RUSSIAN VIEWS ON INF TREATY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005313

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2017
TAGS: PARM MARR PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN VIEWS ON INF TREATY


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: The GOR is interested in working with the
U.S. to see how other countries could be encouraged to agree
to the norms of the Treaty on the Elimination of
Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF),but
wants to proceed cautiously. Acknowledging that there are no
provisions in the current treaty to allow it to be expanded,
working level MFA officials proposed that we gather reactions
from other countries to the October 25 U.S.-Russia Joint
Statement and analyze them to determine how best to proceed.
They suggested that the U.S. and Russia work together in the
Conference on Disarmament (CD),and/or at the
Non-Proliferation Treaty prepcom, but were flexible on the
venue. Defense experts told us that Russia wants to either
abolish or "universalize" the INF treaty because it sees
future threats more likely to come from Pakistan, China, and
possibly, Iran, all of which could reach Russia with
intermediate range missiles, but they remain skeptical that
those countries would sign on to a ban of their missiles.
Some analysts posited that Iran's participation in a
universalized INF Treaty would also eliminate the need for a
U.S. missile defense system in Europe. End Summary.

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Let's Proceed Slowly
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2. (C) Vasiliy Boryak, Chief of the START and ABM section of
the MFA Department of DVBR and Mikhail Streltsov, INF
representative, expressed appreciation October 30 for the
USG's quick turnaround on the Joint Statement. They
explained that the GOR did not envision trying to enlarge the
INF Treaty itself, but rather to look at ways that other
countries could be brought into line with the "regime of the
Treaty:" its limitations, obligations, and the like. The GOR
intended to initiate joint action in the CD and to provide
the Joint Statement as an official document of the
Conference.


3. (C) Streltsov stressed that, afterwards, Russia and the
U.S. should proceed cautiously. It was not the right time to
present a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly.
Rather, we should get reactions from other countries,
particularly key countries like China, India, Pakistan and
Iran, to the U.S.-Russia Joint Declaration's call for other
countries to renounce and destroy ground-launched ballistic
and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500
kilometers. Then, Streltsov proposed, Russia and the U.S.
could jointly analyze the reactions and develop ideas to make
the Joint Declaration's proposals more specific. While
noting that the GOR had received no reactions to the
Declaration from other countries yet, Streltsov said that
earlier indications from Pakistan were that they were not
ready yet to engage on the issue of eliminating
intermediate-range missiles, and, a year ago, China had been
negative.
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Format Should Be Discussed Later
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4. (C) When asked whether the GOR would press for
negotiations for a new Treaty, Boryak replied that the GOR
was not proposing negotiations at this time, and Streltsov
added that it was premature to formulate a position on the
form or the desired outcome of our discussions. He said the
GOR thought the issue could be worked in the CD and/or NPT
prepcom, but was flexible on venue.

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Experts Skeptical on Expanded Ban
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5. (C) Most defense experts were skeptical that efforts to
"universalize" the INF Treaty would be successful, but argued
that the ban on intermediate range missiles should either be
scrapped or extended to other countries. Noting that future
threats to Russia were more likely to come from China or
Pakistan, or even Iran (though most discounted the threat
from Iran anytime soon),either these countries should not be
allowed to have missiles that could reach Russia, or Russia
should be permitted to have its own missiles capable of
responding to the threat. Few, however, were in favor of
abolishing the INF Treaty. General Pavel Zolotarev, Deputy
Director of the Russian Academy of Sciences U.S. and Canada
Institute, stressed it was important for the U.S. and Russia
to keep the Treaty so as to set the example, and serve as a

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base from which to press other countries to renounce
intermediate-range missiles. While some experts noted that
elements in the MOD might want to abolish the Treaty in order
to make the case for funding for new weapons (and possible
skimming of money off the top),others said the MOD saw no
urgent need to withdraw from the Treaty. Aleksandr
Konovalov, President of the Institute for Strategic
Assessments, contended that Russia would not abolish the INF
Treaty, because it would take Russia too long to reconstitute
the physical infrastructure and capabilities necessary to
build intermediate-range missiles.

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INF Linked to MD
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6. (C) Konovalov suggested that if the INF were expanded to
other countries, particularly Iran, it would eliminate the
need for missile defense in eastern Europe, and would give
the U.S. and Russia more time to discuss how the threat from
Iran should be addressed. He contended that Iran would not
develop an ICBM for many years.

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Comment
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7. (C) As we develop the U.S.-Russia Security Framework
proposed during the October 12 2 2 meetings, building on the
Joint Declaration on the INF Treaty is one area where we and
the Russians could develop joint cooperation on a significant
element of arms control, and could be an area where we could
leverage Russia's concerns about future threats to achieve
elements of our goals with respect to Iran.
BURNS