Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5055
2007-10-18 11:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF

Tags:  PREL PINR PBTS MARR OSCE MD RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2925
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #5055/01 2911155
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181155Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4694
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005055 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR PBTS MARR OSCE MD RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF
5+2 TALKS ON MARGINS OF OSCE SEMINAR

REF: A. CHISINAU 1221


B. CHISINAU 1198

C. CHISINAU 687

D. MOSCOW 5006

Classified By: POLITICAL M/C ALICE G. WELLS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 005055

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR PBTS MARR OSCE MD RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF
5+2 TALKS ON MARGINS OF OSCE SEMINAR

REF: A. CHISINAU 1221


B. CHISINAU 1198

C. CHISINAU 687

D. MOSCOW 5006

Classified By: POLITICAL M/C ALICE G. WELLS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: MFA officials told us on October 17 that the
recent exchange of positive signals between Chisinau and
Tiraspol and the productive October 6 Putin-Voronin meeting
may have created a "unique opportunity" for the possibility
of renewed talks between Chisinau and Tiraspol in the "5 2"
format. MFA Transnistria negotiator Nesterushkin informed us
that on the margins of an October 22-23 OSCE-hosted seminar
on Transnistria (TN) in Ukraine, the 5 2 parties would likely
convene for an informal discussion on the way ahead.
Nesterushkin indicated that he, EU Special Representative
Mizie, and Moldovan Minister of Reintegration Shova had
already indicated their willingness to attend, and he thought
TN "Foreign Minister" Litskai could be convinced to
participate. However, the MFA cautioned that the only way to
"guarantee" TN participation would be to include on the
agenda a discussion on a document that would prevent Chisinau
from taking additional measures to restrict Tiraspol's
autonomy. Nesterushkin also warned that the U.S. should not
try to "overload" the OSCE-hosted discussions with the U.S.
proposal to organize a seminar on the possible
internationalization of Russian PKF in TN as a way to break
the impasse in Adapted CFE Treaty discussions. End Summary.


2. (C) Transnistria Negotiator Ambassador Nesterushkin and
MFA Second CIS Department Deputy Director Nikolai Fomin in
separate meetings told us on October 17 that recent
developments have created a narrow window of opportunity for
direct negotiations between Chisinau and Tiraspol in the
"5 2" format.

Friendly Signals from Chisinau and Tiraspol
--------------


3. (C) Nesterushkin characterized the recent efforts by
Chisinau and Tiraspol to lower the tension as encouraging

(refs A-B). Nesterushkin observed that Tiraspol's decision
to repeal the "migration tax" for right-bank Moldovans and to
repeal the 100% tax on Moldovan food and agricultural
products was a "clear" signal of TN's willingness to
negotiate. Moldovan Embassy Political Counselor Valeriy
Saava agreed that the cancellation of the migration tax went
a long way to improving the atmosphere for possible
negotiations, as the tax was a "source of deep frustration
for Moldovans." Among the positive signals from Chisinau,
Nesterushkin cited as the most substantive the decision to
extend the registration of TN enterprises until December 31,
2008 and the decision not to hold another round of municipal
elections in a left-bank village (ref C). He said such moves
help "in some measure" to calm TN fears.

"Brief, but Solid" Putin-Voronin Meeting
--------------


4. (C) Fomin said Voronin requested a one-on-one meeting
with Putin on the margins of the October 6 CIS Summit in
Dushanbe. Although the meeting lasted only 20 minutes, Fomin
maintained that the meeting was "solid" and productive. For
example, Fomin and Nesterushkin attribute Moldova's decision
to allow the 17 Russian-national wine producers to export
their products to Russia without having secured an abolition
of the Russian ban on wine products from Moldovan nationals
to the Putin-Voronin meeting. On TN, MFA officials cautioned
that the meeting between Putin and Voronin underscored that
fundamental differences in the solution to the problem
remain. However, Fomin agreed with Saava's assessment that
at least the presidents "listened to each other and took each
other's views into account."

Window of Opportunity: OSCE Seminar in Odessa
--------------


5. (C) Nesterushkin commented that OSCE Head of Mission Head
Louis O'Neill's October 22-23 seminar on ways to incorporate
confidence-building and security measures in the TN
settlement process represented a "unique opportunity" to
gather the 5 2 parties for an informal discussion.
Nesterushkin explained that on the evening of October 23,
following the seminar, O'Neill would convoke the 5 2
representatives for a separate informal discussion ("not
negotiations") on possible ways to reach a political
settlement. Nesterushkin indicated that he would attend the
last day of the seminar and the 5 2 informal discussion, and
he understood that EU Special Representative Mizie and
Moldovan Minister of Reintegration Shova were also willing to

MOSCOW 00005055 002 OF 002


attend.


6. (C) When we asked about Tiraspol's attendance,
Nesterushkin happened to get a call on his cell phone from TN
"Foreign Minister" Litskai, who was looking for guidance on
whether he should attend the informal discussion.
Nesterushkin stepped out of the room to talk with Litskai,
but when he returned, he told us that he counseled Litskai to
attend the discussion, "as Tiraspol has nothing to lose."
Although uncertain that Smirnov would sign off on Litskai's
travel to Odessa, Nesterushkin suggested that Russia would
encourage Tiraspol's participation.

There Is a Way to "Guarantee" Tiraspol's Attendance...
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Nesterushkin claimed that Russia "can only do so
much" to force Tiraspol back to the negotiating table. He
thought that one "sure way" to guarantee Litskai's
participation in the 5 2 informal discussion is for all
parties to agree to some kind of document that would
articulate Chisinau's commitment not to take any action that
would further restrict Tiraspol's economic and political
autonomy. Nesterushkin said that he passed out draft text of
such a declaration in the most recent "3 2" meeting in
Vienna.


8. (C) Nesterushkin acknowledged that Russia's insistence on
the need for a Transit Protocol "was categorically rejected"
by the 5 2 mediators and observers, but he hoped that all
parties would give careful consideration to a document that
only aims to maintain the status quo while negotiations are
underway. Nesterushkin cautioned that without such a
commitment from the parties, particularly from Chisinau and
Washington, he could not guarantee Smirnov would allow
Litskai to attend the discussion in Odessa. (Note: Saava
hinted that Moldova's Foreign Ministry was giving serious
consideration to the elements of a possible document. End
note.)

"Let's Not Overload the OSCE Discussion"
--------------


9. (C) Nesterushkin warned that the U.S. should not try to
"overload" the OSCE seminar with the U.S. proposal to hold
discussions on the internationalization of Russian PKF in TN
and on a political settlement (ref D). While Russia
recognizes the merits in the most recent U.S. proposal to
break the impasse in U.S.-Russia CFE discussions,
Nesterushkin speculated that any discussion on
internationalization of Russian PKF would take a back to
Russia's "efforts" to reach a political settlement in TN.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) A usually cynical and dour Nesterushkin was
cautiously optimistic that the upcoming OSCE seminar in
Odessa could be the right venue at the right time to
re-launch direct talks between Chisinau and Tiraspol.
Nesterushkin assured us he will urge Tiraspol to accept the
invitation to the informal 5 2 discussions without any
preconditions, but it is clear that Moscow and Tiraspol are
interested in a document that would prevent Chisinau from
asserting greater financial and administrative control over
TN.

Burns