Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW4420
2007-09-10 02:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

RUSSIA WANTS A STABLE PAKISTAN BUT AVOIDS DIRECT

Tags:  PGOV PREL IN PK RS XD 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHMO #4420/01 2530249
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 100249Z SEP 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3679
INFO RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 2317
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1122
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004420 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IN PK RS XD
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WANTS A STABLE PAKISTAN BUT AVOIDS DIRECT
BACKING OF MUSHARRAF

Classified By: Political M/C Alice D. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004420

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2017
TAGS: PGOV PREL IN PK RS XD
SUBJECT: RUSSIA WANTS A STABLE PAKISTAN BUT AVOIDS DIRECT
BACKING OF MUSHARRAF

Classified By: Political M/C Alice D. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Russia seeks a stable Pakistan, preferably
under the leadership of President Musharraf, but is reluctant
to weigh in on the country's volatile political situation.
The MFA told us that the GOR considers Musharraf capable of
maintaining government control of the nation's nuclear
weapons -- the top Russian priority in Pakistan -- and does
not want him replaced by a less competent leader. Russia
would like Musharraf to take stronger action against
terrorist training camps but understands that he is hampered
by domestic politics. Diplomats and analysts tell us that
although Russian-Pakistani relations are slowly improving,
the relationship remains constrained by Russia's strong ties
with India and Russian inability to move past Pakistan's
anti-Soviet role during the Cold War. End summary.

Russia Favors the Predictable Musharraf
--------------


2. (C) Russia's primary concern is that the Pakistani
government maintains control of its nuclear weapons,
according to Andrey Starkov, the MFA's Head of Department for
Pakistan. The GOR would like to see Musharraf eliminate the
terrorist training camps in Pakistan's tribal regions but
understands that the he is hamstrung by political realities.
The Pakistani President is viewed by the GOR as a
"predictable and pragmatic" leader who deals effectively with
these issues, considering the country's turbulent domestic
situation. Starkov stressed that Russia would be concerned
if he were replaced by a less capable leader, but, "unlike
the U.S.," his government is not prepared to intervene or
take a public position on the upcoming Pakistani elections.

Little Russian Activity or Influence in Pakistan
-------------- ---


3. (C) Starkov explained that Russia is not particularly
active in Pakistan. The most dynamic elements of the
bilateral relationship are the Regional Stability Working
Group that annually brings together interagency
representatives to discuss South Asian issues and the
Anti-Terrorism Working Group that fosters cooperation and

intelligence sharing. Starkov noted that real
counter-terrorism cooperation is limited to the GOR
periodically providing information on Chechen and Central
Asian extremists believed to be in Pakistan.

Few Results from the Relationship
--------------


4. (C) Pakistani DCM Syed Sail Abbas commented that Russia is
slowly improving its relationship with Pakistan, but there
does not appear to be any urgency on the part of the GOR nor
is there an apparent goal other than for Russia to expand its
diplomatic role in Asia. The working groups meet annually,
as do the foreign ministers, but there are no concrete
results. The DCM confirmed that the GOR does not comment on
Pakistani internal matters and has not weighed in on the
possibility of Musharraf sharing power with former PM Bhutto
or other aspects of the upcoming Pakistani elections.

Soviet Thinking and India Impact Russian Policy
-------------- --


5. (C) Experts see both the Soviet experience in Afghanistan
and Russia's current relationship with India as affecting the
GOR's dealings with Pakistan. Yevgeniy Satanovskiy of the
Institute of Middle East Studies asserted that Pakistan's
active support of anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan still
colors Russian thinking about Pakistan. That said, the GOR
has adopted a "realistic" approach and prefers that a
military strongman like Musharraf maintain stability in a
country rife with tribal warfare and engaged in a battle
against terrorists and extremists. Satanovskiy understands
that some Russian policy makers fear that without a military
leader like Musharraf, Pakistan could face an Islamic
revolution and become another Iran, but with an already
developed nuclear arsenal.


6. (C) Both Satanovskiy and Yakolevich Belokrinitsky of the
Oriental Studies Institute agreed that the GOR would not risk
damaging its relationship with India by way of Pakistan.
India remains Russia's "traditional" ally in the region.
Gennady Chufrin of the Institute of World Economy and
International Relations told us that improving economic ties
with India is the GOR's key interest in South Asia (septel),
which has led Russia to steer clear of embroiling itself in
contentious issues that could land Russia between India and
Pakistan. Pakistani DCM Abbas cited as an example Pakistan's

MOSCOW 00004420 002 OF 002


efforts to purchase Russian military equipment for
counter-terrorism purposes. The GOR responded simply that it
would "consider" the request.

Comment
--------------


7. (C) Although MFA officials did not speculate about the
political prospects of either of Pakistan's former Prime
Ministers, they clearly signaled their preference for the
status quo, while conceding it may not be sustainable.
Burns