Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5796
2007-12-12 15:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

GETTING THE VOTE OUT: HOW UNITED RUSSIA PULLED OFF

Tags:  PGOV PINR KDEM PREL PHUM RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #5796/01 3461526
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121526Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5824
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005796 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM PREL PHUM RS
SUBJECT: GETTING THE VOTE OUT: HOW UNITED RUSSIA PULLED OFF
THE DUMA ELECTIONS

REF: A. MOSCOW 5432

B. MOSCOW 5548

Classified By: POL M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005796

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM PREL PHUM RS
SUBJECT: GETTING THE VOTE OUT: HOW UNITED RUSSIA PULLED OFF
THE DUMA ELECTIONS

REF: A. MOSCOW 5432

B. MOSCOW 5548

Classified By: POL M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: A comparison of electoral statistics from
the December 2 Duma elections and the previous elections in a
number of selected regions shows that United Russia's use of
administrative assets to get out an increased number of
voters made a difference in the December 2 Duma elections.
Voters for Just Russia, the Union of Right Forces (SPS),and
the Communist Party still participated but, given the huge
increase in voters for United Russia they -- with the
exception of the Communists -- received a smaller percentage
of the vote than in 2003. The additional 500,000 absentee
ballots issued counted for only a small part of the over 9
million more votes cast this time around than in 2003. This
message reviews in more detail election results in those
regions to which Embassy has traveled in the last year. End
summary.

United Russia, Communists Improve
--------------


2. (C) United Russia received substantially more than the
majority of votes in all but a few regions throughout Russia
in the December 2 Duma elections. It doubled its vote count
from just under 23 million votes in 2003 (38 percent of the
vote) to almost 45 million in 2007 (64 percent of the vote).
Of the other parties, only the Communist Party (KPRF)
increased its take, going from just under 7,650,000 votes in
2003 to around 8,100,000 votes on December 2. The increase
in United Russia votes is most certainly due to its
administrative ability to pressure people into voting, its
decision to cast the Duma vote as a referendum on Putin after
his decision to head the United Russia candidate list and
Putin's own eleventh hour appeals to voters to support United
Russia. The increase in support for the Communists shows
their success in casting themselves as the only relevant
opposition party. This contrasts to the widely-held belief
that support for the Communists among voters would wane as
the ranks of their largest constituency, pensioners who had

it better under the Soviet Union, thin out.

Some Regions Do Too Well,
Others Not Well Enough
--------------


3. (SBU) Voter participation across Russia did not vary
greatly, except in the Caucasus, where United Russia won over
90 percent of the vote and the Republic of Mordovia, where
some local precincts initially gave United Russia over 100
percent of the vote (later revised by the regional election
commission to "only" 94.5 percent). United Russia fared less
well in the Far East, the Altai territory, Moscow and St.
Petersburg (just over 50 percent) and even worse in Voronezh
and the Nenetsk autonomous districts (at or just under 50
percent). The media report that some governors and local
United Russia leaders are being held responsible for the bad
results in their regions. Turnout in the rural parts of the
Omsk region was 20 percent higher than in Omsk city and the
regional governor has blamed the mayor for failing to get out
the vote and, according to The Moscow Times, the mayor of a
village in Bashkortostan paid the ultimate price for his
election shortcomings -- he hanged himself on the eve of the
election after superiors chided him for not doing enough to
secure over 80 percent support for United Russia. Few
commentators believe that Yuriy Luzhkov and Valentina
Matvienko, the mayors of Moscow and St. Petersburg,
respectively, will pay any price for their citizens' election
choices, however.


4. (SBU) The Communists (KPRF) did best in the so-called
"red belt," polling several points above the national average
in Voronezh, Samara, and Novosibirsk. Their luck ran out in
Rostov-on-Don, where the United Russia ticket led by a
popular, long-sitting governor pulled in over 70 percent of
the vote. The KPRF ran a respectable second in Rostov with
10.3 percent of the vote (down from almost 15 percent in
2003),enough to grab one seat from the region.
Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) registered an
almost 20 percent drop in support from 2003 across Russia.
In 2003, it garnered almost 7,000,000 votes, but got only
5,700,000 in 2007. Still, it increased its number of
deputies from 29 to a projected 40 in the next Duma. As was
the case in the last election, the LDPR did best in the Far
East, reportedly getting 13 percent in the Primorskiy region
and Khabarovsk and 11 percent in Chita and Magadan. Just
Russia may have just gotten into the next Duma on the
strength of its performance in St. Petersburg (16 percent),
Astrakhan (20 percent) and Stavropol (13 percent). In the

end, Just Russia lost over 3,000,000 votes that its
constituent parties (Rodina, the Russian Party of
Pensioners/Party of Justice, and Party of Russian
Rebirth/Russian Life Party) had polled in the 2003 Duma
elections. Nationally, the Union of Right Forces (SPS) saw
its vote count drop by 72 percent. Given the higher turnout
for the December 2 election, this drop translated into a
decrease of overall voter support from 4 percent in 2003 to
only 1 percent in 2007.

Problematic Voting: A Problem?
--------------


5. (SBU) Some election observers have raised the issue of
early voting and the use of absentee ballots. While the
election violations are serious in any event, the absentee
and early numbers involved do not appear to be large enough
to affect the turnout. The number of early voters in Russia
increased 23 percent from 2003 to 2007; however even at
90,000, earlier voters account for only 0.1 percent of the
entire vote cast on December 2. Similarly, the number of
absentee ballots cast more than doubled; however, they
represent less than two percent of all votes cast. (The use
of the term "absentee ballot" is a bad translation of the
Russian term "okrepitelniy talon." Russians, with few
exceptions, can only vote on election day. They cannot mail
their ballot as U.S. citizens do, but must go to their local
election commission to receive a certificate indicating they
have been removed from the voting registry of their home
district. They can then take this certificate to any polling
station on the day of elections. If the certificate is lost
or stolen, that voter cannot vote.)

Siberia: Mostly Quiet
--------------


6. (C) In the Tomsk region, our contacts report that the
election went off without incident. Aleksandr Prokopevich,
the Deputy Editor of Tomsk Novosti, said that there had been
reports of falsified election results, but he had seen no
"facts" to support those allegations. According to CEC data,
United Russia received approximately 57 percent of the vote
in Tomsk, an increase of more than 10 percent over what the
party polled in regional elections in March 2007.
Prokopevich suggests that this resulted from Putin's decision
to be the "locomotive" for the United Russia ticket, because
Putin is more popular than even well-regarded Tomsk Governor
Kress who headed the list last March. Rural voters in Tomsk
turned out in even greater numbers in support of United
Russia -- roughly 70 percent -- whereas only around 50
percent of urban voters picked Putin's new party , an
increase of 2-3 percent. The Yabloko representative to the
regional legislative assembly, Vasiliy Eremin, viewed the
election with greater concern, seeing the use of
administrative resources (such as directing students in Tomsk
city to vote for United Russia) and the overwhelming
dominance of the "party of power" on television, as shaping
the election results. He was depressed that SPS had lost
ground in an "academic city" like Tomsk, where educated
elites have traditionally supported liberal parties. SPS in
particular suffered from direct administrative pressure,
which Eremin said had led to a drop from 7.7 percent in the
March regional elections to less than 2 percent in the Duma
election, which put it behind Yabloko. Prokopevich suggested
that many who supported the liberals earlier may have turned
their votes to United Russia, which had "delivered" on
promises of economic growth and stability that the "liberals"
had promised, but failed to deliver.


7. (SBU) Voting in other Siberian regions also proceeded
without incident, although the KPRF accusing the
administration of "stealing" votes. KPRF head Gennadiy
Zyuganov singled out the Kemerovo region in his complaints
about election procedures on December 2. In Kemerovo, the
governor is a former communist himself and the KPRF viewed
the region's coal mining towns as fertile ground. Results
there differed sharply from other Siberian regions, looking
more like those from the North Caucasus. Total turnout was
80% (compared to 60% in neighboring Krasnoyarsk, Tomsk and
Irkutsk),with 75% of the voters supporting United Russia.
The KPRF also noted problems in Krasnoyarsk Kray, describing
the election as a "triumph of administrative resources." In
the April regional elections, the Communists had won 20
percent of the vote. However, only approximately 12 percent
of Krasnoyarsk region voters checked the box for KPRF on
December 2, compared to 60% for United Russia. The KPRF
continues to protest the outcome, calling for the governor of
Kemerovo region -- as well as others -- to be removed from
power and initiating a suit with the Constitutional Court to
have the CEC invalidate the results.


8. (C) From all reports, the campaign in Irkutsk was quiet
and boring. Galina Solokina of Teleinform, a news and
information agency in Irkutsk, claimed that the outcome was
expected prior to the election. There were many political
party and international observers in the regions, and
violations were relatively few in number. United Russia
received 57 percent of the vote, lower than its national
tally of 64 percent. Altay Kray, another Siberian region,
also proved less bountiful for United Russia at 54 percent.
When we visited these regions earlier in the year, contacts
reported that Siberia supported United Russia less than the
rest of the country, a contention supported by the election
results. Solokina maintained December 6 that protest votes
in Irkutsk went to LDPR and KPRF. However, a comparison of
the election results of 2003 and 2007 suggests otherwise. In
Altay Kray and Irkutsk, all parties except United Russia saw
a decrease in the number of votes received. KPRF in Altay
Kray lost only one percent of the vote, to win a healthy 17
percent in December, while in Irkutsk all parties except
United Russia lost more than 10 percent. In both regions,
United Russia doubled its vote count.


9. (C) LDPR received 10 percent of the vote in Altay Kray
and 11 percent in Irkutsk compared with its 8 percent
national showing. In both instances, however, the vote for
LDPR was lower than the 16 percent received by the party in
both regions in 2003. The KPRF fared better in Altay Kray (a
typical red belt region) with 16 percent of the vote compared
to its showing of 18 percent in 2003. The vote for KPRF in
Irkutsk was 11 percent on December 2, slightly lower than its
national percentage and much lower than its 16 percent
showing in 2003. Even the minor parties maintained did
better in Siberia. Ten percent of the voters in Altay Kray
voted for parties that did not make it into the Duma compared
with 12 percent in Irkutsk. Nationally, only eight percent
voted for such parties.


10. (C) Aleksey Petrov from the Union of Right Forces (SPS)
described a dour mood among Irkutsk party members. SPS had
conducted its own poll two weeks before the election which
indicated up to nine percent of the respondents would vote
for the party. However, on December 2, SPS received only 1.5
percent of the vote. As a result, the leader of Irkutsk SPS
resigned with three other top leaders (including Petrov).

A Sea Change Along the Volga
--------------


11. (C) In Samara, election results demonstrated a remarkable
shift in electoral fortunes for Just Russia, SPS, and United
Russia. United Russia won just over half of the votes cast
-- a more than 20 percent increase over the March regional
elections and the 2003 Duma elections, in which the party
received around 33 percent of the vote. "Just Russia," which
did surprisingly well in the March regional election and the
Samara Mayor's race, saw its support plummet from 15 percent
to only 8.9 percent on December 2. Vladimir Zvonovskiy of
the Fund for Social Research traced United Russia's improved
fortunes to votes thrown to United Russia from the
newly-created "Green" party, which was connected to a local
oligarch, and which had received 8 percent of the vote in the
March regional elections. Also nudging United Russia's
numbers was the "Putin factor;" citizens heeding the
President's call for support. Zvonovskiy ascribed SPS's drop
in the polls, from 8 percent in March to one percent in
December, to the failure of the party's campaign, which
seemed to abandon the traditional "liberal" agenda for a more
anti-establishment tone.


12. (C) Penza Oblast's election data, particularly reports
on voting turnout over the course of the day, provide some
evidence that Governor Bochkarev used administrative
resources to "get out the vote" for United Russia. By 10:00
A.M. on election day, more than 9 percent of the population
had already voted, and by day's end more than 70 percent of
the registered voters had cast their ballots. Penza also had
a high percentage of voters who participated "outside of
their polling places," a practice that could have allowed
Russian officials to "manage" returns without independent
oversight. Semen Vaykhshtayn, the Chief Editor of Penza's
Ekho Moskvy, noted that the increased turnout was "normal,"
with the population more energized by Putin's participation
in the race. He admitted there were instances of
administrative pressure, particularly the registration of
"non-local" students in local universities to vote in Penza.
Vakhshtayn thought the results as meeting expectations, but
pointed out that the KPRF did less well than expected by 3-4
percentage points (receiving 13 percent instead of the
expected 17-18 percent). Aleksandr Esenkov of Just Russia
voiced his disappointment with the results not only of the
Duma race in which the party received only 5 percent, but

also for the regional legislature. In parallel elections on
December 2, his party barely scraped by the 7 percent
threshold to enter the regional legislature to win one seat
in the 25-member body. The KPRF won two seats, while United
Russia swept the rest.

United Russia's "Solid South"
--------------


13. (C) In Stavropol Kray, Just Russia received only
one-third of the votes it won in the March 2007 elections,
dropping from 37% to 13%, while United Russia discovered
hitherto unknown popularity by soaring from 23% to 61%. As
reported in ref a, United Russia was stung by its loss in
March (the only region where it received fewer votes than
Just Russia),and responded by removing the governor from the
party, replacing the head of the Stavropol Elections
Commission with a United Russia lawyer, and bringing in
nationally-popular figures such as Minister of Emergency
Situations Shoigu, an Olympic gold-medal wrestler, and a pop
singer to head its regional list. Shortly before the
election, the Just Russia regional list was decapitated when
local duma Speaker Andrey Utkin removed himself, citing a
desire to focus on local politics. Soon thereafter, the
regional elections commission removed head of the Just Russia
list Stavropol Mayor Dmitriy Kuzmin from the ballot for
illegal campaigning. The local prosecutor subsequently
announced investigations of Utkin and Kuzmin on separate
corruption charges and just prior to the election local media
widely reported that a search of the mayor's office had
turned up an embarrassing collection of Nazi memorabilia.
Just Russia and its predecessors had historically done well
in the region, with Just Russia's constituent party Rodina
even outpolling the KPRF in the past. The KPRF had received a
solid 14% of the vote in past elections, but pulled only 11%
on December 2.


14. (C) There were few surprises in Rostov-on-Don, where
turnout approached 70 percent and United Russia likewise
pulled in 70 percent of the vote. United Russia
representatives has promised as much during our visit there
two weeks before the election (ref b). If, as expected,
neither the governor nor the head of the local duma take up
their seats, they may be used to reward members in regions
where the party did not do as well.

Closer to Moscow, Some Variation
--------------

15 (SBU) In the Lipetsk region south of Moscow, results
tracked the national norm. United Russia saw its percentage
of the vote increase by leaps from the 2003 Duma elections in
which it received 28 percent of the vote, to a 50 percent
take in regional elections in October 2007, to the December 2
elections in which it received 63 percent. KPRF's support
dropped by nearly seven thousand voters to 13 percent of the
vote (down from 17.5 percent in the 2003 elections).
Lipetsk, unlike many regions in Russia, did not see its total
numbers of voters increase.


16. (C) Although KPRF received enough votes in Voronezh
(208,000 or 16 percent) to send two deputies to the federal
Duma, KPRF local party official Lidiya Kuznetsova said the
elections were "even dirtier and more unfair than usual."
According to Kuznetsova, local government officials were told
to ensure 65 percent for United Russia. While some districts
in the region exceeded that number, in the end 56.6 percent
of the region's vote went to United Russia. Although United
Russia received a lower percentage in Voronezh than the
national average of 64 percent, support for the party more
than doubled since the 2003 Duma elections. The biggest
loser was Just Russia, which saw its percentage of votes it
received as the "Rodina" party drop from 23.7 percent in 2003
to only nine percent in 2007.

Comment
--------------


17. (C) While not an exhaustive review of electoral
statistics, these results from regions in which we have
engaged in substantial outreach over the past year provide a
snapshot of United Russia's use of its great advantage in
local and federal administrative assets to get out the vote,
or at least its vote. A still unanswered question raised by
some observers is how in a country that demographers claim is
losing population every year, an additional 200,000 eligible
voters appeared on the rolls.
BURNS