Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5600
2007-11-30 12:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

CIVIC FORCE: A KREMLIN EXPERIMENT GONE NOWHERE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM SOCI RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3834
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #5600/01 3341258
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301258Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5580
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005600 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: CIVIC FORCE: A KREMLIN EXPERIMENT GONE NOWHERE

REF: A. MOSCOW 05417


B. MOSCOW 03841

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (d).

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005600

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI RS
SUBJECT: CIVIC FORCE: A KREMLIN EXPERIMENT GONE NOWHERE

REF: A. MOSCOW 05417


B. MOSCOW 03841

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (d).

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (C) The political party Civic Force (GS) began life as a
Kremlin project and has enjoyed the freedom of action and
access to the media that come with that status. Unlike other
small, right-wing parties (such as Yabloko and the Union of
Right Forces (SPS)),who have encountered problems in
conducting their election campaigns, GS's chief problems have
been lack of voter recognition, a small campaign war chest,
and the inability of GS leader Barshchevskiy to parlay his
name-recognition value into votes for his party. As a
result, GS will join Yabloko and SPS as an also ran on
December 2, and is unlikely to get even the three percent of
the vote necessary for continued federal financing. End
summary.

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Free From Kremlin Interference
--------------


2. (C) In a November 15 conversation, Civic Force party (GS)
Press Spokesman Aleksandr Agamov acknowledge that GS had
encountered no administrative resistance to its campaign.
Unlike Yabloko and SPS (ref A),GS has been able to contract
for the printing and distribution of campaign materials, has
not had its regional party offices vandalized, and has not
been harassed by Kremlin-friendly youth groups like "Nashi."
GS Chairman Barshchevskiy appears frequently on national
television, both during the national debates transmitted
free-of-charge by the federal channels, and on the channels'
various talk shows.


3. (C) Lack of Kremlin interference, has not meant Kremlin
assistance, however. Agamov complained that as a small, new
party GS had not been able to attract the financial resources
necessary to pay for expensive television time, billboards,
and for printing literature.


4. (C) Agamov told us that GS had done little advertising in
Moscow because of the expense, and the cost meant that buying
television time was not seriously considered, forcing the
party to conduct a "virtual" campaign over the internet
Instead, the party had concentrated its TV ads on the regions

where, unfortunately, it has little name recognition.

--------------
A Failed Experiment
--------------


5. (U) Agamov admitted that GS had been a Kremlin experiment
from the start. GS began with the blessing of the Kremlin,
and may have been initially designed to thwart the efforts of
Yabloko and/or SPS. Its efforts have continued to receive the
blessing of Presidential Administration Deputy Head Vladislav
Surkov (ref B). According to Agamov, the Kremlin's
experiment was part of an attempt to give a voice to the
middle class, whose interests did not lie with the Communist
Party or United Russia.


6. (U) According to recent polls, GS is barely visible to the
electorate. Levada Center has reported less than one percent
of respondents indicating they would vote for GS. VTsIOM and
FOM report similar results. All differences between these
polling agencies are within the margin of error, and in fact
the margin of error includes zero meaning, conceivably, that
GS has no support among the electorate.


7. (C) Agamov did not hide behind excuses and optimistic
rhetoric when discussing his party's chances. Although he
did overestimate the response the party received in recent
polls (he claimed three percent),he acknowledged that the
party still faced a steep battle in getting to seven percent.
He pointed out--wishfully, perhaps--that SPS was polling at
1.5 percent prior to the March regional elections, but
ultimately received about seven percent. His optimism was
keyed to undecided voters and the rumored tendency of
Russians to change their minds in the voting booth.


8. (U) References to GS have been hard to find in the press.
Over the past two weeks, only five mentions of the party were
found and then only in the regions. One article, an op-ed
piece by Party Chairman Mikhail Barshchevskiy discussed the
potential consequences of the recently adopted law on local
self-government. A second article from Chelyabinsk mentioned
Viktor Pokhmelkin who recently left SR for GS, and has been

MOSCOW 00005600 002 OF 002


spearheading an effort to improve road conditions and road
safety in Russia. The remaining articles mentioned GS only in
passing, barely noting the existence of the party.

--------------
A Complicated Relationship with Putin
--------------


9. (C) GS has not criticized Putin or his administration
during the campaign, although the party's leadership has
little affection for YR or Putin's more unliberal and
undemocratic policies. GS has focused instead on a peaceful
transfer of power that they expect will occur after the March
2008 elections. Putin's lame-duck status make criticism of
him irrelevant.


10. (C) The GS leadership has, however, been willing to
criticize United Russia (YR). According to Agamov, the
majority of the Russian electorate, like Putin, knows that YR
has been ineffective, but believe that tolerating its
continued dominance is the price of stability. YR has been
successful in parlaying the popular desire for continued
stability into a vote for YR. GS, on the other hand, sees
significant threats to continued stability in coming years
including the bureaucracy to which YR is beholden.

--------------
Comment
--------------


11. (C) Civic Force began life as the Kremlin-orchestrated
counter to Yabloko and SPS, but constraints on its ability to
operate independently left it with little leverage and it has
failed to register with the voters. As the fates of Just
Russia and GS will likely show on December 2, launching a
party in the current political environment without active
Kremlin support has proven daunting.
BURNS