KOSOVO: RUSSIAN FORECAST FOR "THE DAY AFTER;"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005434

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KS RS
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: RUSSIAN FORECAST FOR "THE DAY AFTER;"
BOSNIA


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary. Russia's Kosovo Troika Envoy
Botsan-Kharchenko told us that FM Lavrov is preparing a
letter to Rice, FM Steinmeier, and EU Solana raising concern
over a possible unilateral Kosovar declaration of
independence on December 11. The letter will also underscore
the rise of radical Albanian groups in Kosovo and neighboring
states, and argue that Kosovar Serbs are resistant to an
international presence in Northern Kosovo -- sowing the seeds
for a "new Abkhazia." Botsan-Kharchenko saw differences
between Kostunica and Tadic that could have relevance after
the Serbian presidential elections. He clarified that the
GOR did not oppose Office of the High Representative (OHR)
measures to strengthen central Bosnian institutions, but
rejected HR Lajcak's use of the Bonn Powers over consensus
building. While he thought the Republika Srpska's (RS)
overall goal was not to secede from Bosnia, the RS
leadership's use of a Kosovo precedent was an example of why
Russia did not support Kosovo's unilateral independence. End
Summary.

Lavrov's Letter
--------------


2. (C) In a November 16 meeting, Special Envoy for the
Balkans Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko told us that FM Lavrov
was preparing a letter for Rice, FM Steinmeier and EU Solana
detailing concerns about next steps in Kosovo. Lavrov will
warn against Kosovo's readiness to declare independence on
December 11, without allowing time for the contact group or
UNSC to discuss the results of the Troika process, and allude
again to U.S. encouragement of Kosovar actions that undercut
the seriousness of the Troika. Conceding the likelihood of a
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI),
Botsan-Kharchenko argued that the US should not oppose a
reasonable amount of time to analyze the report, and stressed
that U.S. influence was essential to restrain Pristina from a
precipitous UDI. Noting that European Union unity would be
very difficult to achieve in the wake of a UDI,
Botsan-Kharchenko argued that Kosovar actions would raise
substantial issues over the legality of successor
international missions.


3. (C) According to Botsan-Kharchenko, Lavrov will also
refer to Russian concerns about security in the greater
Kosovo neighborhood, noting a rise in the activity of
Albanian radical groups both in Kosovo and in
Albanian-majority areas in southern Serbia (Presevo Valley)
and Macedonia. While Belgrade had pledged that the Serbian
military would not be involved in any punitive reaction to
UDI, Botsan-Kharchenko said "let's be frank" -- there was
evidence of the presence of armed para-military
organizations, which Balkan history suggested would be the
vehicle for unrest.


4. (C) Lavrov will underscore Russia's assessment that the
Kosovar Serbs will reject an international presence such as
an ESDP mission. Noting the northern enclaves' already
separate existence from the south, which was reinforced by
Serbian encouragement of an electoral boycott,
Botsan-Kharchenko forecast that Kosovo's unilateral
declaration of independence would produce a "new Abkhazia" --
a constituent element of a country that it repudiated, with
the sympathy and financial support of Belgrade. He said that
the international presence -- UNMIK, KFOR, and civilians --
plays an integrating role, but there would likely be de facto
partition after a UDI. If there was a "day-after scenario,"
he speculated, this was it for Belgrade. We argued that the
international community, Russia included, did not need a "new
Abkhazia" and should take steps (i.e. encouraging Kosovar
Serb electoral participation) to mediate against this
development, but Botsan-Kharchenko did not signal Russian
opposition to de facto partition.


5. (C) Finally, Botsan-Kharchenko said that Lavrov may also
discuss the GOR differences over Ischinger's paper (including
the absence of a point refraining the Kosovars from acting
unilaterally),while emphasizing Belgrade's proposal for a
Hong Kong model.

Tadic and Kostunica
--------------


6. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko reiterated his admiration of the
Troika's dynamics, noting that all three members were willing
to work creatively to find a workable solution. He expressed
some regret that the confederation (CIS, or Germany) model
had been rejected by both sides, but suggested that there
might be some daylight between Kostunica and Tadic.
Kostunica, he noted, had rejected the proposal without

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hesitation, and reconfirmed his opposition in a letter to FM
Steinmeier whereas Tadic had merely expressed disappointment
at the Kosovar's rejection of all proposals, including
confederation, except independence. While Russia did not
seek to exaggerate the point, advisers around Tadic suggested
that after next year's presidential elections, he would be
able to show more flexibility on Kosovo within the framework
of the "common roof" approach to confederation.

Bosnia
--------------


7. (C) We expressed concern over the growing crisis in
Bosnia-Herzogovenia, Belgrade encouragement of Republika
Srpska (RS) actions as a tactic to increase pressure on the
international community over Kosovo, and the prospect of an
unhelpful UNSC presentation by former BS Chairman of the
Council of Ministers Spiric. Botsan-Kharchenko replied that
Russia had predicted and warned of the possible effect of
Kosovo's independence aspirations on RS, but stressed the
Russian assessment that secession was not the RS's goal. RS
PM Dodik did not seek secession -- either for independence or
to join Serbia -- but sought to preserve the Serbian entity
in Bosnia. Botsan-Kharchenko reiterated Russian support for
Dayton, and for Bosnia-Herzegovenia's territorial integrity.
Russian support for the Bosnian state was one reason why it
opposed independence for Kosovo.


8. (C) While supporting stronger federal institutions,
Botsan-Kharchenko said that Russia opposed the High
Representative Lajcak's tactics, as evidenced in his October
19 measures. Lajcak had resorted too quickly to the Bonn
Powers. For reforms to be fully implemented and felt, the
GOR believed that the HighRep needed to work harder to find
consensus among the Bosnian leadership in order to ensure
local ownership of the policies. While Lajcak's goal was to
make the Council of Ministers more effective, RS opposition
to the October 19 measures had the opposite effect.
Botsan-Kharchenko noted parenthetically that Russia was also
unhappy over the obstacles allegedly created by the OHR
(specifically referring to Lajcak's deputy) against Russian
businesses in the RS.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) By hinting at differences between Tadic and Kostunica
now, the GOR may be seeking to give wavering EU countries
ammunition to delay ending the negotiating process before
Serbian elections are held in mid-January and the subsequent
government has time to engage.
BURNS