Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5782
2007-12-11 16:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

MEDVEDEV'S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY - PUTIN

Tags:  PGOV PINR RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #5782/01 3451654
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111654Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5796
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005782 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR RS
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV'S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY - PUTIN

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (d).


Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005782

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2017
TAGS: PGOV PINR RS
SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV'S CAMPAIGN STRATEGY - PUTIN

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason: 1.4 (d).


Summary
--------------


1. (C) Less than a day after Putin came out in support of
Dmitriy Medvedev's candidacy for President, Medvedev revealed
his campaign strategy: to run on the promise of picking Putin
to serve as Premier. Endorsements of a host of regional
authorities, as well as representatives of the President's
parties United and Just Russia that followed suggest a
carefully orchestrated scheme to allow Putin to become his
own de facto successor. Now, questions remain whether Putin
will accept the offer immediately, or draw out the process
and thereby keep the political elite off balance? Could he
even decline to become Premier after Medvedev is safely
ensconced as President and opt for a less formal -- but still
controlling --- role? In any event, this scenario provides

Putin with a perfectly constitutional option for maintaining
his primacy in the political system and while continuing to
play the role of arbiter among the competing clans of Russian
politics. End summary.

He Warned Us
--------------


2. (C) If Putin says yes, it will signal the fulfillment of
his October statement that he would consider serving as
Premier if United Russia won the Duma elections and if voters
chose a capable president with whom he could work. Now that
elections to the Duma gave United Russia a constitutional
majority and Medvedev - as Putin's candidate - is effectively
guaranteed the presidency, both of those stipulations are
likely to be met by the time Putin leaves office. Should
Putin trade the presidency for the position of prime
minister, he will also uphold his promise not to amend the
constitution in order to serve a third presidential term.
There is no constitutional inhibition to Putin shifting his
seat of power. The drawbacks of the Prime Ministry may still
weigh on Putin if he drags out his decision.


3. (C) The choreography of today's announcement, which
included endorsements by United Russia Party Chair Boris
Gryzlov and Just Russia Chair Mironov, and others were a sign
of careful Kremlin orchestration of Medvedev's offer.


4. (C) If Medvedev's gambit comes as a surprise, it is

because the Kremlin and Putin himself had expended
considerable energy recently in promoting the model of
"national leader" - which would allow Putin to influence
policy from his heights of popularity, with his legitimacy
refreshed by the electoral win of the United Russia party
that he led into the December 2 Duma elections. The optics
of Putin serving as Premier always struck many as odd: in a
Russian constitution weighted disproportionately in favor of
the Executive branch, the idea of Putin taking up the
"subservient" position of Prime Minister seemed
incomprehensible.


5. (C) In explaining what has changed that would make the
prospect of serving a Medvedev presidency as prime minister
appealing to Putin, Kremlin-connected analysts note the
following:

-- In terms of optics, Putin endorsed Medvedev to serve as
the joint presidential candidate of United Russia and three
other subservient parties. Medvedev remains little brother,
and Putin will oversee his confirmation at the December 17
United Russia party conference.

-- Medvedev will run on a platform of implementing "Putin's
Plan," and secure his certain victory on the strength of
Putin's popularity as head of United Russia. From the
outset, Medvedev has obligingly defined his presidency as
serving as the guarantor of Putin's policy line, stating on
December 11 that "it is necessary to continue the course that
was started at the end of the 1990s (under Putin)." "Only
with Putin as head of the executive branch, can the new
legislature and executive work effectively."

-- As leader of United Russia, Putin as prime minister would
wield a constitutional majority in parliament that could be
used to redistribute the balance of power, should his
relationship with Medvedev deteriorate over time. (Putin
could, of course, also exert the same influence simply as
party leader.)

-- Regardless of the constitution, the de facto center of
power will shift to Putin. Whether or not Putin seeks to
make that political rejiggering de jure can be contemplated
at a later date. (Experts also note that in the event
Medvedev steps down or is impeached by a Putin-dominated
Duma, Putin would automatically become acting President.)

Taking the Shine off of the Medvedev Penny
--------------


6. (C) Whereas most in the political elite had seen Putin's
endorsement of Medvedev as a "triumph" for the economic
liberals within the Kremlin over the "siloviki," today's
announcement has served to shift the focus back to Putin.
Medvedev essentially received less than one day in the
political sunshine before receding back into Putin's long
shadow. While even harsh critics of the Kremlin, such as SPS
Deputy Party Leader Gozman, Republican Party Chairman
Vladimir Ryzhkov, and columnist Yuliya Latynina, praised the
Medvedev selection as the best possible - for Russia and for
the West - the news that Putin may assume an
institutionalized role immediately reduced optimism that a
Medvedev presidency would inexorably lead to more open and
West-friendly policies.

Implications for Russian Power Balance
--------------


7. (C) The question that was raised even before the
possibility of Putin becoming prime minister surfaced was
what will the presidency look like on May 3, when Medvedev
assumes office. With Putin and Medvedev in the drivers'
seats, power will be more disaggregated than it has been to
date. Although the system will remain presidential, the
presence of a Putin protege and weak successor in the Kremlin
will mean that the key decisions will be made by Putin,
including foreign policy decisions, which have to date been
beyond the responsibility of the prime minister.


8. (C) Another dimension of the disagregatation of power is
the phenomenon of the accumulation of power in state
corporations, with considerable economic influence in the
hands of powerful players from Putin's circle -- such as Igor
Sechin at Rosneft and Sergey Chermezov at Rosoboroneksport.
Medvedev will be first among equals, but will still have to
balance competing interests with (at least initially) less
authority than Putin had, with Putin himself remaining a
critical arbiter from the vantage point of Premier.

Reactions: Preemptive Praise for Putin
--------------


9. (U) Despite the fact that Putin has yet to accept the
new post, the "loyal" elements of the political and business
elite clamored to endorse the idea of "castling" him as
Premier. First Vice Speaker of the Duma, Oleg Morozov,
applauded the idea of Putin as Premier as the final step in
creating a "party" government for the entire country, with
United Russia controlling the President's office, the
government, the legislature, and most regional
administrations. Just Russia leader Aleksandr Babakov was
among the first to suggest that Putin's selection might
trigger a formal redistribution of powers, and made the pitch
(popular among Kremlin spin-doctors) that Putin's step
(consciously or as a by-product of Russian realpolitik) could
result in a strengthening of the party as an institution.

(U) Just Russia Chairman Sergey Mironov in endorsing
Medvedev's offer described the new configuration as a "pretty
good algorithm for a future government."

(U) Deputy Chair of the Communist Party Ivan Melnikov linked
Medvedev's announcement with United Russia's strategy in the
Duma election -- rely on Putin's popularity to attract
voters. He commented that Putin's immediate reaction need
not be definitive and said it didn't make sense to try and
guess the Kremlin's game, much less discuss post-presidential
options.

(U) Director of the International Institute of Political
Analysis Yevgeniy Minchenko saw the offer as an attempt by
Medvedev, to use Putin to jumpstart his campaign. Minchenko
and Deputy Director of the Institute for Social Systems
Dmitriy Badovskiy thought that Putin's continued presence on
the political scene would still nervousness during the
transition among the elite.

What Will Putin Say?
--------------


10. (C) As of this writing, Putin has not taken up Medvedev's
offer although, at an afternoon session with members of the
Board of Directors of the Chamber of Commerce, he spoke of
the future government as if he were already Premier.
Observers were of varying opinions about what Putin's
response might be, with some opting for the President's
trademark inclination to continue the suspense, and others
assuming that Putin, who is presumably aware of the fatigue
among the elite with the continued uncertainty, guessing that
Putin will soon say "yes."

BURNS