REMOVAL OF HIGH-THREAT RADIOACTIVE SOURCES FROM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 005044

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2017
TAGS: KNNP PARM ENRG PGOV PREL GG IAEA RS
SUBJECT: REMOVAL OF HIGH-THREAT RADIOACTIVE SOURCES FROM
THE ABKHAZIA REGION

REF: STATE 137084

Classified By: EST Counselor Colin Cleary for reasons 1.4(b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Rosatom and MFA officials tell us they are
not aware of any plans by Rosatom Director Kiriyenko, or
anyone else at Rosatom, to build a nuclear storage facility
in Abkhazia to dispose of high threat radioactive sources.
We urged that the GOR intervene with the de facto Abkhazian
leadership to allow the removal of the material to the
Mtskheta site near Tbilisi. Russian officials were
non-committal. End Summary.


2. (C) Embassy raised the issue of the removal of high
threat radioactive sources from Abkhazia (ref) separately
with both Vladimir Kuchinov, Director of Rosatom's
International Department, and Mikhail Kondratenkov, Nuclear
Affairs officer in MFA's Disarmament and Security Department
(DVBR),on October 10. Both told us they were unaware of any
plans for Russia to build a nuclear storage facility in
Abkhazia.


3. (C) Kuchinov said Russia shares U.S. concern for proper
storage of such material. He was generally aware of the
facilities and knew they were in poor condition. Rosatom has
been in communication with the two institutes. Kuchinov
agreed that it would be "much better" if the material were
removed. He endeavored to get clarification regarding who,
if anyone, may have told the Abkhaz de facto leadership that
Russia had an interest in building a facility there. We
urged that the GOR approach the Abkhaz de facto authorities
to get them to agree to remove the material to the Mtskheta
facility. Kuchinov was non-committal.


4. (C) MFA's Kondratenkov also told us he would seek
clarification. He commented that given the region's
instability, control of highly radioactive sources is of
great interest to the GOR. As with Kuchinov, we urged that
the GOR communicate to the Abkhaz de facto leadership GOR
support for moving the sources to the Mtskheta facility
quickly. Kondratenkov was also non-committal, but promised
to relay our information to his superiors. He asked whether
the October 2006 agreement was in writing.


5. (C) In a follow up conversation on October 17, Embassy
informed Kondratenkov that the agreement was a verbal one.
We again urged that the GOR use its influence to get the
Abkhaz de facto leadership to move this dangerous material to
Mtskheta as agreed.


6. (C) Comment: We will continue to follow up and report
back any additional information.
Burns