Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW5006
2007-10-15 14:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

A/S FRIED DISCUSSES CFE WITH DFM KISLYAK ON EVE OF

Tags:  PREL PINR PBTS MARR OSCE MD RS 
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VZCZCXRO9702
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #5006/01 2881421
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151421Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4620
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 005006 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR PBTS MARR OSCE MD RS
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED DISCUSSES CFE WITH DFM KISLYAK ON EVE OF
2+2 VISIT

Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS FOR REASON 1.4 (B,)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 005006

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2017
TAGS: PREL PINR PBTS MARR OSCE MD RS
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED DISCUSSES CFE WITH DFM KISLYAK ON EVE OF
2+2 VISIT

Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM J. BURNS FOR REASON 1.4 (B,)


1. (C) Summary: On October 11, A/S Fried and U/S Defense
Edelman continued bilateral discussions with DFM Sergey
Kislyak on the U.S.-proposed CFE parallel actions plan in
advance of October 12-13 2 2 talks. Fried warned that if
Russia followed through on its threat to suspend
implementation of the current CFE Treaty in December, the
effect would not be to promote negotiations aimed at
maintaining the Treaty, as Russia claimed to believe.
Rather, Russian suspension would make it difficult for any
NATO Ally to ratify the Adapted Treaty and would erode the
viability of the CFE regime. Fried urged Kislyak to take
seriously the U.S. approach. Kislyak expressed appreciation
for U.S. willingness to identify a process intended to break
the impasse on CFE but argued that the parallel actions plan
was substantively insufficient. Kislyak encouraged the U.S.
to consider provisional application of A/CFE by all CFE
States Parties, accompanied by near-term political
commitments to address Russia's key CFE and related concerns
(including on renegotiation of flank limitations after entry
into force and a definition of substantial combat forces).
Fried countered that it might be possible to address some of
Russia's concerns via political commitments, but only in the
context of a package approach that addressed remaining
Istanbul Commitments on Moldova and Georgia. Kislyak
underscored that Russia's aim was not to pull out, but
achieve entry into force of the A/CFE. End Summary.

U.S. Ready and Willing to Negotiate
--------------


2. (C) Following bilateral meetings in Washington and Paris
and the informal seminar in Berlin, Assistant Secretary
Daniel Fried and Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman met
with Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Kislyak on October 11 to
build on discussions regarding the U.S.-proposed parallel
actions plan. Fried recalled that the USG had developed its

"parallel actions plan" to break the impasse on ratification
of Adapted CFE by NATO Allies and fulfillment of remaining
Istanbul Commitments by Russia. Noting that Russia has not
provided a definitive response to the U.S. proposal, Fried
said the USG was prepared to address Russian concerns raised
in previous meetings. He reviewed his recent conversations
with Allies on the plan, and confirmed that a number of them
are willing to initiate A/CFE Treaty ratification procedures
as soon as Russia agrees to the parallel actions approach.
Fried said Allies did not need Russia to publicly accept
NATO's linkage between Istanbul Commitments and ratification,
but Russia must be willing to work with the Allies to
creatively resolve these issues.

Russia Says Plan Overlooks Key Concerns
--------------


3. (C) Kislyak noted that Russia was pleased with certain
elements of the parallel actions plan, including the idea of
consultations on Baltic States' accession to the CFE Treaty.
More generally, however, Kislyak said the plan was
substantively insufficient, though the concept of a
step-by-step approach was acceptable. He asserted that the
parallel actions approach maintained an "unacceptable
linkage" between the Istanbul Commitments and the
ratification of the A/CFE Treaty (Note: This is a neuralgic
point with Russia, and one Kislyak did not dwell on in the
Paris or Washington discussions of CFE. End note.)


4. (C) Kislyak asserted that the remaining Istanbul
Commitments and the A/CFE Treaty are both important but one
has nothing to do with the other. He reiterated Russia's
position that to move forward on A/CFE, the U.S. had to break
the linkage. Kislyak also stated that Russia views the
parallel actions plan as providing the NATO Allies with
results (i.e., the withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova
and Georgia),while Russia receives only promises and
"processes" on ratification. For example, there is no
guarantee that the Allies, particularly the U.S., would
complete ratification once Russia withdrew its PKF and
equipment from Moldova and Georgia.


5. (C) Kislyak underscored that the parallel actions plan
allows Moldova and Georgia, which are "not nearly as
interested" in the ratification of the A/CFE Treaty as Russia
and the Allies, to use the Treaty as an instrument to push
their own interests with regard to solving the conflicts
within their respective borders. Kislyak asserted that the
Treaty will never enter into force because it depends on the
position of Georgia and Moldova, both of whom will constantly
move the goal posts.

Additional Elements Must Be Added to Plan

MOSCOW 00005006 002 OF 004


--------------


6. (C) As a way forward, Kislyak reiterated Russia's
proposal for provisional application of the A/CFE Treaty as a
way to get beyond the impasse. This would address Russia's
uncertain prospects for U.S. ratification of Adapted CFE.
Russia would also want other steps: a political commitment
reflecting agreement on a resolution of Russia's flank
concerns on Russia's terms that would take effect immediately
after entry into force of the Adapted Treaty; and steps to
address other Russian desiderata, including collective CFE
ceilings for NATO, and a definition of substantial combat
forces.

U.S. Attempts to Address Russian Concerns
--------------


7. (C) Rejecting Kislyak's claim that the U.S. has hardened
its position on Istanbul and ratification of Adapted CFE,
Fried reminded that Russia, and not the U.S., has threatened
to suspend its participation in the CFE Treaty. Fried
underscored USG interest in finding a way forward on A/CFE,
noting that the current version of the parallel actions plan
is not set in stone. Fried outlined for Kislyak USG
proposals to build on the plan and facilitate the fulfillment
of Russia's Istanbul Commitments.

Transnistria - Marshall Center Conference
--------------


8. (C) In response to Russia's insistence on the achievement
of a political settlement between Chisinau and Tiraspol as a
precondition for internationalizing the Russian PKF in
Transnistria, Fried suggested convening a conference at a
location such as the German Marshall Center to discuss both
issues related to a settlement and the internationalization
of the current PKF. All parties to the "5 2" would be
invited. Noting that Moldova would likely agree to this
approach, Fried said that the U.S. would encourage Moldova to
issue a statement declaring its commitment to peacefully
resolve the conflict. Ideally, the conference would produce
an agreement on the internationalization of the PKF and
accelerated negotiations on the settlement of Transnistria.


9. (C) Kislyak commented that the Marshall Center conference
proposal, in its present format, is "putting the cart before
the horse." From Russia's perspective, the conference would
need to focus on a settlement, and only after that should the
international community focus on the internationalization of
the PKF. He doubted Russia would support a conference that
produced an internationalization of the PKF and only a
commitment to continue talks on Transnistria. However, when
DAS Kramer commented that MFA Transnistria Negotiator
Ambassador Nesterushkin suggested to the U.S. the conference
idea, Kislyak agreed to consult with Nesterushkin.


10. (C) Kislyak added that legally, the 1992 agreement
between Moldova and Russia on the presence of the Russian,
Moldovan, and Transnistrian peacekeeping forces remains in
effect. Kislyak disputed USG assertions that Moldova has
formally called for the withdrawal of the Russian forces and
munitions stockpiles. He noted that Russia had already
withdrawn 40 tons of munitions, but the withdrawal stopped
when the political conditions unraveled in 2003-2004. Fried
challenged Kislyak's assertion that there is no legal or
practical way to move beyond the 1992 Agreement, noting that
Russian officers would remain part of the international PKF
to provide continuity.


11. (C) On a practical level, Kislyak stressed that in the
absence of a political agreement between Chisinau and
Tiraspol, only the Russian PKF would be acceptable to the
Transnistrians and thus only Russian PKF would be able to
maintain stability in the region. Kislyak added that Russia
also needed to consider the safety of Russian citizens living
in the country. Kislyak added that even under the best
circumstances, Russia would not be able to withdraw its
ammunition from Transnistria by December 31, in accordance
with the parallel actions plan. Kramer explained that the
sense of urgency was driven by Russia's looming suspension
from the Treaty December 12.

Gudauta - Relocation of Russian PKF
--------------


12. (C) Fried expressed appreciation for constructive
discussions on Gudauta issues with Russian Ambassador at
Large Chernov, which had helped to clarify Russian thinking.
Fried said the U.S. was not trying to solve the Abkhaz issue
via the Istanbul Commitments; at issue now was one question,
the Russian presence at Gudauta. As long as the Russian PKF

MOSCOW 00005006 003 OF 004


remained a fact of life in the region, we could understand as
a practical matter Russia's need to provide it with
logistical support. The question was why that support
required a Russian presence at the Gudauta base. Gudauta was
far outside the security zone.


13. (C) Recalling Chernov's comments (to EUR/RPM Deputy
Director Jennifer Laurendeau),Fried acknowledged that it may
well be difficult for Russia to engage Georgia directly on a
Gudauta solution. The U.S. would be prepared to work with
the Georgians to identify alternative facilities in the
region that Russia could use to support its PKF. Russia
could continue PKF support functions from another location,
depart from Gudauta and transfer the base legally to Georgia.
In return, Tbilisi would agree to allow Russian logistics
support to relocate to Sukhumi, or another facility in
Abkhazia. We would encourage Georgia to reiterate its
commitment to a peaceful solution to the conflicts and
provide assurances regarding its intentions concerning
Gudauta. Transparency steps, including a expert visit to the
facility, would be part of the approach.


14. (C) Kislyak tried to poke holes in the proposal by
suggesting that a fact-finding mission to Gudauta without a
clear mandate has been done before and is a "futile
exercise." Kislyak also noted that Russia needed Georgia to
guarantee the legal status of its PKF in Abkhazia before it
could agree to any legal transfer of bases. How could Russia
be certain Georgia would not try to throw Russia out of a new
facility if the PKF left Gudauta? Finally, Kislyak countered
that Gudauta is not serving as a military base, but only a
"logistical support facility" for the Russian PKF.


15. (C) Fried responded that the decision should be even
easier for Russia, since Gudauta only supports a logistical
facility and Gudauta is actually further away from the
conflict zone than Sukhumi. He reminded Kislyak that Russia
has already completed most of its Istanbul Commitments
concerning Georgia, and Russia should not allow one
relatively minor issue to stand in the way of A/CFE. Kislyak
agreed to study the proposal to relocate the PKF to Sukhumi,
or elsewhere in Abkhazia.

Other Elements of Possible Package
--------------


16. (C) At the end of the two-hour meeting Fried summed up
his vision of a possible package approach that would allow
Russia and NATO to agree on the parallel actions approach.

-- Agreement on steps leading to fulfillment of remaining
Russian commitments on Moldova and Georgia

-- A discussion of the meaning of the term "substantial
combat forces" in the NATO-Russia Founding Act;

-- As an alternative to the Russian proposal for provisional
application of the A/CFE Treaty, the USG was willing to
explore with Allies the possibility of a political commitment
that no State Party would take any action inconsistent with
the A/CFE. (Kislyak dismissed this idea as implicit in
signature of the A/CFE Treaty).

-- As an alternative to Russia's desire for a collective
ceiling on NATO, which Fried rejected as incompatible with
the new European security environment and with the Adapted
CFE Treaty's post-Cold War structure, Fried said the U.S.
could discuss with Allies the idea of possible modifications
to equipment ceilings after entry into force of the Adapted
Treaty. .

-- In response to Kislyak's concern that Russia needed more
than a promise to discuss the flank limitations for Russia,
Fried made three points: the flank is an essential part of
the Treaty and important for stability in a region of
tension; the idea that the flank would disappear for Russia
but be retained for Russia's neighbors was a non-starter,
particularly unrealistic to the extent that Russia wanted the
Baltic States to join CFE subject to flank restrictions;
Parliaments were unlikely to ratify a Treaty whose core
limitations were subject to renegotiation and would laugh at
a political commitment to abolish the flanks for Russia,
which Russia has demanded. He observed that NATO Allies had
already indicated they would be prepared to consider
proposals by Russia to revise its flank limits in response to
genuine military needs, as States Parties had already done
twice in the past. We could envision a political commitment
to review the operation of the Adapted Treaty after it
entered into force, and this would encompass the flank.

Russia Says December 12 Deadline Not "End of the World"

MOSCOW 00005006 004 OF 004


-------------- --------------


17. (C) Fried warned Kislyak that if Russia suspends
implementation of the current CFE Treaty on December 12,
this would seriously erode the entire CFE architecture
structure. Allies would not be in a position to ratify
A/CFE, and countries such as Armenia and Azerbaijan may be
tempted to build up rapidly their conventional arms. Kislyak
asserted that the December 12 deadline "is not the end of
the world." Russia's aim is not to pull out of CFE or destroy
the regime, Kislyak asserted. Rather, Russia is trying to
achieve entry into force of the A/CFE with changes that were
long overdue. Kislyak stated that one reason why Russia did
not want to fully withdraw from the treaty is because Russia
wants the United States to join the A/CFE. Fried and Edelman
noted that if CFE limitations went away for Russia, they
would erode for all, and Russia should think this through.


18. (C) Kislyak assured Fried that, should the December 12
deadline pass without a resolution, Russia does not plan to
change its force posture, "unless provoked." Kislyak said
that he has heard "rumors" that NATO countries have
threatened to redeploy their troops, and warned against such
actions. Fried and Edelman denied any such rumors.


19. (C) Kislyak explained that because the State Duma
ratified the CFE Treaty, it must pass a law in order for
Russia to withdraw from it. Kislyak thought that the Duma
would take up the bill ratifying Putin's moratorium decree,
which also gives him authorization to retract the moratorium,
by November 1. Kislyak said he expected the bill to pass
without difficulty, as it "was very popular," and suspension
would most likely occur in December. Fried reiterated that
the suspension would not have the effect Russia claimed to
seek: by suspending implementation of CFE, Russia would
damage NATO Allies' ability to move forward on ratification
of A/CFE, and Russia would be blamed for eroding a major
treaty that the U.S. and all of Europe -- including Russia --
considered a pillar of European security and political
cooperation.

Agreed To Keep Talking
--------------


20. (C) Kislyak expressed his appreciation for the United
States' resolve to find a solution to the impasse on CFE,
noting that the U.S. proposals were "inching in the right
direction." Fried stressed that the U.S. was not presenting
"take it or leave it" proposals, and the U.S. remained
willing to work with Russia to reach an acceptable outcome.


21. (C) A/S Fried cleared this cable.
Burns