Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5402
2007-11-15 16:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

DFM KARASIN ON GEORGIA

Tags:  PGOV PREL GG RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7484
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #5402 3191613
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151613Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5260
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 3852
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005402 

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG RS
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN ON GEORGIA

REF: MOSCOW 5371

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005402

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL GG RS
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN ON GEORGIA

REF: MOSCOW 5371

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) On November 15, Ambassador outlined to Deputy Foreign
Minister Karasin both the public and private messages
delivered to Saakashvilli and other Georgian officials by DAS
Bryza during his November 11-14 trip to Tbilisi. The
Ambassador noted that Bryza conveyed to the GOG the
Secretary's firm message that the state of emergency must be

SIPDIS
lifted and that all TV broadcasts (especially Imedi TV) must
be resumed if the GOG is to restore faith in Georgia's
democratic reforms and retain U.S. support. Karasin
expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts to end the current
crisis in Georgia as well as our regular communication on the
matter with the GOR (reftel).


2. (C) Karasin noted that on November 14 he had seen Abkhaz
foreign minister Shamba, who appeared relatively "relaxed"
about the situation in Abkhazia. Karasin told the Ambassador
he was more worried about the possibility of rising tensions
in South Ossetia. He said the GOR understood Saakashvilli
was "nervous" about his political mistakes in Tbilisi and
might seek to "ratchet up" tension in South Ossetia to
distract Georgians' attention from their domestic troubles.
Karasin emphasized that any increase in tensions on the
Georgian side would be a "big mistake" and urged the U.S. to
remain "vigilant." The Ambassador took Karasin's concern on
board, but underscored U.S. expectations that the GOR would
use its influence to restrain the South Ossetians and
Abkhazians from attempting to use the current crisis to their
advantage.


3. (C) The Ambassador noted Saakashvilli's concerns of a
buildup of Russian troops and equipment in Abkhazia. Karasin
insisted that these claims were untrue and that a UN
observers' report had corroborated the limited number of
Russian troops in the region. Ambassador nevertheless
re-emphasized the importance of Russian restraint.


4. (U) Following the GOR announcement on November 13 that it
withdrew the last Russian troops from its base in Batumi, a
Russian Defense Ministry official noted in the press that
there were no more Russian military bases in Georgia. (Note:
The GOR does not consider the Gudauta facility a Russian
military installation. End note.)
BURNS