DFM KARASIN URGES TOUGHER U.S. POSTURE ON GEORGIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005354

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: DFM KARASIN URGES TOUGHER U.S. POSTURE ON GEORGIA

REF: A. MOSCOW 5336

B. TBILISI 2791

Classified By: A/DCM Alice G. Wells: Reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: Prior to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister's
November 9 meeting with GOG DFM Vashakidze, the Ambassador
reinforced U.S. expectations that Russia would do all it
could to de-escalate and calm the situation in Tbilisi.
Karasin said the U.S. should not underestimate how upset
Russia was over Saakashvili's public accusations, and warned
of a "grave danger" of a "sharp decline" in already bad
bilateral relations. Karasin agreed that an unstable Georgia
was in no one's interest. Both Karasin and the MFA working
level reiterated criticism of Georgia's human rights
situation and urged a tougher U.S. public message. The
Ambassador cautioned that Russia should watch both its
actions and rhetoric. End Summary


2. (C) On November 9, the Ambassador described U.S. efforts
in Tbilisi to Deputy Foreign Minister Karasin and the strong
U.S. expectation that Russia would do all it could to reduce
tensions and calm the situation. Karasin expressed
appreciation for the Ambassador's preview of DAS Bryza's
November 10 travel to Tbilisi. He told the Ambassador that
"wiser heads" in the GOR had prevailed and his meeting,
scheduled for later the same day, with Georgian DFM
Vashakidze would go forward. Karasin cautioned that the USG
should not underestimate the degree of GOR anger over
"Saakashvili's attempt to blame us for his problems," and
warned of the "grave danger" of a "sharp decline" in
bilateral relations. The Ambassador noted that Russia had
not been blameless on this score -- a charge that Karasin
sidestepped. Karasin acknowledged that an unstable Georgia
was in no one's interest and expressed hope that early
presidential elections and a lifting of the state of
emergency would reduce tensions. He urged that DAS Bryza
toughen the U.S. public message while in Tbilisi, adding that
"firm private messages are not enough right now." The
Ambassador responded that U.S. public messages have been
direct and consistent, and would remain that way. The
Ambassador reiterated that the U.S. expected Russia to watch
its own rhetoric, and be careful about its actions as well.



3. (C) In a separate, November 9 meeting, MFA CIS Directorate
Deputy Director Aleksey Pavlovskiy charged Tbilisi with
re-enacting the events of 2006, which -- in the Russian
retelling -- involved "concocting" a spy scandal and
arresting a dozen opposition members, in order to influence
local elections. Pavlovskiy approvingly quoted a journalist
at the November 8 State Department briefing, who suggested
that there was too little time for the opposition to prepare
for the January 8 election called by President Saakashvili.


4. (C) Reiterating the charges made in previous MFA
statements, Pavlovskiy attributed GOG actions to a campaign
to blame Russia for Georgian domestic problems. In a swipe
at the U.S., he noted that the GOR "has no dogmas about
Georgia, and has no need to embellish what happens there."
Pavlovskiy recalled Karasin's earlier letter to U/S Burns
contending that recent events once again confirm that Georgia
is not a democracy and is not in the process of becoming one.
In violently dispersing demonstrators, President Saakashvili
had shown his true face. Only signals from the European
Union and NATO had curbed the Georgian President. Pavlovskiy
urged the U.S. to publicly criticize the harsh measures
employed against demonstrators and the closure of opposition
radio station Imedi. If criticism is confined to private
meetings with GOG officials, he asserted, the turbulence
would continue. Pavlovskiy acknowledged the public U.S.
statement calling for an end to the emergency situation and
resumption of all media, but argued it fell short of what was
necessary to chasten the Georgian leadership.


5. (C) Pavlovskiy also stressed that the Karasin-Vashakidze
meeting had been scheduled before the dispersal of
demonstrators. With some hesitation, he said, the GOR had
decided to go forward with it in spite of Georgian
accusations of an alleged Russian coup plot, the withdrawal
of the Georgian Ambassador to Moscow, and the tit-for-tat
expulsions that had ensued. Pavlovskiy said that Karasin was
prepared for a serious conversation, but was inclined to
believe that the visit would be used to provide the
appearance of normality to a bilateral relationship that was
in fact under strain.
BURNS