RUSSIA: INTERPRETING PUTIN'S DUMA VICTORY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005596

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2107
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI KDEM RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: INTERPRETING PUTIN'S DUMA VICTORY

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: The significance of the December 2 Duma
elections is the magnitude -- and not the fact -- of Putin's
win and how he can use this "vote of confidence" to dictate
presidential succession. Having been transformed into a
referendum on Putin, the parliamentary elections are a step
backward in Russia's evolution and a reaffirmation of
personality over political institutions. Reversing efforts
to engineer an acceptable opposition party, Putin tied his
political afterlife to the success of the ruling party.
While Putin's win will be real, reflecting both the
complacency of the public and the paucity of the opposition,
the size of his majority will be inflated by the blatant use
of administrative resources, domination of television, and
black p.r. against opposition politicians. Observers will
assess the quality of the Putin victory by voter turnout,
whether United Russia secures a constitutional majority, and
the magnitude of the Communist Party's second place finish.
Kremlin sensitivities over appearing to be "another
Kazakhstan" may help two pro-Putin opposition parties also
limp across the threshold. Putin's victory will provide an
institutional patina to his selection of an heir presumptive,
but doesn't alter the fundamental fact of life that Putin the
man, and not the party leader, controls this political
transition. End Summary

A Referendum, Not an Election
--------------


2. (C) The December 2 Duma elections are not about a new
parliament, but about Putin and the quantitative mandate that
he seeks in order to legitimize his continued influence over
the Russian body politic after he steps down from the
presidency in May 2008. The outcome is largely foreordained
and backed up by professional polling data: a lopsided win by
the ruling United Russia party and a second place finish by
the Communist Party, with one or two pro-Putin "opposition"
parties perhaps limping across the seven percent threshold.
The magnitude -- and not the fact -- of the United Russia win
will be the story, and the plotline is dominated by the
question of how successful Putin will be in transferring his
sky-high popularity ratings to a lackluster political party,
which he himself has derided as "not great, but the best we
have."


3. (C) In terms of democratic political development, this
election is retrograde: a step away from the development of
coherent political parties. The storyline could have been
different. Until Putin's surprise decision in early October
to lead United Russia into the polls, this election was about
the emergence of the Kremlin-blessed Just Russia opposition
party, whose message of social justice could have challenged
the Communists' lock on the left-leaning electorate; for a
brief few months, we saw in our travel to regional capitals
the beginnings of elite competition between Just Russia and
United Russia. During this interregnum, United Russia
moderates spoke optimistically about building credible and
more European-looking political parties, and Kremlin
spin-meisters even saw room for a liberal party in the Duma
mix, with the more compliant Union of Right Forces reaching
what it thought was a firm deal with the Kremlin for its
share of administrative resources.

Dominated by Putin, but Marred by Violations
--------------


4. (C) When Putin changed his mind, and linked his future
political fate with United Russia, official encouragement of
political competition, as well as any tolerance towards
liberal parties critical of the Putin, evaporated. A
mini-cult of personality campaign quickly took off,
embarrassing to the liberal Russian elite, but apparently
popular (or at least palatable) among the masses. Part
Madison Avenue (slick television ads, a U.S.-styled
convention replete with shimmying girl bands and film idols)
and part Communist-era nostalgia (milkmaids, Communist youth
camp songs, public paeans and "spontaneous" demonstrations in
support of the great leader),Putin's campaign literally
dominates the landscape -- with the "Putin's Plan -- Russia's
Victory" campaign poster omnipresent throughout Russia's
eleven time zones.


5. (C) No one here, not even the fiercest critic of the
Kremlin, believes that Putin -- or his designated political
vehicle, United Russia -- faces any credible threat from any
pole on the political spectrum. Public complacency and a
craving for "normalcy" reign, fed by eight years of
uninterrupted economic growth, full coffers, and the pride
associated with Russia's reemergence as a major global
player. The Kremlin has been able to ignore the biting
liberal critique of Putin's democratic retrenchment, rising

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corruption, and state corporatism, because liberal
politicians have spent their time devouring each other,
fighting ideological battles from the 1990's, flirting with
compacts with Putin, and resolutely refusing to unite behind
one party. As one independent editor put it to us: "the
liberals have no instinct for survival." On the other end of
the spectrum, the Communists remain locked in the past, with
party leader Zyuganov taking no steps to modernize his
message or to expand his vote bank beyond the cohort of loyal
pensioners. During the past eight years, Zyuganov has
delivered the Communist vote on almost every legislative
issue of importance to Putin and Putin has returned the favor
by rarely criticizing Zyuganov directly.


6. (C) However, while Putin's win will reflect the
legitimate choice of Russia's voters, the size of his
majority will not. As in 2003, the Duma campaign has been
distinguished by the blatant use of administrative resources,
the ruling party's domination of the state-controlled
television, and the use of "black p.r." against opposition
candidates, as well as covert restrictions placed on their
ability to campaign (e.g., the frequent cancellation of
conference halls due to last-minute "repairs" or "electricity
outages"). Credible reports, including those gathered during
our regional travel, indicate that governors (65 of whom head
United Russia regional party lists),mayors and others in the
official food chain are under pressure to deliver 70 percent
of the voters to United Russia, with the ethnic republics
anxious to overfulfill the plan. (Chechen President Kadyrov
has boasted publicly that Putin will receive 100 percent of
his republic's votes.) In this mix, even the criticism of
the statistically imperceptible Other Russia opposition
movement led by Garry Kasparov, who does not have a political
party to challenge Putin, proved intolerable.

Interpreting the Duma Returns
--------------


7. (C) Because Putin's United Russia is presumed to garner
a majority of votes, the definition of winning has shifted.
The following factors will determine how local pundits
measure the Kremlin's success:

-- Voter Turnout: Anything below the 2003 turnout of 55.75
percent will be considered an embarrassment, and a tepid
endorsement of Putin's intent to play a significant role in
Russia's political future. Not surprisingly, university
rectors, bureaucrats, and state directors have been exhorted
to get out the United Russia vote. In some localized
instances, United Russia supporters may have ordered state
workers to show up at the office on Sunday with an absentee
ballot in hand (over three times as many absentee ballots
have been issued, compared to 2003); meanwhile, the range of
positive inducements around polling places such as free food
and entertainment has grown to include free gynecological
checkups (sic) and psychiatric counseling.

-- Constitutional Majority: Despite United Russia denials,
the Kremlin wants a constitutional majority (67 percent),
which necessitates at least a 60 percent win. (Note: Since
most parties won't cross the seven percent threshold, their
percentage of the vote will be distributed to the winners on
a proportional basis.) This is substantially higher than the
37.57 percent won by United Russia in 2003. Putin and his
circle have assiduously attempted to lower expectations, with
a simple majority painted as a winning outcome. Putin
reportedly told Prodi that United Russia would get 55 percent
of the vote, with the Communists scoring 12 percent, and both
LDPR and Just Russia securing around the seven percent
minimum. Privately, the Kremlin drumbeat is for 70 percent.

-- Communists' Tally: If the Communists poll more than 14
percent, most analysts here will read the higher than
expected turnout as a protest vote against Putin, with
liberals casting their ballot with the only party that can
reliably be expected to cross the seven percent threshold.
(There has been much liberal commentary over how to vote
against Putin, without inadvertently giving support to United
Russia. Because of the seven percent threshold, these
commentaries argue that a vote for one of the minor liberal
parties ends up benefiting Putin, since United Russia will
receive a proportional share of the votes "wasted" on parties
that don't enter the Duma.)

-- Number of Victorious Parties: Whether the pro-Putin
"opposition" LDPR and Just Russia secure their minimum seven
percent also will reflect Kremlin sensitivities over not
appearing to be "another Kazakhstan." According to polling
data, both parties are hovering within statistical reach
(LDPR at 6 percent; Just Russia at 4 percent). Whether the
Kremlin can walk (promote Putin) and chew gum (provide some
dollops of electoral support to LDPR and Just Russia) at the

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same time remains a question mark. LDPR's Zhirinovskiy is a
superb if odious campaigner, whose foul-mouthed and
outrageous antics often attract a nationalist or youth vote.
His three-minute campaign speech, which immediately followed
Putin's much ballyhooed November 28 pep talk to the nation,
is read here as Kremlin support for LDPR aspirations.
(Zhirinovskiy's "opposition" spiel centered entirely on his
support for Putin's policies.)

Election Results: Implications for Succession
--------------


8. (C) The Duma outcome sets the stage for Putin's
designation of a presidential successor, whose nomination can
come no later than December 23 (and most expect will happen
more quickly, with the convening of a United Russia party
conference). The presumption has always been that Putin
would "anoint" a successor, and polls have consistently
supported that a majority of Russians would vote for whomever
he designated. However, the Duma elections will add
legitimacy to Putin's centrality in the process and provide
an institutional veneer. While our best guess is that PM
Zubkov and First Deputy Prime Ministers Medvedev and Ivanov
remain the front-runners, the greater Putin's mandate,
conceivably the greater the possibility that he could select
a dark horse candidate as his heir presumptive.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Derided as irrelevant only two months ago, the Duma
elections have become an important stepping stone in the
succession process, but the central fact of Russian political
life remains the same. Putin remains the arbiter of Russia's
political transition.
BURNS