's middle class.


3. (C) Surprisingly, many saw the defeat of traditional
liberals as creating a new challenge for the Kremlin, which
will have to be sensitive to the approximately ten million
"disenfranchised" voters (i.e., those who cast votes for
opposition parties that did not cross the threshold into the
Duma) and alert to the changing expectations of the average
Russian. Tsipko, who lectures across Russia, underscored
that the value placed on "freedom" remains very high, with
university students and the Kremlin-sponsored Nashi youth
supporters surprisingly critical of Putin's policies. Ruling
party loyalists are sensitive to the charge that the pendulum
has swung too far, with Duma Constitutional Committee
Chairman Pligin among those arguing (along lines similar to
the presidential candidate Dmitriy Medvedev) that an
over-reliance on state capitalism is dangerous and needs to
be checked by a more activist Duma. Indeed, at the December
11 session of the Chamber of Trade and Industry, Putin
himself underscored that he had no intention to create state
capitalism and gave his support to a slow transition into
private hands, once those companies become more competitive
on world markets. Kremlin-loyal analyst and Public Chamber
member Andrannik Migranyan joked that the Kremlin had made a
liberal out of him: while the re-establishment of state
authority was essential, it had gone too far. Because
liberals were marginalized and preoccupied with their
internecine battles with one another, Migranyan posited that
reform would have to come from within the ruling party.


4. (C) The challenge for the West, this group of analysts
told us, was to appreciate Putin's popularity, the
indifference of the Russian voter to the western critique of
the Kremlin, and the need to define priorities in the
bilateral relationship. Remchukov, who faces continuing GOR
pressure in the wake of the arrest of his deputy editor,
nevertheless stressed that Putin is the most popular of any
G8 leader: "the Russian people voted with their heart."
Efforts by the West to influence Russian internal politics,
he stressed, would fail and be greeted with extreme cynicism.
Pligin, whose image as a ruling party liberal does not
diminish his loyalty to the Kremlin, took exception to the
U.S. criticism of the Duma elections, arguing that Russians
wanted and voted for a stable and economically developed
country. Their "deep patriotism" and "real stress" over the
role of Russia in the world and its neighborhood were factors
that played a significant role in Putin's win. Remchukov and
others urged the U.S. to prioritize its relations; while
differences should be expressed, battles should be chosen
carefully.
Reform Starts in the Ruling Party
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5. (C) Ruling party moderates are hoping for intra-party
reforms to be jump-started at the December 17 conference,
which is expected to be dominated by the formal nomination of
Medvedev as presidential candidate. Pligin told us that the
party needed to move beyond being a vehicle for bureaucrats
and businessmen, and to develop a coherent, ideological
identity. While the political tack during the Duma elections
had been leftward, with populist gestures and sops to
pensioners, Pligin said United Russia would have to re-stake
its claim to market reforms and to broaden the space for
political debate. Pligin's partner in generating reform
proposals, Expert Editor Valeriy Fadeyev, said strengthening
the party would be a key instrument in ensuring the evolution
of other democratic institutions. According to Fadeyev and
Remchukov, one measure under consideration is a party
commitment to open debate until a final decision is reached
(perhaps in an overt move to overcome Duma Speaker Gryzlov's
oft-quoted and -derided statement that "the Duma is not a
place for discussion"). While many are predicting a
significant cabinet reshuffle, Venediktov insists that it
will occur in the New Year, once the constellation around
Medvedev becomes clearer.

Any Convention Surprises?
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6. (C) While Putin hinted to the Mexican Ambassador at a
recent accreditation ceremony to expect more surprises at the
United Russia party conference, it's difficult to predict
what other pronouncements might trump his December 10
selection of Medvedev as designated heir. Party leaders want
Putin and/or Medvedev to join United Russia (and would
welcome a splashy December 17 announcement),ending the
tradition of Russia's leaders being disassociated from the
putative vehicles that bring them to power and perhaps
heralding an evolution to Duma-endorsed appointments of prime
ministers. Just Russia leader Aleksandr Babakov told us
that, while desirable over the long-term, Russia was not
ready for this democratic leap yet. Several analysts
speculated that Putin might reiterate his call for
constitutional changes, lengthening the presidential term
from four to five years and delinking the Duma and
presidential elections, but those would hardly be
earth-shaking. He has ruled out publicly the redistribution
of powers between the president and prime minister. The
prospect of multiple Kremlin candidates running for the
presidency has receded with Putin's firm endorsement of
Medvedev, which has been echoed by the three mini-parties of
power (Just Russia, Civil Forces, and Agrarian Party).


7. (C) One other possible, but smaller surprise would be a
large-scale re-shuffling of the party cadres. The United
Russia website announced that the congress would deal with
questions of staffing -- the "rotation" of cadres in the
General Committee, as well as the leadership of regional
contingents -- and the appointment of head of the party's
Duma faction and Speaker. Although the party leadership is
recommending Boris Gryzlov hold those offices, the
possibility exists for "liberals" like Pligin and others to
take on a more prominent role.

Comment
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8. (C) The Embassy will attend the United Russia conference
on Monday, which kicks off in the late afternoon and wraps up
by early evening. No one discounts Putin's ability to
surprise, but as we move through the formal processes leading
to the certification of potential presidential candidates by
December 23, the room for maneuver is narrowing.

BURNS