Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5223
2007-10-31 15:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

GOR VIEWS ON NO-RESULT JCC ON SOUTH OSSETIA

Tags:  PREL PGOV GG RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4356
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #5223/01 3041502
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311502Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4962
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005223 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: GOR VIEWS ON NO-RESULT JCC ON SOUTH OSSETIA

REF: TBILISI 2683

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4(b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005223

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: GOR VIEWS ON NO-RESULT JCC ON SOUTH OSSETIA

REF: TBILISI 2683

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4(b/d).


1. (C) Summary. The GOR's Special Envoy on the South
Ossetian conflict expressed disappointment with the October
23-24 Joint Control Commission (JCC) meeting in Tbilisi. He
attributed the failure to the two parties' widely different
views and reluctance to fully engage. The GOR Envoy advised
that efforts should resume when there is more political will
to resolve the problem and cautioned against GOG unilateral
action. The Russian Envoy praised the new Head of the OSCE
Mission in Tbilisi for her understanding of the situation and
willingness to be a dedicated mediator. End summary.

JCC -- Futile Exercise?
--------------


2. (C) The GOR's Special Envoy on the South Ossetian
conflict Yuriy Popov told us on October 30 that the October
23-24 JCC failed because of the maximalist positions that
both the Georgian and South Ossetian sides brought to the
table. Instead of demonstrating readiness to solve the many
problems that exist, both sides came with no-compromise
proposals, leading the talks to an impasse.


3. (C) Popov said that he had a strong suspicion that the
GOG strategy was designed to make the JCC look ineffective.
The Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Davit
Bakradze left the meeting immediately after the opening,
leaving his deputy Dimitri Manjavidze to chair. In Popov's
view, Bakradze's departure highlighted Georgia's skepticism
on the JCC even before real negotiations started. Popov said
the October 23-24 JCC, which was convened after a
one-year-long hiatus, "should have been given full-faith
engagement." He asked whether the U.S. knew and endorsed the
GOG's "pre-determination" to block any progress at the JCC.

Widened Division
--------------


4. (C) Popov said that Georgia's key demands included
demilitarization of the South Ossetian region and the
broadening of control over the Roki tunnel checkpoint on the
border with Russia and the breakaway territory, Didi Gupta.
The South Ossetian chief negotiator Boris Chochiev demanded
the release of the two South Ossetian peacekeepers in

Georgian custody, a meeting between Saakashvili and de facto
South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity, and a non-violence
pact. The GOG rejected the South Ossetian demands, stressing
that it cannot sign a non-violence pact until the alleged
illegal flow of arms through the Roki Tunnel is terminated.


5. (C) Popov said that his last-ditch attempt to craft a
joint oral statement -- after efforts on a written statement
failed -- came to nothing. Popov thought that the two
parties needed to signal willingness to work together even
though negotiations proved to be fruitless this time. He
praised the new OSCE Head of the Mission Terhi Hakala for her
solid grasp of the situation and untiring efforts to bring
the two parties' views closer. Popov emphasized that since
the two parties of the conflict have gone too far, bringing
them back would take a step-by-step approach to build
confidence first.

Lonely Place for Popov?
--------------


6. (C) Popov felt that he was mistrusted by both sides: the
GOG had no confidence in the GOR as the mediator while South
Ossetians thought that he was not completely on their side.
According to Popov, Chochiev was particularly unhappy when
Popov said that the GOR was willing to accept Dmitriy
Sanakoyev as a local political leader. They did not even
want to hear Sanakoyev's name pronounced at the session.

Grim Prospect
--------------


7. (C) Before the JCC, Popov had planned to suggest a JCC in
Moscow in December but now he thinks it better to postpone.
Popov speculated that the GOG was anxious about the impact of
Kosovo on the two breakaway regions while Kosovo throws
Russia into an unenviable position between a rock and a hard
place. If Russia chooses Abkhazia independence, the North
Caucasus will applaud and will want to be next. In the long
run, the chain reaction will create an insurmountable
problem. On the other hand, if Russia chooses to delink
Abkhazia from Kosovo, the North Caucasus will think Russia is
"cowardly." Popov emphasized that it is important not to
lose face. Whatever Kosovo might bring, Popov feared that
autonomy would no longer work for the South Ossetians.

MOSCOW 00005223 002 OF 002


Instead, it might have to be a form of federation. Popov
warned that Georgia's pre-election behavior may lead to some
form of unilateral action in the conflict zone to divert
attention from Georgia's internal problem. He asked that the
U.S. urge the GOG to avoid the temptation.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) Popov understands that time is running out on the JCC
and there must be movement if it is to stay relevant. Mutual
Russian and Georgian admiration for the new OSCE Head of
Mission may open up opportunities for re-engagement.
Burns