Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5720
2007-12-06 10:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA-GEORGIA RELATIONS

Tags:  PREL PGOV GG RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0002
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #5720/01 3401007
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061007Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5689
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005720 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA RELATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1,4 (B/D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005720

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA-GEORGIA RELATIONS

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1,4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary. Russia is in no hurry to re-evaluate its
bilateral relations with Georgia, with the MFA issuing
repeated statements slamming Saakashvili's anti-Russia
tactics as a "farce." MFA officials confirm that Saakashvili
is persona non grata in Moscow, while Duma Chairman Gryzlov
raised the diplomatic temperature by promising to consider
recognition of Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's independence in
January (although previous Duma deliberations have not
entailed any GOR steps towards recognition). Russian experts
downplay prospects for a diplomatic improvement given the
burden of recent history, the Saakashvili factor, Georgia's
need for an external enemy during a difficult domestic
period, and the U.S. role in advancing Georgia's ambitions,
and the Kosovo "precedent." How Russia responds to Kosovo's
expected UDI remains a wild card in its relations with
Georgia. End summary.

Official Views
--------------


2. (C) Since November 7, the MFA has issued repeated tough
statements about Georgia, especially in response to
Saakashvili's accusation that the GOR was behind Georgia's
opposition demonstrations. The GOR termed Saakashvili's
anti-Russia tactics a "farce," and repeatedly predicted that
the upcoming elections, conducted in an atmosphere of
"Russophobia" and intimidation of the opposition could not be
free and fair. Prior to his November 30 meeting with
Georgian FM Bezhuashvili, FM Lavrov accused Saakashvili in an
interview with the weekly magazine "Itogi," for attempting to
use Russia as a scapegoat in "justifying" his domestic and
foreign policy failures. Lavrov maintained that the GOR is
tired of the pattern that has the Georgian leadership declare
its readiness to put the bilateral relationship back on a
normal track, then resort to anti-Russia provocations when
the GOR replies with concrete steps for the normalization.
Lavrov criticized "Western sponsors" of Georgia for a "double
standard" that has them acquiescing to Saakashvili's
wrongdoings, but quick to point the finger at every alleged
Russian misstep.


3. (C) MFA Regional Conflict Division Chief Aleksey

Dvinyanin told us that Saakashvili's latest anti-Russia
rhetoric had made him unwelcome in Moscow. A meeting with
Putin was a remote possibility without concrete, positive
steps by the GOG. Russia's Special Envoy for the South
Ossetian conflict, Ambassador Yuriy Popov echoed the same
sentiment, noting that "Saakashvili is well beyond getting
under our skin." Both agreed that if Georgia continued down
its anti-Russia path, little improvement in bilateral
relations would be possible.


4. (U) On December 3, while basking in the warm glow of a
Duma election victory, United Russia Chairman Boris Gryzlov
informed the press that the new Duma would consider in
January Abkhazia's and South Ossetia's appeals for
independence. Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose "Russian
passport holders" enthusiastically supported United Russia at
the December 2 Duma election, have already sent the results
of their referenda -- held in 1999 and 2006 respectively --
to the Duma, Gryzlov said. (Note: Similar Duma promises in
November and December 2006 to South Ossetian and Abkhaz
requests for recognition did not entail any concrete GOR
steps toward recognition.)

What Moscow Experts Say
--------------


5. (U) The vast majority of Russian experts support GOR
actions and statements on Georgia: Saakashvili's Georgia
does not deserve Russia's "generosity.". Only a (small)
handful of liberals at the Institute of Europe and the Moscow
Carnegie Center argue that Russia should stop talking the
double talk -- respect for the Georgian territorial integrity
but no GOR plan for a "hands off" policy. At the other end
of the think tank spectrum, the CIS Institute supports
immediate recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. All
agreed that it is a pity that the two nations with such deep
historical, cultural binds, cannot get along. Moscow
analysts argue that the following factors have shaped
Russia-Georgia bilateral relations:

-- Too Much History:


6. (C) Moscow laments the dynamic established in the '90s,
when Georgia began to move precipitously away from Russia.
Moscow State Institute of International Relations'(MGIMO)
Vladimir Degoyev thought that the dispute with Georgia was a
metaphor for Russia's basic ambivalence toward the West,
while the continuing series of GOR - GOG altercations were a
reflection of Russia's failed adjustment to its new
neighbors. Georgia's decision to look west only exacerbated
Russia's lack of self confidence. The West's failure to
understand Russia's historical ambivalence about the West and
fears of unstable borders increase Russia's nervous tics
toward Georgia, which has become a hostage in Russia's search
for its own identity.

--- Saakashvili and His Young Team:


7. (C) The color revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia were
difficult for Russia to absorb. Since then, Russia has
learned from its mistakes during the Orange Revolution and
has established manageable relations with Ukraine; it even
kept contacts at all levels and with all parties active
during the Ukrainian political crisis earlier this year.
Georgia is a different story. Many attribute failed
relations to the Saakashvili factor and Russia's policy
mistakes. Moscow Carnegie Center's Aleksey Malashenko
thought that the GOR should have been more forthcoming when
Saakashvili reached out to Putin in the years after the Rose
Revolution, instead of resorting to what Malashenko termed
the "bully" policies of a trade embargo and the suspension of
direct flights between the two countries.


8. (C) Many commentators here regard Saakashvili as
impulsive and immature -- ill-suited to lead Georgia. His
under-40 team is a "generation fitted with a new matrix which
has no memory of the past," according to Fedor Lukyanov
Editor-in-Chief of Russia in Global Affairs.

--- Saakashvili's Plight, Russia's Schadenfreude:


9. (C) Many specialists said that Russia does not need a
problem in Georgia, which they consider a weak "non-state"
that is crippled by the labor drain to Russia and a
population decline. Experts are quick to recall the many
ethnic fault lines among that already diminished population.
If Saakashvili had underestimated the opposition; Moscow
experts were also surprised at the magnitude of discontent
demonstrated by the huge turnout at anti-government
demonstrations. In the aftermath of the political crisis in
Tbilisi, Russian officials and experts barely hid their
contempt for Saakashvili's attempt to find an external cause
for his domestic problems after the beatings of opposition
demonstrators, and the closure of an independent television
station. Popov said Saakashvili's mismanagement gave life to
the Georgian opposition, which was otherwise a non-entity, a
"still-born child." Now that the mask was off, Saakashvili
had been revealed as just another post-Soviet power-hungry
corrupt leader, he added.

---"Misguided" U.S. Policy:


10. (C) At a time when the Russian public is inclined to see
the U.S. and the West as Russia's enemy, every USG move in
Georgia is closely watched. Our MFA contacts are convinced
that the U.S. advised Saakashvili to pick an early election
date in order to interdict opposition efforts to mobilize.
For the Russian media and public, the USG's reaction to
Saakashvili's November 7 crackdown of opposition
demonstrators and the closure of the opposition T.V. station,
"Imedi" was too mild and came too late. The USG "double
standard" was the buzz word here when the President issued a
strong statement about Gary Kasparov's arrest and the GOR
treatment of opposition demonstrations in Moscow. The feud
between Saakashivili and former Georgian Defense Minister
Okruashvili represents for many experts the tip of an iceberg
of corruption and intrigue.

--- The Consequences of Kosovo:


11. (C) Practically everyone we talked to thought that
Kosovo would be seen as a precedent in the Caucasus. Sergey
Markedonov of the Institute for Military and Strategic
Analysis said that one could argue endlessly about whether
Kosovo is unique or universal, but "if Kosovo is unique, so
is Abkhazia; if Kosovo is universal, so is Abkhazia."
According to MGIMO's Aleksey Bogaturov, the West applies
"dualism" and attempts to impose a semantic argument on
Russia and the rest of the world for reasons of political
expediency. Lukaynov predicted that even if the GOR does not
react to the West's recognition of Kosovo independence with
immediate recognition of Abkhazia, it will constantly remind
the U.S.of its "mistakes." Whatever Saakashvili might think,
for many, Abkhazia is lost forever for Georgia and
Saakashivili has to come to terms with the loss. The
Institute of Oriental Studies' Vitaliy Naumkin suggested that
as a response to Kosovo, the GOR drastically increase its
economic cooperation with Abkhazia and establish a Russian
representative office a la the American Institute in Taiwan
(AIT) without officially recognizing Abkhazia. Ekho Moskvy
Editor Aleksey Venediktov related a December 4 conversation
with the Foreign Minister, in which Lavrov argued against
recognition and symmetrical responses but concluded, "I am in
the minority,"

--- Come January 5, 2008:


12. (C) No one in Moscow doubts that Saakashvili will be
re-elected on January 5, and the belief is widespread that
his continuation in power spells further trouble for
Russia-Georgia relations. They consider that reconciliation
is not amenable to deadlines and Saakashvili's wiser choice
would make Georgia more attractive in order to keep the
breakaway areas with Georgia. Many felt that "freezing" the
conflict would be better than a drastic move that could
ignite another ethnic war. In the meantime, Russians are
quietly engaging in trade with Abkhazians. Abkhazian
mandarins, persimmons and other produce are regular sights in
Moscow markets despite the official line that the CIS
sanctions against Abkhazia are in force. Many argue against
the costs of supporting "unrecognized" territories and advise
a more liberal business atmosphere and efforts to initiate
grassroots interaction.
BURNS