RUSSIA: NO POSTPONEMENT OF NEW STATE FLIGHTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005311

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/RUS KELLY AND PATTERSON
STATE FOR EEB/TRA BYERLY AND COLEMAN
AIR FORCE FOR DEB PLUNKETT
OSD FOR DANIEL ROH AND ANNE GEBHARDS
NSC FOR WARLICK AND MCKIBBEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2017
TAGS: ECON EAIR PREL RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA: NO POSTPONEMENT OF NEW STATE FLIGHTS
PROCEDURES

REF: MOSCOW 4765

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d).

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Summary
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1. (C) The GOR has decided to implement the pre-payment
scheme for USG "state" flights despite previous indications
from the MFA that last week's informal bilateral discussions
might stave off the November 1 implementation of these new
rules. Because U.S. policy is neither to pay nor charge for
state flights, the Russian demand for pre-payment prior to
processing the diplomatic clearance request may effectively
curtail official USG flights to the Russian Federation.


2. (C) Post recommends that we propose to the GOR a
senior-level meeting in Washington with a commensurately-led
Russian delegation to explore the consequences of the
pre-payment scheme on the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship.
It is post's belief that the MFA must lead the Russian
delegation since the Federal Air Navigation Authority (FANA)
is a technical agency empowered by the GOR only to negotiate
a USG payment regime, and is incapable of assessing the
adverse impact its actions are having on the larger
U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship (see Para 13). End
Summary.

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Cordial But Tense Dialogue
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3. (C) A U.S. delegation including the U.S. Air Force,
EUR/RUS, and Embassy ECON and DAO met with a Russian
delegation led by the Federal Air Navigation Authority (FANA)
Director for International Relations, Mikhail Parnev,
November 1-2 in Moscow to resume consultations on State
Flights. This 15-year-old dispute heated up upon USG receipt
of a Russian diplomatic note September 23 (reftel) informing
the U.S. that, unless payment was received in advance for USG
official or "state" flights to or through Russian Federation
airspace, the GOR would not provide the necessary diplomatic
clearances. This would, in effect, deny USG official
aircraft the right to fly over or land in Russia, unless an
exemption was received or the flight was covered under some
other treaty instrument, such as the Open Skies Treaty or
START.


4. (SBU) Parnev presented the delegation with a somewhat
revised version of an agreement previously rejected by the
USG in January 2007. Like its predecessor, this new document
is based solely on the premise that the U.S. would A) make
good its "debt" for Air Traffic Control (ATC) services
rendered to USG state flights by the Russian Federation since
1993 and B) commit to pay for navigation services to USG
state flights to and over the Russian Federation in the
future. The GOR proposal also requires payment for USG state
flights utilizing airspace that is within the Russian Flight
Information Region (FIR) but which is not Russian territory
(e.g. over the high seas, international airspace).


5. (C) Parnev confirmed that the proposed terms apply even if
the USG aircraft is flown without utilizing Russian ATC
services (i.e. with "due regard" for the safety of civil
aviation),as is the right of state aircraft. As an
incentive, Parnev pointed out that payment would be forgiven
for the years 1995-1999. (Comment: Parnev failed to mention
that the GOR had previously told U.S. representatives that it
could not locate records for those intervening years. End
Comment.)


6. (C) The U.S. side promised to review and respond to the
document once an official translation had been made, while
stressing again that no agreement based solely on Russia's
insistence that the U.S. pay for navigation services rendered
to its state aircraft would be approved. Parnev refused to
acknowledge the U.S. point that his stance could effectively
curtail official USG travel to Moscow. The U.S. team offered
to meet again once it had had sufficient time to incorporate
U.S. points into the draft text and suggested that the
fundamental disagreement - to pay or not to pay - be handled
at a higher level. In response to the U.S. delegation's

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request to delay imposition of the fees until such time as
our negotiations had been concluded, Parnev promised to seek
guidance from the MFA and FANA. He warned, however, that he
was not hopeful permission would be granted absent a U.S.
commitment to pay.

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Unfortunate Result
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7. (C) When ECON and RUS officers reconvened with Parnev and
an MFA representative November 2 to finalize minutes of the
November 1 session, Parnev claimed he was still awaiting a
decision from higher authorities at FANA and MFA regarding
postponement of the pre-payment regime. USG officials
explored what a higher level discussion might look like, and
stressed that the discussion would be a political one.


8. (C) Parnev, it soon became clear, viewed the chance for
higher level discussions as his personal opportunity to
present his bills (again) to higher-ranked USG officials for
payment. In response, USG officials insisted that the MFA
lead any political discussion, and made clear to the MFA how
FANA's action would be received in the U.S., particularly
after the U.S. team had arrived on such short notice (as
requested by MFA and with the understanding that its arrival
could forestall implementation of the prepayment regime).
USG officials underscored that there could be genuine
repercussions to the GOR's denial of flight clearances.


9. (C) On November 3, MFA North America Director Igor Neverov
told the DCM that the U.S. initiative to send the team to
Moscow to continue discussions on state flights had been a
welcome step. However, the MFA had not been able to
convince the rest of the Russian interagency community to
postpone implementing the new pre-payment system, which was
now in effect. That said, the GOR remained open to further
negotiations.

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Comment
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10. (C) As long as FANA remains the lead negotiator in the
talks to resolve the dispute on state flights, discussions
will continue to focus on the debts and budgets of the air
traffic controllers. FANA is interested in getting paid and
its subsidiary organizations that carry out the actual work
are funded solely from fees. Every agreement that FANA has
presented, including the one received November 1,
pre-supposes U.S. consent to a paying relationship, despite
the fact that Russian law allows exemption from aviation fees
by international agreement. FANA is not responsible for, nor
is it authorized to, weigh the impact any curtailment in USG
flights would have on the overall US-Russia relationship.


11. (C) The impact of the Russian decision to impose
pre-payment has now become unavoidably political. Unless the
USG changes its policy or the GOR walks back the new
procedures, the GOR could effectively deny clearance to U.S.
official aircraft. While exceptions might presumably be
negotiated on a case-by-case basis (for example, on flights
with Cabinet-level officials and above),it seems clear that
the GOR is unlikely to approve any where near the current
number and variety of flights.


12. (C) The USG has been reluctant to allow state flights to
be treated differently depending on the rank of passengers,
as this undermines the U.S. position that all state aircraft
are exempt, and because there may be security risks
associated with the disclosure of the names and ranks of
passengers overflying (not landing in) foreign territory.
Negotiating individual exceptions would be complicated (at
best) and could well disrupt travel planning for high-level
delegations and CODELs. End comment.

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Suggested Way Forward
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13. (C) To get past the deadlock in which we find ourselves
now that the Russians have upped the ante, the U.S.
delegation and Embassy Moscow concluded that discussion with

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the GOR must first address the fundamental "pay or don't pay"
disagreement before any meaningful technical work can
proceed. We further concluded that this would be effective
only at a political level on both sides and with an agency
other than FANA in the lead. We propose that the USG invite
a Russian delegation led by the MFA to come to Washington in
early December. The invitation should request that the GOR
team be led at an appropriate level and have the composition
to address the political impact of the dispute. The U.S.
side should have a similar composition and level of
leadership. The goal of the meeting would be to assess the
impact of any curtailment of flights on the broader
U.S.-Russia relationship and to explore possible ways
forward.
BURNS