U.S., RUSSIA, AND EUROPEAN COOPERATION: FIRST WE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005824

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS: PREL KV EU OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: U.S., RUSSIA, AND EUROPEAN COOPERATION: FIRST WE
NEED TO REMOVE OBSTACLES

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary. MFA European Cooperation Director Ryabkov
offered only partial reassurance on prospects for cooperation
on European issues after a "stormy" round of international
meetings, including strong disagreements on Kosovo and the
OSCE. The MFA expected similar restrictions to be placed on
ODIHR's monitoring of the March presidential elections, which
would meet Russia's technical commitments but continue to
demonstrate Russia's objections to ODIHR's autonomy. Ryabkov
told us the GOR had decided not to link support for the OSCE
mission in Afghanistan with dialogue on reforming ODIHR. He
reiterated Russian opposition to a Georgian MAP, and
expressed alarm at recent GOG comments to "resolve" the
situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia-Poland
bilateral relations delivered a breakthrough with agreement
to lift the Russian ban on Polish meat, which the MFA hoped
could invite new consideration of Poland's veto of PCA
negotiations with the EU. End Summary.

ODIHR, Elections, and Near-Misses on Afghanistan
-------------- ---


2. (C) In a December 13 meeting, MFA European Cooperation
Director Sergey Ryabkov told us the GOR position on election
observers for the March presidential elections would be
mirror the Duma elections: Russia would fully and completely
honor its international commitments according to Russian
legislation. He did not envision any change, especially in
the light of developments at the OSCE ministerial, and noted
that "everyone stands where everyone stood." He noted that,
technically, accrediting one observer would meet Russia's
international commitments to accept a "reasonable amount" of
monitors, and GOR limits on numbers and duration were to be
expected. He told us the GOR had not been in touch with
ODIHR Ambassador Strohal regarding the presidential
elections, but had been in communication with Finland, the
incoming chair of the OSCE.


3. (C) Ryabkov stressed that Russian opposition was not
focused on the issue of long-term missions but on the
principle of OSCE reform; specifically, reform of election
monitoring. He said the GOR could not tolerate an
organization where decisionmaking and criteria were opaque.
Pointing to the U.S. and 20 other delegations who spoke
against an OSCE resolution to continue discussions on ODIHR
in 2008, Ryabkov said this demonstrated OSCE "malfunctions."
We noted the Russia stance was disappointing and sent mixed
signals to other members on improving the campaign and
election day environment.


4. (C) Ryabkov informed us that the GOR had considered
establishing a direct link between supporting the OSCE
declaration on Afghanistan and ODIHR reform. In the end,
however, he said the importance of the OSCE mission to
Afghanistan, and a sound and balanced text on the matter,
were in the interests of the GOR and demonstrated Russia's
willingness to cooperate. Ryabkov said the OSCE crisis was
becoming more aggravated by the year.

Kosovo
--------------


5. (C) Ryabkov reiterated Russian opposition to EU and U.S.
attempts to persuade the SYG to use his authority to condone
a ESDP mission based on UNSCR 1244. He noted the December 10
PPC meeting had focused almost entirely on Kosovo, and had
not just been an exchange of notes, but "rounds" of
increasingly emotional arguments. The GOR would continue to
press for the one-year extension of OMIK, conditioned on
monthly reviews (with the expectation that a UDI would lead
to its closure).


NATO Enlargement and Georgia
--------------


6. (C). Ryabkov characterized the last Lavrov-Bezhuashvili
meeting on the margins of the OSCE as "alarming," with
Bezhuashvili warning that "this was Russia's last
opportunity," and that Saakashvili would "resolve" the
situation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia "as he pleases" if
reelected. Ryabkov emphasized that NATO's offer of a MAP to
Georgia in Bucharest would worsen the already strained,
emotion-charged bilateral relations and advised the deferment
of the offer. He underscored that a Georgian MAP would not
only worsen Russian relations with Georgia (with Saakashvili
acting with "impunity," but U.S.-Russian relations as well.
Ryabkov rejected the arguments that MAP was an instrument for
continued democratic reform and transparency, but took on
board the point that both countries should work to lower the

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rhetoric and avoid miscalculations.

Positive Movement in Poland and EU Relations
--------------


7. (C) Ryabkov noted that Lavrov and Polish FM Sikorski had
a good meeting on the margins of the NATO-Russia Council, and
it was a positive sign that Sikorski was engaging personally
to improve Russia-Poland bilateral relations. Ryabkov
confirmed that at their December 12 meeting, Russian and
Polish Ministers of Agriculture made "good progress" in
gradually removing limits on the import of Polish goods,
particularly meat, milk, and apples. He also noted that
Polish PM Tusk had accepted an invitation to visit Moscow at
the end of January, preceded by a Deputy Foreign Minister.
The GOR hoped that these new dynamics would cast a new light
on the Polish veto of new PCA negotiations with the EU.


8. (C) Ryabkov said that there was progress in several areas
with the EU, including continued discussion on a visa-free
travel regime, and "Schengan" flexibility for Russian
citizens living near Kaliningrad/EU borders. The EU and
Russia have also finalized general terms to include Russia to
EU civil response efforts and capacity. He noted that while
systematic talks were continuing on WTO accession, overall,
there was "trouble" in dealing with the EU on international
issues.
BURNS