Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW4118
2007-08-22 15:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

U.S. NON-PAPER ON CFE DELIVERED

Tags:  PREL PARM KCFE NATO OSCE RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0035
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #4118/01 2341516
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 221516Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3148
INFO RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 004118 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/17
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO OSCE RS
SUBJECT: U.S. NON-PAPER ON CFE DELIVERED

REF: (A) STATE 116196

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 004118

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/17
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO OSCE RS
SUBJECT: U.S. NON-PAPER ON CFE DELIVERED

REF: (A) STATE 116196

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Russian MFA Officials expressed appreciation
for the non-paper (timeline) on Adapted CFE ratification and
fulfilling the Istanbul commitments (reftel),and agreed to
review it carefully and prepare a response for the September
11 meeting between EUR A/S Fried and DFM Kislyak. They noted
their desire to continue consultations to resolve the
differences over A/CFE. Russian CFE negotiator Vadim
Solomenko, however, reiterated that the Istanbul commitments
were not directly related to the A/CFE and flank restrictions
were unacceptable, argued that inspection and transfer of
Gudauta to Georgia would be impossible to achieve due to
Abkhazian opposition, and suggested NATO actions lacked
specificity. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) PolMinCouns delivered ref A demarche and non-paper on
August 22 to Andrei Vorobiev, Principal Counsellor in the
Department for Security and Disarmament Affairs of the MFA,
and Vadim Solomenko, Russian Arms Control Advisor and
long-time CFE negotiator. PolMinCouns went through reftel
points, stressing that we shared Russia's desire to see the
A/CFE Treaty enter into force, and that the non-paper was a
serious effort to move the process forward jointly and to
achieve Russia's fulfillment of its remaining Istanbul
commitments and ratification of A/CFE by NATO Allies. She
emphasized that the timeline envisioned meeting Russia's
desire for the Treaty to come into force by summer 2008. She
added that we had begun consultations with NATO allies on the
details of the plan, including with the Baltic States and
Slovenia. Using reftel points, PolMinCouns also responded to
DFM Kislyak's four additional issues raised during the July
31 meeting between DFM Kislyak and A/S Fried in Washington.


3. (C) Vorobiev said the non-paper appeared to develop and
even go beyond the ideas discussed in Washington. He said
the GOR would study the proposal carefully and discuss it
with other Russian government agencies and prepare a response

for the September 11 meeting. He asked whether we envisioned
holding a meeting at the Director level before then. He said
that Russia had not yet consulted with other Treaty members,
but would begin to do so at the beginning of September.


4. (C) Solomenko then offered his "initial" impressions of
the non-paper. He said that he immediately saw several weak
points:

-- First, the plan tried to connect the Istanbul commitments
with the A/CFE treaty. From Russia's perspective, the
substance of Russia's commitments in Moldova and Georgia are
not linked to the Treaty itself, including, for example, on
the withdrawal of munitions from Moldova. He reiterated that
Russia's presence in Moldova was regulated by treaty, and a
decision to remove peacekeepers would be a function of
Moldovan-Transnistrian relations.

-- Second, even if a fact-finding team were to go to Gudauta
and confirm the absence of Russian forces, the Georgians
would not accept the conclusions of the team, because the
Abkhazians would not permit the GoG to participate in the
fact-finding team, and there was no mechanism to effect a
"formal transfer" of the facility to Georgian authorities.

-- Third, Solomenko criticized the lack of specificity with
respect to NATO actions, asking how many NATO Allies would be
willing to start the ratification process? When would the US
ratification process begin? He suggested NATO could agree to
a new mechanism enabling all NATO members to decide
individually when to begin the ratification process.

-- Fourth, Solomenko raised GOR opposition to the flank
restrictions, but did not argue the point that western allies
were receptive to addressing specific GOR concerns after
A/CFE came into force.

Finally, Solomenko said that the non-paper seemed not to
include any of the proposals Russia had outlined at the
Extraordinary Conference in June, and noted some members'
interest in holding another Extraordinary Conference before
the end of the year. He acknowledged, however, that the GOR
would study the proposals carefully. Vorobiev added that the
GOR was in favor of continuing consultations and seeking a
way forward.


5. (C) PolMinCouns reiterated that the non-paper was not an
effort to revisit disagreements over the links between the
Istanbul commitments and the A/CFE Treaty, but to move
forward the process to find a solution. The non-paper
demonstrated a serious effort by Washington to resolve the
differences between us and to achieve the entry into force of
the A/CFE Treaty, as well as to respond to Kislyak's request
for a fleshed-out proposal. On the issue of Gudauta, she
emphasized that the U.S. and Russia could play an important
role in facilitating an acceptable solution (together with
the Friends of the Secretary-General). On ratification by
Allies and the U.S., she underscored that we continued to
gather information on the individual ratification processes
in CFE member states, but that some Allies would be able to
ratify more quickly than others. The U.S. specifically
sought to provide the GOR, as suggested by Kislyak, with
early evidence of NATO members' intent to ratify; at the same
time, as specified in the Timeline, the U.S. would begin
consultations with the Senate, which was the normal process
for ratification of treaties.


6. (C) Vorobiev undertook to pass the reftel package to
Kislyak, who is currently on summer leave.
Melville