Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5153
2007-10-25 14:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

PUTIN'S PROBLEM

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM PINR SOCI RS 
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VZCZCXRO9259
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #5153/01 2981433
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251433Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4843
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 005153 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR SOCI RS
SUBJECT: PUTIN'S PROBLEM

REF: A. MOSCOW 4910

B. MOSCOW 5066

C. MOSCOW 5040

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 005153

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR SOCI RS
SUBJECT: PUTIN'S PROBLEM

REF: A. MOSCOW 4910

B. MOSCOW 5066

C. MOSCOW 5040

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Putin's problem is that there is no
political or honorific perch that will ensure his ability to
check the powers granted by the constitution to his successor
and, by ruling out a constitutional amendment allowing a
third term, some observers believe that he has boxed himself
in a corner. While Putin retains the upper hand and has kept
both supporters and detractors off-balance, many believe that
his political machinations are motivated by a basic distrust
of his inner circle. Increasingly, the Duma elections are
seen as a referendum on Putin, and one that will
re-legitimize him electorally as he leaves office. The
ruling party's expected rout leaves little room for the
opposition, and seems to have ended the short-lived
experiment with forming the officially sanctioned opposition
Just Russia party, as well as precluded a liberal party
presence in the Duma. There is some debate over whether the
"real" contenders for the presidency are limited to PM Zubkov
and First Deputy Prime Ministers Medvedev and Ivanov, with a
trial balloon over a return to "collective leadership"
largely dismissed. The mini-cult of personality that
surrounds Putin dismays even ruling party moderates. The
lack of clarity over a post-Putin power structure has
injected an element of uncertainty that may well intensify
with the election of his successor. End Summary

All Bad Choices
--------------


2. (C) With time to reflect on Putin's surprise
announcement that he would lead the ruling party into the
December Duma elections, the paradox confronting the Russian
President has become more pronounced. Kremlin watchers
stress to us that Putin's problem is that he cannot finesse
the constitution's concentration of power in the hands of the
President. "Leader of the nation," a Russian "Deng," or, as
one commentator gibed, an "Ayatollah Putin" are not part of
the Russian political lexicon. In a series of conversations

with Ekho Moskvy Editor Aleksey Venediktov, Carnegie Center's
Liliya Shevtsova and Masha Lipman, Center for Political
Technologies Aleksander Makarenko, and Foundation for
Effective Policy Gleb Pavlovskiy, the one point of agreement
among the sharply differing analysts was that, having
signaled his intention to remain in the political thick of
things without amending the constitution, Putin now faced a
bad set of choices:

-- Prime Minister: While Putin stipulated easy
preconditions for taking up the mantle of Prime Minister
(reftel a),observers question his readiness to assume what
is clearly a subordinate position. Yabloko leader Grigoriy
Yavlinskiy told the Ambassador that it was increasingly
unlikely that Putin would opt for the prime ministership,
given the optics of having to serve at his successor's
sufferance. Even Pavlovskiy who has spun publicly the
concept of a strong prime ministership ceded the point
privately, noting that "all the real decisions are made by
the President." Putin becoming Prime Minister gains greater
plausibility with a constitutional rejiggering of
authorities, but analysts believe that the moment for a
dignified restructuring of political powers passed in 2006.
Lipman concluded that Putin has boxed himself in a corner,
but could not remain out of power for any length of time, for
fear of losing his hold.

-- United Russia Party Leader: An improbable choice given
Putin's general disdain for politicians, and specific
disregard for the many bureaucrats and hacks that crowd the
ranks of the ruling party. Putin's refusal to join the
party, despite heading its party list, and his insistence
that the two other seats in the federal "troika" go
unoccupied, cast doubt on his interest in tying his legacy to
the foibles of the party. Already, Pavlovskiy warned, Putin
would be tarnished by association with the motley crew that
head many of the party's regional lists.

-- Duma Chairman: As party leader, with a presumed
constitutional majority, Putin would hold important levers,
including the power to initiate the impeachment of the
President (which would still require a two-thirds approval of
the Federation Council),to confirm the Prime Minister, to
veto legislation, to amend the constitution, and to determine
budgets, while retaining immunity from prosecution. While
the Duma would be a suitable perch for an early return to the
presidency, allowing Putin a visible political role, without
the day-to-day responsibilities of office, the downsides
would be both psychological and political. As one among

MOSCOW 00005153 002 OF 005


many, Putin would have to fear the Kremlin's ability to
subvert his majority through the blandishments of power -- a
power that would remain concentrated in the presidency.
Nevertheless, many have read Putin's emphasis during his
recent "telebridge" on the need for an effective Duma to
uphold his legacy as a signal that he is seriously
considering taking up the chairmanship. (Note: Putin does
not have to make a decision in December. He can decline a
Duma seat, serve out his term until the May 7 inauguration of
his successor, and then fill a "vacancy" that would emerge in
the United Russia parliamentary ranks.)

-- Federation Council Chairman: While little more than a
rubber stamp in the current political set-up, Putin could use
the Council's constitutional role of approving legislation
and constitutional amendments as a break or lever on the
policy agenda. Theoretically, the position would provide
Putin with a low stress, high profile role in managing
center-periphery relations. The Council also has the final
word on impeachment.

-- Security Council Secretary: An amorphous position, left
unfilled since Igor Ivanov's July 2007 resignation, the
Secretary has no constitutional standing and no check over

SIPDIS
the President's domination of foreign policy. Pundits see
this scenario as the closest to forging a Deng-like role for
Putin. While the position would provide Putin a political
sinecure within the Kremlin walls, and a writ to engage in
the foreign policy statesmanship of which he has become
increasingly fond, no one believes that chairing the Security
Council would stave off the post-presidential erosion of
Putin's authority.

-- Chairman of the Constitutional Court: A lofty-sounding
position, headquartered -- thanks to Putin -- in the
President's home town of St. Petersburg, the chairmanship
would allow Putin to invalidate laws, amendments and treaties
on constitutional grounds. The 15-year sinecure would
provide him with continued personal immunity. However, in a
country where laws have little to do with practice or the
distribution of power, the Court is hardly a feared presence
and Russians would be hard-pressed to identify the current
incumbent.

-- Russian Olympic Committee Chairman: Putin could
capitalize on Russian pride in capturing the 2014 Winter
Olympics, while enjoying a high visibility, low-risk perch.
The position would provide no check over the actions of his
successor, but would keep Putin in the public eye, close to a
multi-billion dollar spending trough, while serving as a
reminder of a signal Putin policy triumph.

-- "Elder" Statesman: No one rules out a decision by Putin
to retire from the political limelight, while influencing
policy from behind-the-scenes. The received wisdom is that
Putin can expect a year to 18 months of control, before a
hand-picked successor and his "new praetorians" would ease
out or undo Putin-era appointments.

-- President? At this stage, few believe that Putin would
entertain a third consecutive term as President, although
Yavlinskiy told the Ambassador that this was more credible
than a prime ministerial scenario. It would be a humiliating
come-down from Putin's emphatic public statements that the
constitution should not be amended "for one man," would throw
into question his international standing and legitimacy, and
raise real questions about the intensity of intra-Kremlin
power struggles (reftel b) that necessitated such a drastic
step. Nevertheless, there remains a steady drumbeat of calls
for a third Putin term, with Oscar-winning movie producer
Nikita Mikhailkov issuing an appeal in the name of the
60,000-strong Artists Union, with Kremlin insiders such as
Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff Surkov resuscitating the "FDR
model" in public seminars and interviews, and with
"spontaneous" demonstrations across the country calling for
Putin to reconsider.


3. (C) At this stage, the political establishment is in
agreement that Putin has foreclosed no option, and remains
intent on fostering an atmosphere of uncertainty that
underscores his central and inimitable role in casting
Russia's political future; however, they debate whether this
is a sign of presidential strength or weakness. Both
Venediktov and Shevtsova portray Putin's decision to head the
party as a vote of no confidence in his inner circle to
protect him after his departure from the Kremlin, and as
evidence that the "Yeltsin model" has been rejected. Putin's
guard dogs, including Sechin, Shevtsova argued, are "too
vicious" to trust. Shevtsova argued that Putin was thwarted
in carrying out a major restructuring of his cabinet in
September by his inability to do so without tipping his hand
in advance. Analysts closest to the Kremlin believe that the

MOSCOW 00005153 003 OF 005


degree of Putin's success in the Duma elections, as well as
the political dynamics during the interregnum between the
March presidential elections and May inauguration, will
provide the final, critical input in Putin's decisionmaking
process.

A Referendum, not an Election
--------------


4. (C) Increasingly, the December Duma elections are viewed
here as a personal referendum on Putin. By leading United
Russia to triumph, Putin will attempt to score a higher vote
count than his successor can secure in the March presidential
elections. The by-product (and perhaps the goal) will be a
constitutional majority for the ruling party. Electorally
"refreshed" and "legitimized," Putin will seek to transfer
the authority generated by his December electoral rout to any
position that he elects to hold. Yavlinskiy and Makarenko
are among those who described Putin's gambit as another step
in the over-personalization of politics underway in Russia,
which could produce as much as a 75 percent landslide for the
outgoing President. Politicians tell us that orders have
been given to regional leaders to generate 70 percent
turnouts for the ruling party, with one senior Dagestani
politician maintaining that the ethnic republics would
"overfulfill the plan" and produce 90 percent acclamations,
unless formally dissuaded. Pavlovskiy told us that ruling
party members are prohibited from discussing the prospect of
a constitutional majority, so as not to dampen voter turnout.
(Latest Levada Center polls show United Russia at 68 percent
popularity, up from 55 percent in September, whereas VITsOM
has consistently shown United Russia running 10 points lower.)

Political Party Development the First Victim
--------------


5. (C) By turning the election into a referendum on Putin,
the Kremlin has sharply curtailed the potential for a viable
political opposition to emerge. With United Russia expected
to pull down 60-75 percent of the vote, the Communists a
reliable 10-15 percent (if not higher),and ten small parties
eating up at least 8 percent of the vote, the question
remains whether Zhirinovskiy can flog his brand of outrageous
nationalism across the 7 percent threshold, when polls have
him holding at a steady four-five percent. All but
vanquished is the notion of an "official" opposition party
that would serve as a refuge for second-tier elites and
provide for limited elite competition, with Just Russia's
Mironov allegedly conceding to political allies that he was
"outsmarted by (Kremlin ideological chief) Surkov." In the
last three weeks, Just Russia has faced a hemorrhaging of
regional elites, with angry supporters allegedly seeking
refunds on their purchases of prime party list slots. While
Makarenko was not prepared to conduct last rites, arguing
that Just Russia still had a final chance to capitalize on a
popular message of social justice, Pavlovskiy savaged Mironov
as "an idiot," who was incapable of taking advantage of
Putin's protection to form a viable party over the last year
and would need a "miracle" to survive. Current polling of
intending voters predicts a two-party Duma.


6. (C) Like SPS leader Anatoliy Chubais (reftel c),
Yavlinskiy told the Ambassador that he was realistic about
Yabloko's chances in the December 2 elections, but was more
upbeat about the long-term fate of liberal parties. Yabloko
was convinced that the lack of property rights would
eventually strike a sympathetic chord with the electorate.
His party's task was to preserve space for liberals in the
political spectrum. Yavlinskiy agreed that there was no
grassroots movement yet; people were "too preoccupied with
their daily lives," but he was confident that a movement
would materialize, and he even guessed that Putin's decision
to affiliate with United Russia may have improved Yabloko's
marginal chances in the December contest. Putin's decision
to ally himself with a party had clarified the atmosphere,
and might make "people less interested in imitation brands"
of democratic parties.

And the President is...
--------------


7. (C) With the appointment of Zubkov as Prime Minister
upsetting previous succession calculations, the debate now
centers on whether the set of presidential candidates has
been fully unveiled. Makarenko endorsed Kremlin-insider
Vyacheslav Nikonov's conclusion that there were only three
real contenders: Prime Minister Zubkov, and First Deputies
Medvedev and Sergey Ivanov. Makarenko argued that while 40
percent of voters will select whomever Putin supports, the
question presupposes that Putin's nominee be a known
statesman. Noting that it took 18 months to build up
Medvedev in the polls, Makarenko questioned whether there was

MOSCOW 00005153 004 OF 005


time to groom a fourth. Other's disagree. Yavlinskiy is
among those who argue that should Putin win a decisive
mandate in the Duma elections, he could designate any
credible candidate as his successor with very little
spadework.


8. (SBU) The media tracking company "Medialog" provides
insight into the intensity of the grooming process,
documenting that in the period September 22-28, Zubkov was
mentioned 208 times on state-controlled channels, compared to
Ivanov's 115 and Medvedev's "mere" 53. Expanding the picture
to include all references on television, Zubkov's dominance
held, with his 2116 appearances more than double Ivanov's
1016 and about four times greater than Medvedev's 533.
According to the most recent polls, Zubkov has yet to
overtake his rivals, but streaked from zero to 13 percent in
a three-week period. (When Putin's name is added to the mix,
no other candidate polls more than 3 percent, to the Russian
President's 63 percent draw.)

A Return to Collective Leadership?
--------------


9. (C) For a true believer in the third term scenario, such
as Pavlovskiy, the list of candidates is long, but always
comes up short because "no one compares to Putin." Instead,
Pavlovskiy has floated the trial balloon of a return to
"collective leadership," as was the case in the aftermath of
Stalin's death and Khrushchev's ouster. While it takes a
remarkable excess of nostalgia to view either period as
halcyon, Pavlovskiy argues that they "were not bad years" and
makes the case for a diffuse decionmaking, a leaching of
authority from the presidency, and the centrality of Putin in
balancing the rival power centers. Many scoff, including
Eurasia Foundation's Andrey Kortunov and Carnegie's
Shevtsova, who both argue that Russia lacks strong
institutions that would provide an arena for real
competition. A power vertical, Shevtsova added, by
definition precluded the space necessary for rival power
centers and Putin knew from personal experience that "new
clans, and new praetorians" would form around his successor.
While United Russia's Chairman of the Duma's Constitutional
Committee Vladimir Pligin forecast to us a "redistribution"
of powers between the presidency, prime ministership, and
parliament, as part of an evolutionary reform of the 1993
constitution, he suggested that it would emerge only after
Putin's dominance over the political system had faded.

And a Resurrection of a Mini-Cult of Personality?
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Within the hothouse of Moscow politics, there is
some disquiet and a fair measure of embarrassment over the
trappings of the cult of personality that have begun to form
around Putin. Raising eyebrows have been the ubiquitous
"Putin's Plan - Russia's Victory" billboards that blanket the
country; the 10,000 youth activists who celebrated the
President's October 7 birthday in downtown Moscow,
undissuaded by pouring rain; the Mikhailkov petition for a
third term, coupled with his sycophantic television show "55"
that marked Putin's birthday and heralded his achievements;
the imagery of Putin alone on the United Russia "troika"
(with Newsweek Editor Leonid Parfyonov joking that even
Stalin allowed his comrades their place on the mausoleum
wall); and Putin's manifest pleasure in pulling the political
wool over the eyes of his inner circle with the Zubkov
appointment. While Venediktov charitably attributed it to a
good public relations team, Makarenko called it "bad taste"
and evidence of the extent to which Putin is prepared to pump
up his electoral ratings. Lipman castigated the loyalty,
"bordering on groveling," among the elites.


11. (C) Whether it is the "degeneration of the Russian
elite" (Shevtsova) or a real grass-roots swell to secure the
continuation of the one post-Soviet leader whose rule is
associated with stability and economic growth (Pligin),the
fact of Putin's outsized personality and domination of the
political scene is viewed by political opposites as a
paralyzing distortion of Russian politics. Pligin, speaking
carefully, stressed that Russia needed to move beyond
personality, to "create the guts" of a real opposition, to
protect and encourage civil society, and to grant real
private property rights. While institutions are needed to
regulate the balance of power in Russia, Pligin said the
political short-term would depend on Putin's choices, with
Russian pre-Revolutionary or post-Soviet history providing
few guideposts for this political evolution. In the
meantime, Shevtsova commented, decisionmaking had ground to a
halt, as risk-averse bureaucrats wait for the power struggle
to resolve itself.

Comment

MOSCOW 00005153 005 OF 005


--------------


12. (C) The inherent contradiction between ensuring Putin's
long-term political influence, while overseeing his departure
from the presidency, will continue to color decisionmaking
and preoccupy the Kremlin leadership. While Putin remains
firmly in charge now, he has injected an element of
uncertainty in Russia's political future that is not likely
to be resolved -- and may well intensify -- with the election
of his successor in March.
Burns