Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5387
2007-11-15 10:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK: IRAN, MD, CFE, BILATERAL,

Tags:  PREL PGOV PARM MARR EAIR KCRM KJUS RS 
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VZCZCXRO7233
OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHROV
DE RUEHMO #5387/01 3191003
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151003Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5233
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005387 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MARR EAIR KCRM KJUS RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK: IRAN, MD, CFE, BILATERAL,
ISRAEL VISIT


MOSCOW 00005387 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005387

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM MARR EAIR KCRM KJUS RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DFM KISLYAK: IRAN, MD, CFE, BILATERAL,
ISRAEL VISIT


MOSCOW 00005387 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary : In a November 14 meeting (other topics
septel),DFM Kislyak told the Ambassador that the postponed
Solana-Jalili dialogue, potential Chinese FM visit to Tehran,
and imminent IAEA report may have prompted Chinese
cancellation of the November 19 P5 1 meeting. Kislyak
expected little progress on the IAEA plan, and suggested
internal disagreements within the Iranian leadership. On
missile defense, he stressed a growing "credibility gap"
between proposals raised during the 2 2 meetings and
subsequent U.S. statements, and said Russia would focus on
three key elements when evaluating the final U.S. paper.
While reaffirming that Russia sought solutions in the CFE
negotiations, Kislyak flagged growing differences on Moldova,
Georgia and flank restrictions. The Ambassador briefed
Kislyak on DOJ/State meetings on implementation of the
European Convention on Prisoner Transfer and flagged dates
for discussions on state flights, with Kislyak committing to
an MFA "backup" (but not necessarily leadership) in the GOR
delegation. Kislyak welcomed the proposed economic dialogue
led by U/S Jeffery, and reiterated his doubts about U.S.
willingness to proceed on 123. Kislyak will be in Jerusalem
November 16, in follow-on discussions to PM Olmert's October
Moscow talks. End Summary

Iran, PRC Postponement of P5 1, IAEA
--------------


2. (C) In a November 14 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy
Foreign Minister Kislyak said that he had "no clue" why the
Chinese abruptly postponed the scheduled November 19 meeting
of the P5 1 in Brussels. Kislyak discounted lingering
unhappiness over the Dalai Lama visit to Washington D.C., and
noted the official reason conveyed to both the French hosts
and the Russians was that the new Chinese Political Director

was required to travel elsewhere in the region. Since the
PRC had submitted its comments on the UK draft paper, the GOR
had no reason to expect a postponement. The Ambassador noted
Washington's concern over the Chinese decision and encouraged
the GOR to keep the PRC focused on the P5 1 track.


3. (C) Kislyak speculated that the Chinese were waiting for
the results of the next Solana-Larijani-Jalili meeting, which
was supposed to have taken place in early November. (Kislyak
added that the GOR played a helpful role in pushing Jalili to
finally "answer the phone" when Solana called to reschedule.
Although DFM Vaidi subsequently confirmed a meeting during
the third week of November, Kislyak underscored that Iranians
appeared locked in internal debates over next steps.)
Kislyak also pointed to corroborated reports that the Chinese
FM planned to visit Tehran; while the Russians had expected
the visit to occur November 9 or November 12, Kislyak did not
rule out a postponement. Kislyak concluded that the
outstanding Solana dialogue, the potential Chinese FM visit,
and the imminent IAEA report may have driven the Chinese
delay. While France had "toyed" with the idea of inviting an
alternate Chinese MFA official (equivalent to MFA Director
for Disarmament Antonov),which Russia could accept, the GOR
would reject a session with only the Chinese Ambassador in
attendance. "We need a meeting with meat."


4. (C) Kislyak predicted that the IAEA report would contain
a mix of good and bad. While the Iranians had provided some
additional information, El Baradei had not given Russia any
reason to believe that Iran had satisfied outstanding IAEA
concerns.

MD Paper: Credibility Gap
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador stressed that the missile defense
paper outlining the proposals raised during the October 2 2
would be forthcoming shortly. Kislyak underscored the need
to have the paper 10 days in advance of the November 26
Washington session, arguing that "we need something to
discuss." Kislyak volunteered that he was not encouraged by
the statements from senior U.S. officials, which appeared to
walk back or repudiate undertakings made in Moscow. The MFA
kept track of the evolving public posture of the U.S.,
Kislyak commented, and was struck by the inconsistencies
between statements made in Moscow, versus Prague. Kislyak
commented that the GOR had given up trying to characterize
the U.S. proposals for others, given the mixed signals since
the departure of the Secretary and Gates. The Ambassador
responded that the GOR knew what it heard, and it should
expect the paper to correspond with the Moscow discussions.
The GOR should not jump to conclusions before it sees the
paper.


6. (C) Kislyak stressed that the Russians would be looking

MOSCOW 00005387 002.2 OF 003


for three elements raised during the course of the 2 2 and
discussed with Ltg Obering: deferral of the stationing of
missiles in the ground until the Iranian threat became a
reality; a decision to not activate the radar until
necessary; and the presence of Russian military at the sites
in the Czech Republic and Poland. Citing statements made by
USDP Edelman in Prague over the prospective site visits by
the GOR, Kislyak concluded that "this is quite a different
version" of the Rice-Gates proposal. The Ambassador again
urged Kislyak not to jump to conclusions.

CFE: Growing Differences
--------------


7. (C) Kislyak noted that the U.S. was late in delivering a
CFE paper, which would be the basis for the DAS Kramer
discussion with MFA Director Antonov on November 16.
Commenting on the negotiating process, Kislyak said "we are
not sitting idly by, but do not understand where we are
moving." The Ambassador pushed back, underscoring the serious
effort and high-level attention invested in addressing
Russian concerns. While there were legal limits on some
issues, such as the provisional application of the A/CFE, the
U.S. delegation had shown creativity in trying to outline a
resolution of existing disputes. Kislyak backtracked a
little, stressing that MFA Director Antonov likewise was
under instructions to find solutions, not to create
roadblocks in the discussions.


8. (C) Kislyak insisted that all parties needed to work
harder to overcome the widening differences on Moldova and
Georgia. Kislyak highlighted confusion over the civilian
observer presence in Moldova, terming the U.S. proposal for
500 OSCE personnel "mindboggling." While Russia was prepared
to find a mutually acceptable formula, it would oppose
efforts to solve Transnistria through the CFE. "This is
unrealistic and we won't do it." If the plan was to use 500
OSCE monitors to oversee 200 Russian peacekeepers,
demilitarize the area, and then replace Russian forces,
"don't waste our time." Kislyak reiterated longstanding
Russian complaints over the Moldovan transit regime, which
complicated the local environment. On Georgia, Kislyak said
that Russia believed Saakashvili was considering ratification
of CFE, but would not accept the presence of the Russian
logistic and supply unit Abkhazia, which was a GOG
"obligation." While acknowledging the Ambassador's point
that Tbilisi was preoccupied with other issues, Kislyak
insisted that more had to be done, and more quickly, if a
standoff were to be avoided.


9. (C) On flanks, Kislyak stressed that Russia had received
no commitment at all to eliminate the restrictions on Russian
forces. "You have shown us some carrots, but don't let us
chew." Kislyak underscored that Russia would not act on the
basis of Western promises of a better future regime. The
Ambassador commented that it was the GOR that had created
artificial time lines and urged Russia to postpone its
decision to suspend on December 12. Kislyak stressed that
the political decision to suspend had already been made and
Putin was committed to carrying through if Russian red-lines
were not addressed. The Ambassador reiterated that flank
restrictions were not an issue for the U.S. to resolve; they
were a core element of the Treaty, and the primary attraction
for many participating states. Kislyak said Russia found
those arguments unconvincing, with some countries hiding
behind Turkey. Russia did not threaten Turkey, and the ratio
of assets was overwhelmingly in the GOT's favor.

Bilateral: Kuznetsov, Jeffery Visit, State Flights, 123
-------------- --------------


10. (C) The Ambassador briefed Kislyak on the visiting
DOJ/State team's discussions with their Russian counterparts
on the implementation of the European Convention on Prison
Transfer, and its possible application to convicted Russian
diplomat Kuznetsov. The Ambassador emphasized that despite
Kuznetsov's appeal, the U.S. would begin processing the
paperwork for a potential request to transfer Kuznetsov under
the Convention, which would save time in the event that
Kuznetsov's appeal was unsuccessful. While no promises could
be made about the outcome of a transfer request, the U.S.
team was able to brief on the technical requirements of the
Convention.


11. (C) On the issue of state flights, the Ambassador
flagged an imminent invitation to the GOR from Ambassador
McDonald, to hold negotiations in Washington during the end
of November or first week of December. The Ambassador
stressed that Ambassador McDonald was the lead on this issue
in the U.S. interagency, and urged Kislyak to provide a MFA
counterpart to head the Russian delegation. Kislyak

MOSCOW 00005387 003.2 OF 003


undertook to speak to the navigation services, but stressed
that the Federal Aviation and Navigation Agency was "very
practical" and, in any event, there would be MFA "backup" to
the Russian delegation. The Ambassador underscored that the
U.S. viewed the issue in political, not technical, terms.


12. (C) Kislyak confirmed First Deputy Prime Minister
Denisov's interest in an economic dialogue with U/S Rubin
Jeffery, and said the only difficulty would be scheduling.
The GOR hoped the Jeffery-Denisov channel would allow for a
broad strategic discussion of economic issues. The
Ambassador said the U.S. understood the time constraint
facing Denisov, and that the first round was deliberately
proposed for Moscow in order to facilitate the discussion.


13. (C) Welcoming the finalization of the Plutonium
Disposition Joint Statement, Kislyak questioned the
Ambassador on the status of the 123. Kislyak asked
sarcastically, "should I break out the champagne?" The
Ambassador said there was no reason for Kislyak to be
cynical. While the document remained at the White House and
outstanding concerns remained over one issue (septel),the
administration was committed to moving forward on cooperation
in civilian nuclear energy with Russia and viewed it as a
strategic interest. Kislyak noted his pessimistic personal
assessment, based on mounting reports that the Lantos bill
had become the litmus test for cooperation with Russia.

Jerusalem Bound
--------------


14. (SBU) Kislyak noted that he would be in Israel for
political director-level discussions on November 17,
following on PM Olmert's productive October 17 visit to
Moscow. (Kislyak, no athlete himself, took evident pleasure
in having scored a VIP seat for the Russian-Israel soccer
match. While a self-professed novice to the game, he
appeared gripped by the geopolitics of Russia's possible
advancement in the FIFA cup.)
BURNS