GEORGIA MISSILE INCIDENT: RUSSIA ISSUES ITS OWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 004113

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR MOPS OSCE UNSC GG RS
SUBJECT: GEORGIA MISSILE INCIDENT: RUSSIA ISSUES ITS OWN
EXPERTS REPORT, EXPECTS OSCE ACTION

REF: USOSCE 337

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice Wells. Reason: 1.4
(b, d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) MFA acting Department chief Tarabrin described to us a
report compiled by Russian experts "proving" that Russia had
nothing to do with the August 6 missile launch on Georgia.
The report is being distributed in the UNSC and OSCE. We
assured Tarabrin the U.S. considers all information, but the
Russian report does not undermine the conclusions of the
international experts. We hoped Russia and Georgia would
resume normalizing relations. Tarabrin said the incident had
ruined a planned Saakashvili visit, but Georgian State
Minister Bakradze will visit soon and talks may take place on
water, wine and agricultural imports. Since the Russians
have publicized their report, it is natural for the
international experts to present their findings to the OSCE.
However, trading accusations will not reduce tensions, nor
prevent a repetition of this provocation. We need to focus
the two sides on normalization. END SUMMARY


Russian Experts Report
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2. (C) We approached MFA 4th CIS Department Acting Director
Dmitriy Tarabrin August 22 to ask about next steps in the
reaction to the August 6 missile incident. We stressed that
it important to renew the process of improving
Russian-Georgian relations and reducing tensions, while at
the same time preventing future incidents.


3. (C) Tarabrin said the Russian experts' group had completed
a report which Russia had distributed in the OSCE and UNSC.
It echoed the press conference the experts gave in Tbilisi
(available in English on the MFA website, www.mid.ru). Its
main points:

-- The Georgian radar read-out is open to question as it
omits tracks of other planes flying on the zone of radar
coverage and shows only a straight flight, omitting the turn
that observers saw. It quotes the Georgian PKF commander,
Kurashvili, as denying the existence of such a flight.

-- The report cast doubt on the evidence of the missile
remains, saying the physical evidence from the impact is not
consistent with what would have survived a launch, and where
the pieces would have been. The Russians agree that Georgian
SU-25s could not have launched the missile -- but say they
could have carried it and dropped it.

-- The report maintains that many of the parts of the missile
did not belong to a Kh-58, especially one panel written in
English. It maintains that some parts appear to have been
separated with a metal and show corrosion, indicating they
were cut some time ago.

-- The report maintains that Georgian military and officials
(including the President) approached close to the missile in
a manner inconsistent with behavior towards unexploded
ordnance.

Tarabrin suggested that the Georgians manufactured the
incident to "divert the public's attention from the difficult
situation in Georgia" in the run-up to the Georgian
presidential and parliamentary elections.


4. (C) We dismissed the electoral angle, noting that
Saakashvili needs no such help in getting re-elected. We
replied that the U.S. has looked at all the evidence and,
while questions remain regarding all versions of the
incident, the Russian report does not provide alternative
answers or undermine the U.S. conclusion that the two groups
of international experts got it essentially right. If the
Russians have distributed their report in the UNSC and OSCE,
it must expect similar airing of the international experts'
findings in those venues. Tarabrin said the "case is closed"
in the UNSC, but expected, "unfortunately," some further
activity in the OSCE. Tarabrin also called into question the
mandate of the OSCE's special representative, Zuzul. He said
Zuzul's authority would have to be clarified before Russia
decided whether to accept a visit from him. Karasin had told
this to the Portuguese Ambassador August 21. We pointed out
that refusing to accept him would not look good. Karasin had
expressed to the German Ambassador and French Charge Russia's
"disappointment" that its "western partners" had "immediately
taken the position of Georgia." The Germans and French have

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requested another meeting with Karasin, who will see them
soon.


5. (C) We said that there is natural concern in the West
about a missile landing on Georgia. Looking beyond that,
however, how best to get Russian-Georgian normalization back
on track? Tarabrin said the missile had disrupted Putin's
invitation to Saakashvili to visit him in Sochi this month
(Putin is receiving Kocharyan there on August 23). But, he
said, Russia will receive Georgian State Minister Bakradze on
August 30. Direct postal service will be resumed soon.
Rospotrebnadzor chief phytosanitary officer Onishchenko has
just written to DFM Karasin expressing his readiness to
resume negotiations with the Georgians on wine, water, and
agricultural imports as soon as Ambassador Chubinishvili
returns to post. (Comment: Chubinishvili told us two weeks
ago that Georgia is constantly demanding such meetings and
never gets them. Every so often Onishchenko announces to the
press that he would be ready to meet, but the meetings never
take place. We'll see whether this time is any different.
End Comment.) Tarabrin said atmosphere is important in the
normalization of relations. He claimed the Georgians are
organizing a youth march on Tskhinvali, which is provocative
and dangerous.

Comment
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6. (C) Russia's distribution of its experts report seems to
us to render moot USOSCE's reftel request for guidance: if
the Russians have told their story, the international experts
should as well. But trading accusations will neither improve
relations between Georgia and Russia, nor reduce tensions in
the region, nor even prevent a repetition of such
provocations. We cannot see Putin making major moves to
improve relations with Georgia between now and the Russian
presidential elections next March. At the same time, he
cannot want the situation to degenerate into open conflict.
Others in the Russian succession struggle may not share that
view. The U.S. needs to focus both Georgia and Russia on the
advantages to both of stabilizing the relationship.
Melville