MFA ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005371

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: MFA ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN GEORGIA

Classified By: A/DCM ALICE G. WELLS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: In a November 13 conversation, the
Ambassador reinforced with DFM Denisov U.S. efforts in
Tbilisi and urged GOR restraint. In a separate meeting, MFA
Fourth CIS Department Director Kelin welcomed EUR DAS Bryza's
statements encouraging the Georgian leadership to restore the
political process in Georgia. Kelin doubted the GOG would
conduct fully democratic presidential elections on January 5,
but argued that the Georgian opposition was a politically
relevant force, if still weakened from previous GOG arrests
and harassment Kelin flatly denied that there was a troop
build-up in Abkhazia, stressing that any detected movements
were part of the normal rotation of troops and equipment.
Kelin and Georgian Charge Shugarov separately described the
November 9 meeting between DFM Karasin and Georgian DFM
Vashikadze as "very difficult." Karasin viewed as premature
Vashikadze's proposal to establish a dialogue on normalizing
bilateral ties, particularly any time before the December 2
Duma elections, but FM Lavrov may agree to meet Georgian FM
Bezuashvili on the margins of the upcoming OSCE Ministerial.
Karasin lectured Vashikadze on the need for Tbilisi to set a
democratic example for South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
Pro-Kremlin youth groups have organized demonstrations
outside the Georgian embassy, but turnout remains low. End
Summary.

Georgia's Domestic Politics
--------------


2. (C) On November 13, the Ambassador reiterated to DFM
Denisov U.S. efforts in Tbilisi and underscored the need for
Russian restraint. In a separate meeting with MFA Fourth CIS
Department Director Andrey Kelin, we reviewed EUR DAS Matthew
Bryza's calls for an immediate end to the state of emergency,
the return of independent media (especially Imedi TV),and
the need to take steps to address the fundamental political,
economic, and social challenges in Georgia. Kelin was
pleased that the U.S. and the EU were expressing its concerns
about the Georgian government's behavior in a public manner
(and not simply behind closed doors),although he had
received reports that Imedi TV would not be reopened.


3. (C) Kelin welcomed Bryza's engagement with Georgian
opposition figures and agreed that Georgia took the right
step by calling for early presidential elections. However,
Kelin cast serious doubt on the fairness and openness of the
electoral process. He stressed that the January 5 election
is sandwiched between major holidays in Georgia (Christmas
and New Years on one side and Orthodox Christmas on the other
side) and is only weeks away, making it difficult to organize
election observers. Kelin underscored that the GOG still has
not lifted the state of emergency, the ban on independent
media remains in effect, and the opposition parties will not
have enough time to mount an effective campaign.


4. (C) Kelin argued that the Georgian opposition had come
back from political near-death to constitute a politically
relevant force. However, he downplayed prospects of
unseating Saakashvili in the upcoming elections mainly
because the GOG arrested or removed from politics the most
charismatic leaders prior to the previous presidential
elections. He called the current opposition leaders only
"remnants of the opposition movement." He noted that the GOG
moved especially hard against current leaders Tsotne
Gamsakhurdia and Shalva Natelashvili, who are facing charges
of espionage and conspiracy to overthrow the government, but
denied press reports that they had sought refuge in Russia.

Karasin-Vashikadze Meeting
--------------


5. (C) Kelin stressed that the GOR was reluctant to go ahead
with the already scheduled November 9 meeting between DFM
Karasin and Vashikadze, given the expulsion of three Russian
diplomats in Tbilisi. "As we expected," Kelin said, "the
Georgians came here empty handed." He noted that Vashikadze
proposed only that a "channel" of communication be
established, but the substance or format of the communication
remained unclear. Kelin noted that Vashikadze suggested that
FM Lavrov and FM Bezuashvili meet on the margins of the
upcoming OSCE Ministerial. Although Kelin thought Lavrov
would not oppose the meeting, Karasin underscored for
Vashikadze the need for positive signals from Tbilisi, such
as the release of the two detained South Ossetian
peacekeepers, before a formal channel can be established.


6. (C) Karasin also told Vashikadze that the expulsion of
the Russian DCM in Tbilisi was especially offensive to the
GOR, given that minister counselors "cannot be involved" in
the work of security services. Characterizing the expulsions
as a "deliberate demonstration of subversive action," Karasin

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said the latest GOG actions left a "very bad impression" on
the GOR.


7. (C) Georgian Charge Givi Shugarov separately told us that
the Karasin-Vashikadze meeting was "very difficult." Karasin
told Vashikadze that the "unprecedented" expulsion of the
Russian diplomats and the strong anti-Russian rhetoric from
Saakashvili and other GOG officials made it very difficult
for the GOR to agree to a dialogue on normalizing relations
with the GOG. Karasin stressed that Russian society,
particularly in the run up to the December 2 Duma elections,
would not accept such "normalization." Shugarov said Karasin
insisted that Russia does not have "aggressive intentions" in
Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Karasin noted that Russia is not
interested in annexing either of these territories and
pressed the GOG to "lead by example" by adopting policies
that would attract the Abkhaz and South Ossetians to Tbilisi,
underscoring that pictures of police beating demonstrators in
front of Parliament was counterproductive on many fronts.

Russian Troop and Arms Build-up in Abkhazia?
--------------


8. (C) When asked about recent GOG statements of increased
Russian activity in Abkhazia, Kelin flatly denied the
accusations. Kelin said that Defense Ministry officials had
confirmed prior to our meeting that the only activity taking
place in Omchamir, Abkhazia, was the "normal rotation" of
troops and suggested that any movement of arms was directly
related to the "normal process." (Note: Press reports
indicate that Russian Deputy Chief of Staff of Land Forces
Yevnevich called the Georgian allegations a "canard." End
note.) We urged Russia to refrain from actions or statements
that would only worsen the political situation in Georgia.

Demonstrations Outside of Georgian Embassy
--------------


9. (C) Shugarov confirmed that approximately 40
demonstrators from the pro-Kremlin youth group Young Russia
demonstrated peacefully outside the Georgian embassy on
November 12, focusing their ire on Saakashvili, while
praising the friendship of the Georgian and Russian nations.
We observed around 15 protesters around the corner from the
Georgian embassy on November 13, who were carefully watched
by seven police officers. Shugarov said the demonstrators
are generally members of pro-Kremlin groups Young Russia,
Young Guard, or Nashi.


10. (C) Kelin assured us that Moscow Mayor Luzhkov's office
provides ample protection around the Georgian embassy every
time a Russian organization applies for permission to hold a
rally outside the embassy. When asked about Luzhkov's strong
public statements on the need for the GOR to recognize the
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Kelin noted that
Luzhkov's comments should be taken as those from "a private
citizen" and do not represent the official Russian position.

BURNS