RUSSIA/GEORGIA: BAKRADZE VISIT FAILS TO EASE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004307

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR MOPS OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA/GEORGIA: BAKRADZE VISIT FAILS TO EASE
TENSIONS

REF: MOSCOW 4008 (EXDIS)

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1
.4 (b, d)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Russian MFA South Ossetia negotiator Yuriy Popov told
us August 31 that visiting Georgian State Minister Bakradze
did not hit it off well with DFM Karasin. The Russians
appear to take Bakradze seriously. Popov worried that the
planned "Peace March" to Tskhinvali could elicit a
provocative military response from the "unreliable" Kokoity.
Popov thought this might scupper the planned JCC meeting in
September; he will travel to Georgia late next week. Popov
thought the Georgian arrest of two North Ossetian
peacekeepers was another provocation that could cause a harsh
reaction in the North Caucasus. He reiterated that Russia
would like to return South Ossetia to Georgia as they are
"expensive clients," but admitted that there are strong
forces in Russia that want to recognize South Ossetia, in
part to "challenge" Washington, if Kosovo achieves
independence. END SUMMARY.

"Only Moderately Offensive"
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2. (C) Popov said he had dropped out of DFM Karasin's August
30 meeting with Georgian State Minister for Conflict
Resolution Bakradze and Manjgaladze. He had to make room
Deputy Security Council Secretary Nazarov and one of his
deputies, Kolesnikov. But he had learned the discussion was
not productive. "We recognize that we have to talk with them
and not pretend that they don't exist," he said. But Karasin
and Bakradze had "widely different approaches," and did not
hit it off in this, their first meeting since Bakradze
assumed the Ministry. Karasin appeared to understand that
Bakradze is a serious player, describing him as
"intelligent," "with a strong grasp of detail," and "only
moderately offensive."


3. (C) Underlying the meeting's fruitlessness was Russian
sensitivity over the August 6 bombing incident in
Tsitelubani, Georgia. Popov said the U.S. "knows as well as

SIPDIS
we do that this was a Georgian plane." We assured him that
it would be impossible to convince the USG that the plane was
not Russian, but our aim is not to politicize the incident:
rather, our goals are to prevent a repetition of such
provocations while getting the normalization of
Georgian-Russian relations back on track.

The Immediate Train-Wrecks...
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4, (C) Popov was not sanguine about progress. Karasin and
Bakradze agreed that the Joint Coordinating Commission
plenary should go ahead as scheduled in Tbilisi in September.
But Popov thought the meeting would be derailed once again.
He said the Georgian-organized "Peace March" to Tskhinvali
would produce a harsh reaction from South Ossetian leader
Kokoity, including the cancellation of the JCC and
re-emplacement of roadblocks to block movement along highways
used by Georgians to reach the areas of South Ossetia they
administer. He said Russia had previously prevailed upon
Kokoity to cancel a provocative military parade he had
planned for an anniversary in September; Kokoity was planning
to import hardware from outside the zone of conflict for the
march. If the Georgian-organized "peace march" goes ahead,
Kokoity may renege on his word. Karasin is sending Popov to
Tbilisi and Tskhinvali next week to calm the situation down
(Abkhazia negotiator Chernov will also go, but later; South
Ossetia is considered the more dangerous for the moment).


5. (C) Popov also complained about the Georgian detention of
two North Ossetian members of the Joint Peace-Keeping Force
on charges of taking part in kidnappings. Popov claimed the
OSCE mission had determined the men were not involved, but
the Georgians were still holding them -- sheer provocation,
in the Russian view. Worse, Popov had been receiving "harsh"
telephone calls on the issue from Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia.
Popov implied that the arrests could produce a strong
reaction in Russia's restive North Caucasus.


6. (C) Popov expressed dislike for Kokoity, saying the
Russian MFA view is that he is unreliable and erratic.
However, Kokoity has strong supporters in Moscow, some
motivated by "material interests," others by political. He
said that in his view, Russia wants to unburden itself of
South Ossetia and leave these "expensive clients" to Georgia.
He reiterated his preferred scenario for bringing this about

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(reftel).

...And The Big One Looming
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7. (C) Popov recognized that Kosovo could derail all his
hopes. He said that some in Moscow are pushing for
recognition of South Ossetia, should Kosovo achieve
independence. The primary motivation of recognition would be
to "challenge" Washington.

Burns