DFM KARASIN ON UKRAINE, BELARUS, GEORGIA, MOLDOVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005478

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN ON UKRAINE, BELARUS, GEORGIA, MOLDOVA
AND KOSOVO

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) Summary. In a November 21 meeting with the
Ambassador, DFM Karasin requested the USG's understanding of
the "erroneous" Ukrainian interpretation of "Holodomor
(1932-33 famine)" and other events that happened during WW2.
He urged that the USG lift the sanctions imposed by the U.S.
Treasury against Belarus's biggest petrochemical
conglomerate, Belneftekhim. Karasin previewed the GOR's
intention to raise the two South Ossetian peacekeepers in
Georgian custody since August 20 at the OSCE Madrid
Ministerial. He did not rule out a possibility of Russia -
Georgia foreign ministers meeting on the margins of the
Madrid ministerial. Karasin reiterated his earlier statement
that the GOR did not object to Philip Remler's candidacy as
the next OSCE Moldova Head of Mission (HOM) although he
worried about the "propriety" of the U.S. keeping the job for
the eighth time. End summary.

Holodomor and Roman Shukhevich
--------------


2. (C) Karasin opened his November 21 meeting with the
Ambassador by stressing the need for a clear understanding of
historical facts, then underlining Russia's concern with the
"erroneous tonality" of the Ukrainian authorities'
interpretation of the Holodomor as a genocide specifically
targeted at Ukrainians. No one disputes that the Holodomor
occurred, but equating it with the Holocaust while ignoring
other victims -- Kazakhs, Russians and Belarusians-- would be
unethical, Karasin said. He claimed that this "skewed"
interpretation was in evidence at the Holodomor exhibition at
the Ukrainian Cultural Center. (On November 19, a group of
activists from the Eurasian Youth Union raided and damaged
the exhibition in protest. The MFA criticized the
exhibition, but condemned the youths' behavior.) The GOR had
no problem supporting the recent UNESCO resolution honoring
Holodomor victims which, at the GOR's urging had added other
nations to the list of victims and removed the reference to
genocide.


3. (C) Karasin argued that Ukrainian President Yushchenko's
November 13-15 visit to Israel should have made him more
sensitive to the implications of awarding the title of Hero
of Ukraine to Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) leader Roman
Shukhevich. Shukhevich had been known as a Nazi
collaborator, Karasin said.

Belneftekhim
--------------


4. (C) Karasin requested that the USG unfreeze
Belneftekhim's assets. He termed the November 12 Treasury
decision to implement sanctions again Belarus's biggest
petrochemical conglomerate "incomprehensible," and noted the
impact the freeze would have on the Belarusian economy.

Georgia
--------------


5. (C) Karasin described Georgian First Deputy Foreign
Minister Vashkidze's November 9 Moscow visit as "fruitless."
According to Karasin, Vashkidze suggested that "The two
countries should improve their relationship." at the same
time that Russia was being portrayed in the ugliest possible
light during the Georgian election campaign. The approach
did not resonate well in Moscow, Karasin said. The GOR would
continue to engage directly with the Georgians, not through
the media. He warned against possible Georgian military
"adventurism" in South Ossetia, which could be catalyzed by
the "simpleminded logic" that events on the streets of
Tbilisi are somehow connected with South Ossetia. He urged
that the U.S. use its "special" relationship with Georgia to
avert tensions in South Ossetia. The Ambassador replied that
the U.S. had been clear publicly and privately about its
concerns about recent problems in Georgia but emphasized the
need for Russia also to show restraint in its rhetoric and
actions, and to urge restraint by its own friends in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. The Ambassador also expressed
appreciation for regular communications with Karasin and the
GOR on Georgia. Karasin said the GOR also found said
communication to be very helpful.


6. (C) Karasin expressed frustration at the GOG's "lopsided"
application of UNSC 1781 on Abkhazia: focusing only on the
right of the IDPs' return while ignoring other parts of the
resolution, such as the expansion of UN monitoring to areas
between the conflict zone and the Kodori Gorge. Karasin
recalled that the GOG was neglecting the UNSYG's
recommendation that the Patriot Youth Camp be closed. He
said that talk of an alternative government in South Ossetia

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only aggravated the situation. The JCC meeting in Tbilisi
was important, although it produced few results.

OSCE Ministerial Preview
--------------


7. (C) Karasin said that the GOR is planning to raise at the
Madrid OSCE Ministerial the fates of two South Ossetian
soldiers in Georgian custody for over two months. In
response to the Ambassador's question, he did not rule out a
meeting between Lavrov and Bezhuashvili in Madrid, and said
Lavrov would be ready to meet if the Georgians were.

OSCE Moldova HOM
--------------


8. (C) Karasin reiterated that he did not object to Philip
Remler's candidacy for the HOM OSCE Moldova job. He
wondered, however, about the "propriety" of reserving the job
for an American for the eighth time in a row, and recalled
that any decision has to be made in accordance with OSCE
procedures and with the agreement of the Moldovan government.

Kosovo
--------------


9. (C) Asked by the Ambassador about the impact on the
frozen conflicts of Kosovo's possible unilateral declaration
of independence, DFM Karasin quickly said, "They'd better
not." He refrained from "painting a post-December 10
picture, noting that the new international situation that it
will trigger could introduce a variety of unknown
consequences." Karasin reiterated the GOR position -- delay
the decision at least till the middle of 2008.
BURNS