Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5405
2007-11-15 16:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

REMOVAL OF HIGH-THREAT RADIOACTIVE SOURCES FROM

Tags:  KNNP PARM ENRG PREL IAEA GG RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #5405 3191632
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151632Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5268
INFO RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 3853
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0510
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005405 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE/NNSA FOR TOBEY/CONNERY/LOONEY
DOE/NNSA/NA-21 FOR BIENIAWSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017
TAGS: KNNP PARM ENRG PREL IAEA GG RS
SUBJECT: REMOVAL OF HIGH-THREAT RADIOACTIVE SOURCES FROM
ABKHAZIA

REF: A. STATE 137084

B. MOSCOW 5044

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005405

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DOE/NNSA FOR TOBEY/CONNERY/LOONEY
DOE/NNSA/NA-21 FOR BIENIAWSKI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2017
TAGS: KNNP PARM ENRG PREL IAEA GG RS
SUBJECT: REMOVAL OF HIGH-THREAT RADIOACTIVE SOURCES FROM
ABKHAZIA

REF: A. STATE 137084

B. MOSCOW 5044

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Rosatom International Affairs Director Vladimir
Kuchinov called in EST Counselor November 14 to follow up on
our earlier approaches to Rosatom and MFA regarding removal
of high-threat radioactive sources from Abkhazia. Kuchinov
confirmed that Rosatom Director Sergey Kiriyenko had not
agreed (and would not agree) to fund a storage facility in
Abkhazia.


2. (C) Kuchinov stated that Russia agrees with the U.S. that
the continued storage of the materials at the two institutes
in Sukhumi is dangerous and that the materials should be
removed as soon as possible. However, Kuchinov informed us
that the GOR does not support moving the materials to the
storage facility in Mtskheta, outside Tbilisi. He said the
GOR believes conditions in Georgia are too unstable.
Instead, Kuchinov said the GOR proposes moving the materials
to a facility in Russia. Kuchinov did not specify which
facility, but said that there were various options. Kuchinov
added that the GOR had made only "preliminary contact" with
de facto Abkhaz authorities on this idea.


3. (C) Kuchinov said Russia would like to work with the U.S.
on removal of the materials. Rosatom Deputy Director Ivan
Kamenskikh intends to discuss the matter with DOE Principal
Assistant Deputy Administrator Ken Baker in Moscow on the
margins of late November talks on finalizing the Bratislava
report. Russia would also like to coordinate with the USG on
how to raise the matter with Georgia. Kuchinov told us the
GOR had decided not to discuss the matter in detail with the
Abkhaz de facto authorities or at all with the Georgian
government prior to getting the U.S. reaction to the idea of
moving the material to Russia.


4. (C) Comment and action request: Coordinating with the GOR
on moving the high-threat radioactive sources from Abkhazia
to Russia would appear to be the quickest way of achieving
U.S. nonproliferation objectives. It would also represent an
opportunity to demonstrate practical bilateral
nonproliferation cooperation. Post requests Washington's
guidance on whether the U.S. would be willing to take Russia
up on the offer to coordinate on removal of the materials to
a Russian installation.
BURNS