Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW4584
2007-09-18 10:03:00
SECRET
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIAN RESPONSE ON UAVS TO SYRIA AND

Tags:  ETTC IR KSCA MTCRE PARM PREL RS SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0012
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #4584 2611003
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181003Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3943
S E C R E T MOSCOW 004584 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017
TAGS: ETTC IR KSCA MTCRE PARM PREL RS SY
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN RESPONSE ON UAVS TO SYRIA AND
NANOTECHNOLOGY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN

REF: A. STATE 27529 B. STATE 19780 C. MOSCOW 1005 D.
MOSCOW 851

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T MOSCOW 004584

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2017
TAGS: ETTC IR KSCA MTCRE PARM PREL RS SY
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN RESPONSE ON UAVS TO SYRIA AND
NANOTECHNOLOGY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN

REF: A. STATE 27529 B. STATE 19780 C. MOSCOW 1005 D.
MOSCOW 851

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Russian MFA Office of Disarmament and Security Affairs
(DVBR) passed us a non-paper September 12 (faxed to EUR/RUS,
informal translation in paragraph 3) in response to ref a and
b demarches on the possible sale of UAVs to Syria and
nanotechnology cooperation with Iran. DVBR officer Alexander
Deyneko stressed that the possible sale of the Danem UAV to
Syria (refs a and c) did not fall under category 2 of the
Missile Technology Control Regime and was not prohibited
under Russian law, as it was designed solely for
environmental purposes. However, Syria had never responded
to the Russian presentation and thus no sale was envisioned.


2. (S) With respect to possible Russian vaccine production
assistance to Syria and nanotechnology assistance to Iran
(refs b and d),Deyneko reported that the Semyonov Institute
for Chemical Physics had signed a cooperation agreement with
the Teheran University of Medical Sciences and exchanged
information on the development of cardiology medicine, but
that no transfer of equipment or nanotechnology had occurred
or was planned. He also noted that the GOR did not consider
such cooperation to be subject to the arms and export control
regimes.


3. (C) Begin Russian non-paper:

Taking into account that non-proliferation issues are of high
priority for the Russian side, and in view of the importance
of maintaining and furthering partnership relations with the
USA in this sphere, we have thoroughly studied reports that
came from the U.S. about the dual-purpose products, either
exported from Russia or intended for export, which, according
to the U.S., may be used for the development of mass
destruction weapons or means of their delivery. We have
already checked some of the above reports while other reports
are still being checked.

We would like to underline that any export from Russia is
carried out in accordance with national law on export
control, which ensures compliance with the international
obligations of this country.

With regard to the subject matter of your questions we can
inform as follows:


1. On the possibility of supplies to Syria of Russian
produced unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAV).

In 2006, the Russian Experimental Design Office Sokol
conducted for the Syrian side a presentation of an UAV DanEM,
produced for environmental monitoring. It should be noted
that the UAV DanEM does not pertain to the products of
military designation and, therefore, it cannot fall under the
criteria of Technical Supplement to the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and the Russian Control List. The
Syrian side did not submit any proposals for buying the UAV
DanEM.

Also, we would like to note that the expressed concern of the
U.S. side in this respect runs counter to the U.S. general
policy in the MTCR directed at reducing control over unmanned
aerial vehicles.


2. On cooperation with Iran in the sphere of
nanobiotechnology.

In December 2005, the Semyonov Institute for Chemical Physics
and the Scientific Center of Teheran University of Medical
Sciences signed a protocol of cooperation. Dmitriy Kuznetsov,
representative of the Institute, is actually a contact person
for cooperation with Iran.

Within the frame of this cooperation, the sides have
conducted consultations and exchange of experience in
development of medicine for cardiology. No transfer of
equipment or nanotechnology is envisaged by the above
protocol.

We would like to note that this type of cooperation does not
fall under the requirements of multilateral export control
regimes, or the List of the Australia Group, and does not
pertain to any proliferation danger. All the materials of
cooperation with the Iranian side are usually published in
open sources. However, as nanotechnology belongs to a
high-tech sphere of scientific exploration, it has been
subject to strict state control.
Burns