CFE: THE DAY AFTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005749

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2017
TAGS: PREL KCFE NATO OSCE MARR RS
SUBJECT: CFE: THE DAY AFTER

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reason 1.4(b),(d)


1. (C) Summary. On December 12. Russia will suspend
participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty, ceasing notification, inspections, and permissions
for inspection under the Treaty, and not participating in the
December 15 annual exchange of information. Officials have
said Russia will not immediately change its force posture,
although a small number of forces could be moved south to
deal with unrest in Dagestan and Ingushetia. According to
officials, additional actions will depend on responses by the
West. The GOR plans to continue negotiations to resolve
outstanding issues, but sees a deadlock on the flank regime.
If there is agreement on a package solution that addresses
all outstanding issues, Russia would be prepared to lift its
suspension prior to ratification of A/CFE by all States. The
MFA denies defense experts' claims that the CFE Treaty is not
very important to Russia. The GOR is ready to meet before
the 12th, but MFA Director Antonov will not be in Brussels
for the NATO Ministerial. Embassy Moscow recommends that the
U.S. public response to Russia's treaty suspension should be
done in concert with key European Allies, stressing that U.S.
continues to observe its CFE commitments and is open to
further dialogue with Russia. End summary.

Russian Actions after December 12
--------------


3. (C) On November 30, Putin signed the decree providing for
suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty,
to take effect at midnight December 12 (contrary to the
statement from the Presidential Administration that the
suspension would take effect at midnight between December 12
and 13, the MFA told us it will take effect at midnight
between December 11 and December 12). The law allows Putin
to rescind the decision to suspend without going back to the
Duma, but we do not anticipate he will do so.


4. (C) On December 5, MFA Counselor Sergey Federyakov
confirmed that starting on the 12th, Russia would cease all
inspections, permissions for inspections, notifications and
exchange of information, as required by the Treaty. Russia
would not make the December 15 annual information exchange.
He noted that Russia was considering continuing participation
in the Joint Consultative Group, as it was a useful forum for
discussion, but needed to work out the legalities of such
participation.


5. (C) Federyakov also confirmed press statements by CHOD
Baluyevskiy that Russia did not intend to change its force
posture following suspension, although the GOR might move a
few troops to the south to deal with unrest in Dagestan and
Ingushetia. He added that Russia would adhere to its 1999
political commitments regarding stationing of forces in
Kaliningrad and Leningrad oblasts, provided the Baltics did
not significantly increase their military presence. He said
that Russia just wanted the freedom to deploy troops anywhere
on its territory, even though actual deployment would likely
stay the same.

Progress on Some Issues...
--------------


6. (C) Federyakov told us that the GOR believed considerable
progress had been made on some major issues at the Madrid
meeting between A/S Fried and Director Antonov (ref B),but
there were still key issues unresolved, and the progress was
not sufficient for Putin to decide not to suspend the Treaty.


7. (C) Federyakov said the GOR believed we were heading in
the right direction on the issues relating to ratification by
Allies, provisional application of the A/CFE, accession
discussions with the Baltics and Slovenia, and definition of
substantial combat forces, and that these issues were
resolvable.

But Flank, Collective Ceilings Still Unresolved
-------------- --


8. (C) The flank regime, however, was still deadlocked.
Federyakov said Russia was the only country that did not have
the right to put its forces wherever it wants on its
territory, and this "really irritates Putin." Russia also
viewed the issue of collective ceilings for NATO forces as a
problem. He said Russia could change the language but needed

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to keep the essence of the idea - that reductions of
Treaty-Limited Equipment for all of the NATO countries would
be one level.

Georgia and Moldova Still Problems
--------------


9. (C) In response to our concerns about the GOR walking
back progress on Georgia and Moldova, Federyakov denied that
the GOR had changed its positions. He said Russia felt it
was essential to have some evidence of Georgian acceptance of
Russian peacekeepers at Gadauta. Russia's preference was for
a documentary authorization of the presence, but he did not
rule out some other form of acknowledgment. He noted that
the GOR was awaiting the results of A/S Fried's discussions
with the Georgians, and expected a new proposal.


10. (C) Federyakov said the GOR was working on its
counterproposal on Moldova and hoped to have it done before
the 12th. The GOR did not want to link a settlement of the
Transnistria issue to CFE. The mandate for the observer
mission should focus only on CFE-related matters, not on the
broader conflict in Transnistria. The mandate should include
periodic visits by the civilian observers to Kolbasna,
monitoring of activities of the peacekeepers, and contacts
with Russian and Moldovan troops. He stressed we should
focus on the functions of the mission first, and discuss
numbers of monitors later.

"Let's Keep Talking"
--------------


11. (C) Federyakov reiterated Lavrov's public comments that
suspension of the Treaty "would not be a tragedy," and the
GOR wanted to continue discussions after the 12th. He
claimed Russia had made significant concessions by agreeing
to talk about Georgia and Moldova (while reiterating that the
issues were not linked to A/CFE),and by replacing its
previous insistence that the Baltics and Slovenia join the
original Treaty with acceptance of their joining only the
Adapted Treaty. He repeated recent statements in the press
by Putin and Lavrov that the original Treaty was hopelessly
out of date and did not reflect reality.

Deal Needed to Lift Suspension
--------------


12. (C) In a December 3 press conference, Putin said "If our
partners do ratify these (CFE) agreements and begin to
implement them, then we are not ruling out the possibility
that we also come back to them. I would like to emphasize
once again that we are not going to wait forever."
Clarifying this, Federyakov said Allied ratification of the
A/CFE was not the key to lifting the suspension. If the U.S.
(including Allied State parties) and Russia could reach
agreement on a "package solution" that resolved all of the
issues, the suspension could be lifted, even if Allies had
not yet ratified the A/CFE Treaty. He stressed that the
package had to include all the issues; Russia could not agree
to include some and forget the rest.

CFE Treaty Important to Russia
--------------


13. (C) We noted to Federyakov that several defense experts
had told us the CFE Treaty was not really important to
Russia. The GOR saw it as a political tool and a means of
garnering political support during an election year. The
experts argued that CFE was about transparency and
confidence-building measures, and Russia believed it had not
worked. Russia still saw the U.S. and the West as
adversaries. Federyakov denied that the A/CFE Treaty was not
important to Russia, saying Moscow believed strongly that
there needed to be a treaty on conventional forces in Europe.
Federyakov confirmed that the GOR was prepared to meet again
prior to the December 12 suspension, but that MFA Disarmament
Director Antonov would not be at the NATO Ministerial.


14. (C) Embassy Moscow recommends that the U.S. should greet
Russia's suspension publicly, reaffirming our adherence to
the Treaty, and our readiness to continue dialogue with the
Russians. To the extent possible, our public message should
be coordinated with key European Allies, who hopefully will
deliver the same message. Publicly and privately, the
Russians need to hear the U.S. and its Allies speak with one

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voice on Russia's unilateral decision to suspend its
observance of the Treaty.
BURNS