Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5781
2007-12-11 15:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH FEDERAL COUNCIL

Tags:  PREL PGOV RS 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #5781/01 3451511
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111511Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5793
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005781 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH FEDERAL COUNCIL
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE CHAIR

REF: MOSCOW 5771

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005781

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH FEDERAL COUNCIL
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE CHAIR

REF: MOSCOW 5771

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Federation Council International Relations
Committee Chairman Margelov told visiting NSC Senior Director
Mary Warlick on December 11 that he was very satisfied with
Putin's selection of First Deputy PM Medvedev as his
successor. Margelov described Medvedev as the "best case
scenario" for Putin and Russia, stressing that Medvedev is a
loyal Putin ally, an efficient manager, has a relatively
clean past, and is unfettered by clan politics. Meeting
before Medvedev's public call for Putin to become Prime
Minister in 2008, Margelov speculated that Putin would try to
retain influence as a "national leader," but doubted the
strategy. Margelov underscored that Medvedev was also a good
choice for U.S.-Russia bilateral relations, predicting that
the sharp anti-USG rhetoric would drop and a more "positive"
foreign policy would be developed following Medvedev's
presumed inauguration. In the meantime, however, bilateral
relations would remain tense. Margelov provided his take on
the host of contentious foreign policy issues facing the U.S.
and Russia, including MD cooperation, CFE, Kosovo, Iran,
ODIHR, and Russia's neighborhood. Margelov expressed
disappointment over Liberal Group actions to block his
nomination as PACE President and confirmed his appointment of
the new GOR "Institute of Human Rights and Cooperation." End
summary.

Medvedev's Nomination, Putin's Future
--------------


2. (C) In a wide-ranging December 11 meeting with visiting
NSC Senior Director for Russia Mary Warlick, Federation
Council International Relations Chair Mikhail Margelov
expressed strong support for the Putin-led United Russia
Party's choice for presidential candidate nominee (reftel).
Margelov said that First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev was the "best case scenario" for Putin and Russia.
He characterized Medvedev as very efficient (similar to Putin
during his first term in office) and thought he would bring
fresh blood to the Kremlin. Margelov added that Medvedev is
not "handcuffed" by the siloviki or various Kremlin clans,

nor does Margelov have as "difficult a past" as others in
Kremlin's circle. Margelov said that Putin's pick of
Medvedev also gives the president the choice to remove
himself from further mediating clan disputes and focus on his
legacy and his future.


3. (C) When asked to what extent Putin will allow Medvedev
to independently lead Russia after he steps down in May,
Margelov stressed that Medvedev is and probably will remain a
loyal Putin ally. That said, Margelov noted that Medvedev
may reexamine his faithfulness to Putin after some time in
office. Margelov said that Putin has told both him and
French President Sarkozy that he remains keen on carving out
a role for himself as "national leader." However, Margelov
doubted Putin would be successful in his endeavors, noting
that Russia's political system centers around the president.
Margelov added that the Yeltsin family thought they could
manipulate Putin when he was elected president, but "we all
know what happened after the first year or so."


4. (C) Margelov expressed hope that, with the mystery
surrounding his choice for successor behind him, Putin would
use his remaining months in office to strengthen the
political institutions in Russia. Margelov noted that the
liberal parties would be wise to take advantage of this
transitional period and focus their attention on the
development and articulation of values. This way, in 10-15
years, Russia could develop into a genuine three- or
four-party political system.

Medvedev's Positive Impact on U.S-Russia Relations
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Margelov stated in unambiguous terms that the
U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship would improve
significantly "by May or June," strongly hinting that
Medvedev's presumed May 7 inauguration would usher in a new
chapter in bilateral relations. Margelov predicted that the
sharp anti-USG rhetoric from the GOR would drop dramatically
and Russia would begin to take a generally "positive"
approach to foreign relations.


6. (C) In the meantime, however, Margelov stressed that
little progress would be made on the bilateral agenda,
relations would remain tense, and the GOR would keep up the
tough rhetoric during the electoral season. He commented
that U.S.-Russia relations have regressed to the "detente
years," when there was noticeable cooperation only on a few

issues, including non-proliferation, Middle East peace
process issues, and "new threats."

Tour d'Horizon on Key International Issues
--------------


7. (C) Warlick asked Margelov for an update on Russia's
position on the host of key foreign policy challenges.

-- Missile Defense: Margelov noted that Poland has become
more "relaxed" in its approach since Donald Tusk was elected
Prime Minister, which includes a willingness to discuss with
Russia U.S. MD plans in Poland and the Czech Republic.
Margelov said that Poland needed to understand that Russia's
insistence on a "presence" at the proposed MD site in Poland
should not conjure up any images of the "Soviets coming to
Poland -- Russia is not the Soviet Union." On the recently
released NIE on Iran, Margelov agreed that Iran's missile
development program remained a problem and thus MD was still
necessary, but he cautioned that the U.S. against focusing
exclusively on Iran's program. Pakistan's unstable politics,
nuclear arsenal, and continued missile development program
were a dangerous mix.

-- CFE: Margelov emphasized that Russia's planned December 12
suspension of the Treaty did not mean that Putin wanted to
initiate a new arms race. Rather, the suspension should be
viewed through the prism of Putin's efforts to receive equal
treatment from the West. In Putin's mind, if the U.S. want
to dismantle binding agreements (i.e., ABM Treaty),Russia
has the right to do the same; if the U.S. wants to recognize
Kosovo, Russia has the right to (at least threaten to) do the
same. Margelov said there were no immediate plans to deploy
more troops to the flank areas, although he claimed Russia
would "work something out" with Turkey on Russia's southern
flank. Margelov was pleased the Baltic states remained
interested in joining the Treaty, and he thought Russia would
continue to engage in negotiations with the Allies after the
suspension.

-- Kosovo: Margelov repeated familiar GOR concerns regarding
the impact of Kosovo's universal declaration of independence
(UDI),including the likelihood of a "chain reaction" in
Northern Cyprus, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia. Margelov
described Northern Cyprus as the EU's "problem," but the
separatist regions in Georgia were serious concerns for
Russia, because Russia "would have to do something."
Margelov dismissed Russia's recognition of either these two
territories as a viable option for Putin, but he thought it
entirely possible that Russia could adopt a "U.S.-Taiwan
relationship" with Abkhazia.

-- Iran: Margelov believed Russia would continue to work with
the P5 1 on a third UNSC resolution, noting that Russia has
its own "internal motivations" for taking a harder line with
Iran. He said that in the early 1990's, Iran pumped an
unknown amount of money into Tatarstan and the Volga region
for reasons unknown to the GOR. Also, Russia is concerned
about Iran's increasingly active role in the CIS countries,
especially in Armenia. Margelov spun Jalili's replacement of
Larijani as nuclear negotiator as an "important signal" that
should be viewed positively. Claiming to know Larijani well,
Margelov described the former National Security Advisor as an
ambitious politician with his own agenda and clearly formed
views on Iran's nuclear program. Jalili, on the other hand,
is a bureaucrat and will only follow instructions. Thus,
there will no longer be any confusion over whether the
Iranian nuclear negotiator is accurately conveying the
message and intentions of the Iranian leadership.

-- MEPP: Margelov agreed that the Annapolis conference was
successful, and stressed that, based on his recent trip to
Israel, there was a "real desire" in the Knesset to reach an
agreement with the Palestinians. Margelov argued that
although the Olmert and Abu Mazen governments are weak
politically, weak leaders are more disposed to take big
chances; they have little to lose.

-- Georgia: Margelov thought that President Saakashvili took
the right steps in holding early presidential elections and
allowing Imedi to broadcast again, and he fully expected
Saakashvili to win the election. However, Margelov believed
that the upcoming election would be Saakashvili's "last
victory." Influential parliamentarians in Saakashvili's
party recently told Margelov that the Georgian president is
following the worst practices of the Soviet Union -
Saakashvili is a "dictator," who does not tolerate dissent.
Margelov did not expect Russia's bilateral relationship to
improve after the January 5 elections, noting that Russia is
waiting on Saakashvili to demonstrate his commitment to
reaching a "win-win" situation regarding South Ossetia and

Abkhazia.

-- Ukraine: Commenting on the recent formation of an Orange
government and Yulia Timoshenko's expected election as Prime
Minister, Margelov said that Russia has "learned its lesson"
from the 2004 presidential elections and will maintain
"pragmatic" relations with Ukraine, regardless of the
composition of the government. He noted that energy
relations will be based on market relations, joking that
Gazprom trusts only in cash.

-- Belarus-Russia Union: Margelov did not know whether there
was any truth behind rumors circulating in the press that
Putin and President Lukashenko agreed to sign the
Constitutional Act to solidify the union state and elevate
Putin to the position of president of the union. However,
Margelov doubted Putin would take such a step, noting that
there was little desire in the Kremlin or Russian elite "to
be one family with Lukashenko."

-- ODIHR: Margelov expected Russia would issue an invitation
to ODIHR to monitor the presidential elections, and agreed
that the invitation should be sent sooner rather than later.
Margelov argued that Russia issued a limited number of
invitations to ODIHR for the Duma elections mainly for
"mathematical reasons." Rather than issuing a large number
of invitations for ODIHR observers as in years past, Russia
decided to limit the number of invitations to the number of
ODIHR observers who actually took part in the mission.

Margelov's PACE Presidency Nomination
--------------


8. (C) Margelov confirmed that the European Democrat Group
in the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) had
nominated him to take over for van der Linden as president in
January 2008. According to Margelov, PACE nomination rules
stipulate that party coalitions nominate a person, and not a
nationality, for the presidency position; thus, Margelov's
Russian nationality should not be an issue of discussion.
However, he expressed disappointment that the Liberal Group
was actively seeking to block Margelov's candidacy. Margelov
expected a strong reaction from the Kremlin if his nomination
was blocked, although he remained optimistic about his
chances.


9. (C) Margelov stressed that, if elected, he would use his
two years as PACE President to promote a "positive agenda"
for Russia-EU relations. In this context, Margelov would
seek to use PACE as an alternative channel for discussion of
issues, noting that the official channel has not proven to be
very effective.

Margelov's Appointment as Chairman of New Human Rights NGO
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Margelov also confirmed that he was asked to chair
the board of trustees of the newly created Institute of Human
Rights and Cooperation. Margelov said that although there
were some in the Kremlin who wanted the institute to focus
only on alleged human rights abuses in Europe and the West,
Margelov underscored his commitment to examining human rights
problems abroad (including Central Asia) and at home, similar
to the mission of Amnesty International or Human Rights
Watch. Margelov added that, if he is elected PACE President,
he will try to combine his work in PACE with the human rights
institute, noting that the latter would be able to develop
more quickly if it relied on the expertise and experience of
the Council of Europe.


11. (U) Warlick did not have an opportunity to clear this
message
BURNS