GAMING RUSSIA'S REACTION TO A KOSOVO UDI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005505

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: GAMING RUSSIA'S REACTION TO A KOSOVO UDI

REF: MOSCOW 5434

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: The fact that Russia has not confronted
the U.S. at the most senior levels over the possibility of
Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence does not mean
that Putin and his advisers are resigned to the outcome.
Russian diplomatic self-confidence flows from its sense of
European divisions, its conclusion that Kosovo could be a GOR
"win-win," and a domestic electoral strategy that plays on
Russian outrage over American unilateralism. Russia likely
will increase the costs to the West of Kosovo's independence
by challenging the legality of a UDI, stymieing efforts to
integrate Kosovo into international institutions, flirting
with the Kosovo "precedent," accepting a de facto partition
of Northern Kosovo, encouraging trouble in Bosnia, and
condemning the U.S. European unity, Chinese disengagement,
and a strong private marker on Georgian territorial integrity
are essential tools in pushing back. The further setback to
popular perceptions of the U.S. in Russia will take longer to
fix. End Summary

Russian Diplomacy on Auto-Pilot
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2. (C) As the Troika's December 10 deadline approaches,
Russia seems oddly relaxed about the impending policy train
wreck, when American support for Kosovo's expected unilateral
declaration of independence (UDI) hits up against Russian
insistence on a negotiated solution. Less than one month
from the conclusion of the Troika deliberations, Russian
diplomacy has not shifted gears -- to the contrary, FM Lavrov
regularly underscores the "red-line" that Kosovo's
independence poses for the Russian leadership and the dangers
of a Kosovo precedent for other frozen conflicts. Serbian FM
Jeremic's November 22 visit to Moscow generated Lavrov's
latest warning against UDI and call for continued
negotiations. Yet there is none of the urgency in Moscow that
one would expect, given the specter of Western unilateral
recognition of Kosovo outside the UN framework, as well as
the prospect of Western implementation of "supervised
independence" over the objections of Serbia and Russia. The
Russians have barely gone through the motions of high-level
consultations with the U.S. on an issue that one Russian
analyst described as the "diplomatic equivalent of the 1999
bombing of Belgrade." Putin, in his meetings with the
President in Kennebunkport in July and Sydney in September,
and with the Secretary and Secretary Gates during the October
2 2, studiously avoided any detailed discussion of Kosovo.

What Accounts for Russian Confidence over Kosovo?
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3. (C) We believe that Russian self-confidence is fueled by:

-- Expectations of EU Divisions: Russia calculates that the
objections raised by some EU member states, as well as the
unease of others, will be sufficient to delay critical
support by Germany until 2008, with Serbian presidential
elections another potential pretext for further pushing back
the policy timeline. As DFM Titov jokingly noted to the
Ambassador, the Russian leadership expects that the West will
preserve the sanctity of the extended Christmas, New Year,
and Orthodox Christmas holiday periods.

-- Calculations that UDI Strengthens the Russian Hand:
Russian official and policy communities firmly believe that a
U.S.-driven recognition of Kosovo will produce unexpected and
negative consequences that will haunt Western policymakers
for generations. The U.S. will be saddled with a "bandit"
state and responsible for an "Islamist virus" in the heart of
Europe. As such, U.S. policymakers will have to answer for
the unleashing of irredentist forces, unraveling of the
Dayton Accords, violence that will flow from Serbian
rejection of Kosovo's actions and the de facto partition that
will ensue, as well as the reinforcement of Serbian
grievances that will stymie the Balkans' integration into
Europe. Despite "losing Kosovo," Russian experts say that
Putin wins politically at home for his principled stand,
which Russian parastatals and business will capitalize on to
deepen bilateral economic ties and expand investment in
Serbian infrastructure. In this context, Lavrov's
anticipated letter to the EU, U.S., and Germany on the
consequences of not stopping UDI (reftel) will be Russia's
"final warning," setting the stage for an "I told you so."

-- Electoral Dynamic: Russia's election year emphasis on the
"enemy at the gate," which features prominently in the
Russian backlash against missile defense and CFE, extends to
Kosovo. Experts tell us that Russia will paint U.S.
decisionmaking outside the Security Council as consistent

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with a unilateralist policy course that resulted in the
disastrous state of Iraq, and which threatens destabilizing
military strikes against Iran. This spin reinforces the
appeal of Putin's emphasis on the restoration of Russian
power, a policy course that is endorsed across the political
spectrum. Pro-Western liberals, ranging from Garry Kasparov,
to Anatoliy Chubais and Vladimir Ryzhkov reinforce that the
emotional backlash to UDI among the Russian public will have
"disastrous" consequences for U.S.-Russian relations.

-- Confidence in Manipulating the Kosovo "Precedent:" While
Putin has not tipped his hand, many analysts believe that
Russia will trumpet, but ultimately pocket, the "Kosovo
precedent." The application of UDI outside Kosovo will
remain a sword of Damocles in Russia's hair-trigger relations
with Georgia and a reminder to the Moldovan government of the
need to keep Russian interests at the center of negotiations
over Transnistria. Russia retains the option of provocative
steps that fall short of recognition of Abkhazia or
Transnistria, which will be justified by the GOR as a
necessary response to the domestic political pressures
generated by Kosovo's independence.

-- Conclusion that Russia Wins Both Ways: The policy
community is primed to deliver a victory to the Russian
government regardless of the outcome in Kosovo. If Kosovo's
independence is deferred, Russia's policy is vindicated; if
UDI is recognized, Russia's principled stand and Munich
critique of the West (read: U.S.) is validated.

Expected Russian Reaction to UDI
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4. (C) A win-win calculation does not preclude Russian
actions to increase the cost of Kosovo's independence to the
West. While Putin is the ultimate arbiter of the Russian
reaction, with policy deliberations limited to a small circle
of insiders, we believe the likely range of actions includes:

-- Challenge to UDI's Legal Basis: The GOR will oppose any
effort to justify Kosovo's supervised independence within the
framework of UNSC 1244, or to link the standing-up of an ESDP
mission to the current UN mandate, and will appeal to
non-permanent UNSC members, China, and European
fence-sitters. We expect Russia will move to close the OSCE
Mission in Kosovo, assuming that Serbia concludes it
infringes on its sovereignty in a post-UDI environment.

-- Non-recognition of Kosovo: In the absence of a negotiated
settlement, Russia will not recognize Kosovo and will use its
Security Council veto to ensure that Kosovo is not admitted
into the United Nations.

-- Flirtation with Recognition of Abkhazia: On balance, we
believe that the GOR would strongly prefer to avoid the
prospect of instability in the North Caucasus during an
election season that recognition of Abkhazia and the
all-but-certain Georgian military response could generate.
Despite frequent warnings from Lavrov not to underestimate
the domestic pressure for Russian tit-for-tat declarations of
independence, our best guess is that the Russian leadership
will resort (at least as a first step) to less incendiary
gambits: announcing new infrastructure or investment projects
that further bind Russia to the breakaway Georgian province,
the stationing of diplomatic personnel to provide consular
services to the large "Russian" (or Russian passport holding)
population, and higher-level engagement with the unrecognized
regimes' leaders.

-- Acceptance of De Facto Partition or a "New Abkhazia" in
Europe: While Russian leaders will reiterate that partition
was not a solution advocated or sought by the GOR, they will
accept de facto Serbian partition of Northern Kosovo as the
natural consequence of UDI. Former Prime Minister (and
favored Putin envoy) Primakov remains an open advocate of
partition, and even moderate foreign policy analysts such as
Dmitriy Trenin view it as the best possible outcome.

-- Tacit Encouragement of Republika Srpska: Officially,
Russia will not walk back its support for Dayton and its
agreement on the need to strengthen Bosnian federal
institutions; in practice, however, it could intensify
criticism of High Representative Lajcak, implicitly encourage
Republika Srpska (RS) PM Dodik's actions to challenge Dayton,
and fan Serbian efforts to draw a direct linkage between
Kosovo and RS.

-- Condemnation of the U.S.: Russian officials will paint
American assurances to the Kosovars as proof that the U.S.
never supported a negotiated outcome. The Slavic/Orthodox
Christian card, barely touched in the lead up to UDI
(although the Serbian Deputy Foreign Minister recently was

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accorded a televised meeting with the Patriarch),likely will
be played, intensifying domestic Russian disenchantment.
Kosovo remains a neuralgic subject and a reminder of the
foreign policy "humiliations" of the Yeltsin years; Russians
will readily rally against U.S. actions.

Mitigating the After-effects of UDI
--------------


5. (C) We believe the following building blocks are
necessary to limit the damage to U.S.-Russian relations and
constrain Russian retaliatory policies:

-- Maintain European Unity: Strong German and French
support for Kosovo's independence, ideally timed with (or
before) U.S. recognition, would deny Russia the propaganda
point that this is a U.S.-driven process. Maintaining EU
unity and seamlessly standing-up both an ESDP mission and a
potential OMIK follow-on organization would be powerful
signals that Russia is isolated in its opposition.

-- Keep China on the margins: The fact that China has not
viewed Kosovo as a central issue has denied Russia a powerful
one-two punch and reinforces the GOR's relative isolation in
the Kosovo debate. An unsatisfactory outcome would be for a
UDI to produce a closer Russian-Chinese alliance that slows
U.S. and European policy efforts on both Kosovo and Iran.

-- Lay down unequivocal marker on Georgian territorial
integrity: The U.S. should deliver a strongly worded private
message to the Russians, coordinated with EU partners,
reinforcing international rejection of a Kosovo precedent and
spelling out the consequences of a Russian tit-for-tat
recognition.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) We should not misinterpret Russia's relaxed posture
leading up to the conclusion of the Troika negotiations. UDI
has all the makings of a trainwreck on an issue that ignites
powerful emotions and evokes unpleasant historical memories.
At this stage, managing the aftermath to reinforce areas of
U.S.-Russian strategic cooperation and to minimize the
potential for rash miscalculation -- particularly with
respect to Georgia -- is essential.
BURNS