DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES GEORGIA AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 005147

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS OSCE UNGA MD GG RS
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES GEORGIA AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH
WITH DFM KARASIN


Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: On October 23, DFM Grigoriy Karasin told
visiting EUR DAS Matthew Bryza and the Ambassador that Russia
was increasingly worried about the "anti-democratic"
tendencies in Saakashvili's government and Georgia's possible
attempts to take control of the separatist regions by force
in the coming weeks. Karasin said that the "Okruashvili
affair" confirmed that Georgia's "domestic affairs are not in
order," and he criticized the U.S. for not sufficiently
addressing these problems. Karasin also urged Bryza to
dissuade Saakashvili from any attempt to assert control over
Abkhazia and South Ossetia by force, stressing that Russia
would respond "with adequate measures" if the Georgian leader
proceeded with such "adventurism." Bryza rejected Karasin's
claim that the U.S. was soft on Georgia and provided several
examples of U.S. efforts to moderate Georgian behavior and
policies. Bryza informed Karasin that the Georgians have
agreed to release the seven detained Abkhaz peacekeepers, and
an announcement on their release would likely be made during
the October 25 talks between the Georgian Minister Bakradze
and Abkhaz FM Shamba. Karasin and Bryza also discussed the
Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations. End Summary.

Nagorno-Karabakh
--------------


2. (C) DFM Karasin initiated the meeting by seeking DAS
Bryza's assessment of the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations.
Bryza said there was not a lot of movement in the talks. He
observed that Armenian President Kocharian seems to have
decided to pass this issue on to the next president,
following elections. However, Bryza stressed that there is
still some room for optimism. He commented that the general
atmosphere for movement ahead remains in place, noting that
the U.S. and others have been able to prevent Kocharian from
completely removing himself from N-K talks. Bryza cited as
an example Kocharian's favorable reaction to the Co-Chairs'
compromise proposal on the Lochin Corridor. Bryza said the
U.S. hoped to facilitate an agreement by the parties on this
proposal before the Armenian elections. Bryza stressed that
the negotiators should continue to focus their efforts on
committing Armenia and Azerbaijan to a set of basic
principles.


3. (C) Bryza pointed out his positive talks with PM Sargsian
on October 21 in Washington as another reason for cautious
optimism. Sargsian agreed that Armenia had no other choice
than to agree to a common set of basic principles as
negotiated over the past three years, recognizing that he
should not "work from scratch" following the elections.
Sargsian opined there is no logical alternative to the
principles currently on the table. Bryza commented that
Sargsian is approaching the conflict with a fresh mind and
even observed that Sargsian seems more self-assured than
Kocharian.


4. (C) Karasin agreed with Bryza's assessment of the state
of play in the N-K negotiations and Sargsian's constructive
attitude, but cautioned that we should wait until Sargsian
becomes president to evaluate his commitment to resolve the
conflict. Karasin said that the U.S. and Russia should
continue to press Armenia and Azerbaijan to focus on an N-K
political settlement, underscoring the volatility in the
region. Bryza said the U.S. shared Russia's concern, noting
that the U.S. successfully convinced Azerbaijani President
Aliyev to refrain from "war rhetoric."

Georgia
--------------


5. (C) Turning his attention to Georgia, Karasin stressed
that Russia remains extremely concerned about the precarious
political situation in Georgia and the USG's "unwillingness"
to address the clear deficiencies in the Saakashvili
government.

"Georgia's Domestic Affairs Clearly Not in Order"
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Karasin said Russia could not understand why the U.S.
refused to criticize the "blatant anti-democratic" tendencies
in the Saakashvili government. Karasin asserted that the
arrest of former Defense Minister Okruashvili proved that it
is "premature" to characterize Georgia as a democratic
country. Karasin argued that Okruashvili's "politically
motivated arrest" and the subsequent forced confession
infuriated "many political circles" in Georgia. Karasin
doubted the "Okruashvili affair" would spark another
revolution in the country but was certain the political
instability would only be exacerbated. Karasin urged the

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U.S. to apply maximum pressure on Saakashvili, asserting that
Georgia's "domestic affairs are clearly not in order."


7. (C) Bryza rejected the accusation that the U.S. was soft
on the Saakashvili government, pointing out that U.S.
pressure on Saakashvili to deal with Okruashvili's
"adventurism" eventually led to Okruashvili's dismissal.
Following the defense minister's arrest, Bryza stressed that
the U.S. was "blunt" with Saakashvili, making it clear that
he should not only tolerate opposition groups but ensure
their legal and political standing. Bryza shared with
Karasin U.S. efforts to institutionalize democracy in
Georgia, including successfully convincing Saakashvili to
establish a judicial reform commission that would report to
the President and the Speaker of Parliament and the lowering
of the threshold for entry into the Georgian parliament.
Karasin was pleased to hear that Bryza regularly meets with a
wide range of opposition figures in Georgia.


8. (C) Bryza also drew attention to his own press statements
following the Okruashvili arrest as an example of U.S.
willingness to address publicly questionable political
developments in the Saakashvili government. Bryza said he
told the press that Okruashvili's arrest was a very serious
matter, rule of law must be observed, and that politics
should not get in the way of due process. In response to
Karasin's concern about Bryza's alleged press statements
about U.S. support for Okruashvili's arrest, Bryza assured
Karasin that he was misquoted. However, Bryza said the U.S.
did not believe that public condemnation of Saakashvili for
the Okruashvili arrest was warranted because the Georgian
government's side to the story is plausible, e.g., that
Okruashvili announced the formation of his political party in
a bid to deter his arrest as the GOG's investigation reached
its conclusion.

Saakashvili's Aggressive Handling of Separatist Regions
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Karasin said Russia is even more concerned about
Saakashvili's attempts to establish Georgian control over
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He said Russia has received
information that the Saakashvili government is planning a
major operation in the end of November/early December to take
by force the two separatist regions. The alleged build-up of
Georgian forces in the conflict regions, including artillery
and tanks, only reinforced Russia's concern. Karasin warned
that Russia would respond with "adequate measures" to any
Georgian attempt to take control of the separatist regions by
force. Bryza underscored the U.S.' strong opposition to an
armed solution to the conflicts and assured Karasin that the
U.S. has repeatedly relayed this message to Saakashvili.


10. (C) Karasin reiterated Russia's familiar list of other
examples of Georgian "provocations," including the August 6
missile incident and the detention of the seven Abkhaz and
two South Ossetian peacekeepers. Karasin criticized the U.S.
for not "following through on its promises" to address
Russian concerns, such as the release of the Abkhaz and South
Ossetian PKF and the issuance of a U.S. visa to Abkhaz de
facto Foreign Minister Shamba.


11. (C) Bryza pushed back, citing the United States' strong
support of the JCC negotiating process on South Ossetia as
one of several examples of the U.S.' commitment to a
negotiated settlement on the conflicts. On the August 6
missile incident, despite Russian claims, the evidence did
not support Russia's version of the incident. On the
contrary, evidence assembled by the independent experts group
strongly indicated an incursion on August 6 from Russian
airspace by two Russian aircraft. Karasin did not push back.
Bryza also informed Karasin that the U.S. was working hard
to secure the release of the seven Abkhaz peacekeepers and it
appeared that the Georgians would announce their release
during the October 25 meeting between Shamba and Georgian
State Minister for Conflict Resolution Bakradze. Karasin was
pleased about this development, but cautioned that the legal
process to release them cannot "take months." Bryza also
noted that the U.S. has talked to Saakashvili about the
release of the two South Ossetians, but the Georgians refused
to compromise on this issue, given that the two South
Ossetians are Georgian citizens and violated Georgian law.


12. (C) Bryza disputed Karasin's claim that the U.S.
promised to issue Shamba a visa at a certain time, noting
that the U.S. has been clear on the need for the Abkhaz to
first demonstrate its commitment to make progress in
negotiations with the Georgians. Bryza added that the
Friends remain convinced that Shamba should travel to New
York only when there is momentum in the negotiating process.
Bryza thought a meeting between Abkhaz "president" Bagapsh

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and Saakashvili would be a step in the right direction.
Karasin agreed that such a meeting could be useful and
thought Saakashvili should suggest one. Bryza pledged to
query Saakashvili. Karasin insisted that Saakashvili needed
to refrain from his "adventuristic" approach to the
separatist regions, highlighting Saakashvili's unhelpful
statements following the passage of the recent UNSC
resolution renewing UNOMIG's mandate -- which Karasin said
Russia was pleased to support -- as further evidence that
U.S. had to ratchet up the pressure on the Saakashvili
government.


13. (C) Bryza conceded it was sometimes difficult to manage
Georgian emotions regarding the conflicts, all the more so
when Russia was involved with provocative actions such as the
August 6 aerial attack and the September 20 shooting incident
in Abkhazia. Bryza expressed condolences for the death of
the two Russian soldiers, but warned that the participation
of CIS peacekeepers in training the Abkhaz military
undermined the credibility of the peacekeepers and was highly
provocative.


14. (U) Karasin closed the meeting with a warm entreaty to
Bryza to keep in touch and operate in a spirit of partnership.


15. (U) This message has been cleared by DAS Bryza.

Burns