SERBIAN FM JEREMIC VISIT UNDERSCORES RUSSIA'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005580

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2017
TAGS: PREL SR KV RS
SUBJECT: SERBIAN FM JEREMIC VISIT UNDERSCORES RUSSIA'S
POSITION ON KOSOVO


Classified By: M/C for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4
(b/d).


1. (C) Summary. Serbian FM Jeremic's November 22 visit to
Moscow served to reconfirm Russian-Serbian solidarity in the
runup to the end of the Kosovo troika talks. Lavrov
reiterated Russia's firm support for Serbia, noting that
December 10 was not "the end of history." Jeremic noted that
Serbia saw breaks in the EU's position on Kosovo, but felt
that in the end Germany's strong involvement in the process
would bring wavering countries on board. The GOR and Serbia
agreed that no decisions should be made on the OSCE mission
in Kosovo until after further UNSC discussions. Jeremic
asserted that in the event of a Kosovo UDI, Serbia would use
all measures except force to express its displeasure, but it
was preparing security measures for the possibility of unrest
in border regions. Lavrov warned that a UDI would set off a
"chain reaction" in the Balkans. Jeremic and Lavrov also
discussed Russian investment in Serbian air, energy, and
mining sectors, and Lavrov expressed unhappiness at Serbia
voting with the EU on a UN resolution involving Georgian
refugees. Serbian President Tadic may visit Moscow at the
beginning of January. End Summary.

Jeremic and Lavrov Reiterate Positions
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2. (C) On November 26, MFA Third European Department
Counselor Denis Kuznedelev told us that Jeremic's visit to
Moscow to meet with FM Lavrov and Presidential Representative
to the Central Region Poltavchenko was a Serbian initiative
and was welcomed by Russia as a chance to compare visions
prior to the December 10 deadline. He told us that Lavrov
reiterated the GOR's firm position against setting time
limits on negotiations and insisted Russia would only support
a decision reached by both Belgrade and Pristina. Lavrov had
positively assessed the Serbian government's contribution to
the troika process, stating it had shown flexibility in
negotiations and only requested retention of "limited and
symbolic" competencies in Kosovo. Serbian political
counselor Boris Sekulic told us that Jeremic had stressed
that Serbia was prepared to allow Kosovo "everything except a
place in the UN and its own borders."


3. (C) According to Kuznedelev, Jeremic told Lavrov that he
was pessimistic about the troika process, but declared that
the potential for a negotiated solution was not exhausted and
Serbia wanted to continue dialogue in some form. Jeremic saw
differences in the EU regarding Kosovo, and thought the bulk
of the EU had yet to make up its mind on how to proceed after
December 10. Nonetheless, he believed Germany's efforts to
play a main part in "solving" Kosovo would cause most other
EU countries to adopt Germany's position in the end.


4. (C) Jeremic and Lavrov were set to meet again on the
margins of the November 29 OSCE ministerial, Kuznedelev said.
He told us the GOR and Serbia had a "close understanding"
regarding the future of the OSCE mission in Kosovo, and that
they would block any attempt to renew the mission for 2008
before the troika's report was in. The GOR expected further
debate on Kosovo's status in the UNSC before it would be
willing to agree to any extension of the mission's mandate.

In Case of a UDI
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5. (C) If there were a unilateral declaration of
independence (UDI) by Kosovo, Kuznedelev told us Jeremic
assured Lavrov that Serbia would not use force, but would use
every other tool at its disposal to express its displeasure,
including political, diplomatic, and economic blockades.
Sekulic said that Lavrov confirmed that the GOR would
continue to support Serbia, and noted that the GOR took a
harder line in support of the Serbian position than the
Serbian government had expected. Lavrov said that in the
case of a UDI, the GOR would increase its rhetoric in
international fora and would be "hard" against the U.S. and
EU.


6. (C) In the event of a UDI, Jeremic said that Kosovar
Serbs would not associate with "self-proclaimed
independence," according to Kuznedelev. Jeremic said that
Belgrade was preparing security measures in Preshevo,
Medveda, and Bujanovac in case of unrest in their Albanian
populations. He reiterated that a UDI would bring
instability to Bosnia, Macedonia, and Southern Serbia, noting
that it was difficult for Serbia to uphold Bosnian unity "so
strongly as before" if international law was "destroyed" in
Kosovo. Sekulic told us that Lavrov said a "chain reaction"
would take place in the Balkans after a UDI.

Economic Focus on Russian Investment

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7. (C) Kuznedelev played down the importance of economic
discussions, but Sekulic told us that several Russian
economic ventures in Serbia were discussed. Jeremic hoped
that the Southstream gas pipeline would transit through
Serbia, and Sekulic said Lavrov assured him that Russia would
confirm its chosen route by the end of December. Sekulic
also said Aeroflot's interest in buying JAR, the Serbian
national airline, and the main airport in Belgrade, were
discussed, as well as Russian mining company SMR's interest
in copper mining. Sekulic told us that Gazprom was
interested in purchasing Serbian oil company NIS when it was
privatized, but Serbia preferred to privatized the company
slowly, 25% at a time, whereas Gazprom wanted to by a 51%
stake immediately. Sekulic also said that although Lavrov
told Jeremic the GOR supported Serbia's goal of joining the
EU, the GOR was not happy with Serbia's vote with the EU on a
UN resolution on Georgian refugees.
BURNS