FOREIGN POLICY, RHETORIC AND ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005612

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR RS
SUBJECT: FOREIGN POLICY, RHETORIC AND ELECTIONS


Classified By: DCM Daniel A. Russell for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: International issues have received little
attention in the run-up to the December 2 Duma elections,
reflecting broad consensus behind Putin's foreign policy.
Russia's positions on the top issues that do resonate with
the Russian public - Kosovo, NATO enlargement, missile
defense, CFA and Georgia - have been skillfully marketed to
the electorate as proof positive that Russia is back as a
great power, its influence is growing vis-a-vis the United
States, and its activism on the international scene is
essential to contain America's global ambitions. Likewise,
Putin's tough talk on U.S.-funded NGOs and ODHIR election
observers is another reminder of just how vivid memories of
Russia's humiliation and powerlessness in the 1990s remain
for the elite and the general public. The attractiveness of
Putin's policies and rhetoric on all of these issues has been
used to bolster popular support for the President himself and
United Russia during the electoral campaign. All politics in
Russia will continue to be truly local during the run-up to
both this weekend's Duma elections and the presidential
contest three months from now, and, in staking out tough
foreign policy positions to demonstrate Russia's
assertiveness, Putin and other senior officials will likely
continue to show little regard for the reaction their
statements generate from the United States and Europe. End
summary.

Foreign Policy Consensus
--------------


2. (C) Putin's foreign policy is not up for serious debate.
Most voters associate Russian foreign policy with the
dramatic and sustained increase in standard of living, the
regaining of international respect, and the strengthening of
Russia's influence vis-a-vis the U.S. and the West.
Specifically, Russia's resolve to publicly challenge the U.S.
on key issues like the Iraq war, U.S. MD plans in Europe,
NATO expansion, Kosovo, Georgia, and the CFE Treaty resonates
well with the political elite and general public alike.
Russians vividly remember the hardships and humiliation
following the collapse of the Soviet Union and are satisfied
with a foreign policy course that restores Russia's
"greatness."


3. (C) Reliable polling data clearly show that Russians
generally accept the claims against the USG and its policies.
Most polls suggest that an increasing percentage of Russians
"hold a negative impression of the USG" (up to 40% in a
Levada poll) and that U.S.-Russian relations will be "tense
and hostile" for the next 10-15 years.


4. (C) Not surprisingly, opposition politicians on the
campaign trail have ignored foreign policy, except to largely
endorse Putin's course, while focusing their attention on
pocket-book issues. The published platforms of the leading
parties, in fact, underscore the strong consensus on foreign
policy issues. It goes without saying that United Russia and
the Kremlin-blessed Just Russia fully support and promote the
achievements of Putin's foreign policy. To the extent that
the Communists and LDPR have criticized the current Putin
administration and the pro-Kremlin parties, it is for being
too soft on the U.S. and too weak in protecting Russian
strategic interests abroad, pointing to the GOR's handling of
relations with its neighbors as the clearest example. LDPR
leader and Duma candidate Vladimir Zhirinovskiy said in a
recent interview that Russia should "show (its) neighbors
that a break in ties with Russia would be a lot more painful
for them than for us," and he called for the use of energy
prices to prevent the Czech Republic and Poland from agreeing
to U.S. MD plans.


5. (C) On the other side of the spectrum, the fringe liberal
parties/coalitions, including Yabloko, Union of Right Forces,
and Other Russia, have been more vocal about the anti-U.S.
trends in Russia's foreign policy, but commentators point out
that even these parties have voiced only muted criticism,
mainly to avoid further damage to their standings in the
polls. One of the most Western-leaning (if little known)
parties, the Democratic Party of Russia envisions Russia in a
European defense alliance without the United States.
Undergirding the caution of liberal parties, however, is a
genuine disagreement, even among the most pro-Western of
commentators and politicians here, with the U.S. support for
Kosovo's independence, NATO enlargement to Georgia and
Ukraine, missile defense deployments in Poland and the Czech
Republic, and the Saakashvili government in Georgia.

The Enemy at the Gate
--------------


6. (C) Given the strong domestic support for Putin's foreign

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policy, the GOR is playing up its foreign policy "successes,"
particularly its self-proclaimed role as a check against
American "hegemony," mainly to help divert attention from the
domestic challenges (e.g., food prices, inflation,
demographic trends) and to bolster support for Putin and his
government in the parliamentary and presidential elections.
Accusations by Putin regarding U.S. "meddling" in Russia's
electoral process are the most recent examples of the
Kremlin's efforts to rally voters against an external enemy,
tapping not-so-latent Russian sentiments that the West (read
U.S.) does not want a strong Russia.


7. (C) Putin has sharpened his criticism of alleged U.S.
assistance to opposition parties and NGOs, and warned that
outsiders should keep their "snotty noses" out of Russian
affairs. State television reinforced these official
statements by broadcasting (one week before the December 2
elections) an expose on the "direct links" between the
November 24-25 protests led by opposition organization Other
Russia and alleged U.S.-funded efforts to foment an orange
revolution in Russia. GOR officials have also reacted
angrily to ODHIR's recent decision not to send observers to
monitor the Duma elections. On November 26, Putin told a
group of young United Russia leaders that the State
Department was behind ODHIR's decision, and FM Lavrov earlier
blamed ODHIR for the problems with accreditation that
prompted its pullout.


8. (C) In addition to alleged links between opposition
political parties and the West, voters have been frequently
offered by Putin and others a history of the 1990s that had
Europe and the United States dictating terms to a Russia on
its knees. Putin's campaign stump speech reminds voters of
that "fact" and contrasts it with the independent,
self-assertive Russia he presides over today. Running
through this fall's campaign has been a comment falsely but
persistently attributed to former Secretary of State Albright
that Russia "unjustly" controls the lion's share of the
world's natural resources. The alleged quote has surfaced in
Putin's national open line with Russian citizens and has been
alluded to in at least two other of his televised appearances
to suggest that the United States is unhappy with Russia's
current prosperity and would end it if it could.


9. (C) Even among liberal critics of Putin, such as Russia
in Global Affairs editor Fedor Lukyanov, the GOR is able to
tap the resentment of Western efforts to hold Russia up to a
measuring stick. Lukyanov wrote a lengthy op-ed in Gazeta.ru
that vigorously defended the official reaction to the ODHIR
decision. Lukyanov asserted that the GOR was not interested
in manipulating the ODIHR mission; in fact, Russia's
democracy is sufficiently developed and does not need to be
"quality certified" by outsiders. Lukyanov repeated familiar
arguments that ODHIR maintains lower standards for Western or
Western-leaning governments, and cited the relatively
favorable assessment of Kazakhstan's parliamentary elections
as an example.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) As one commentator told us, Russia's current foreign
policy "transcends even Putin." Russia's assertive
international course is in harmony with the fundamental views
and concerns of most Russians. Not surprisingly, Putin, his
administration and United Russia have all ratcheted up claims
of success and the rhetoric on the international front during
this electoral campaign period. It is telling that little,
if any, thought seems to have been given to the reaction this
tough talk would predictably engender from the West. We
expect this trend to continue through next March, as
presidential succession continues to be the top issue
occupying Putin and his retinue.
BURNS