FROZEN CONFLICTS: DAS BRYZA TALKS WITH RUSSIAN MFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003954

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2017
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS OSCE UNSC GG RS
SUBJECT: FROZEN CONFLICTS: DAS BRYZA TALKS WITH RUSSIAN MFA


Classified By: Charge Daniel A. Russell. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) EUR DAS Matt Bryza discussed frozen conflicts in
Georgia with senior MFA officials August 1. South Ossetia
negotiator Popov agreed that South Ossetian leader Kokoity is
"not indispensable," suggested Kokoity might outlive his
utility "in maybe 3 years or so," but asserted that he wields
real power and "will be around for some time to come."
Russia will not participate in the status commission Georgia
has created to work with the Kurta authorities under
Sanakoyev, but invited the U.S. to work closely with the
Georgians and Russians to make the Joint Control Commission
format a success. Bryza agreed that Georgia should try to
engage Kokoity but questioned how long Russia would find it
in its interests to continue to support his regime. Abkhazia
negotiator Chernov urged Georgia to make a goodwill gesture
and replace its delegate to the Chuburkhinja talks, who is
unacceptable to the Abkhaz. He also urged the U.S. to
facilitate a visit by Abkhaz "FM" Shamba to the UN. Bryza
agreed that talks need to re-start, including between
President Saakashvili and Abkhaz leader Bagapsh; this process
should lead to a Shamba visit. Popov suggested a trilateral
meeting among Saakashvili, Bagapsh and Kokoity. Tarabrin
asserted that Russia is for stability on its southern
borders, but not for the status quo. Bryza replied that it
is hard to convince Georgia of that absent visible progress
in the peace processes. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Charge hosted a dinner August 1 for visiting EUR DAS
Matt Bryza with MFA Ambassador at Large for South Ossetia
Yuriy Popov, Ambassador at Large for Abkhazia Vladislav
Chernov, and 4th CIS Department Acting Director Dmitriy
Tarabrin. Bryza had worked with Chernov in meetings of the
Friends of the Secretary General, but had not met Popov or
Tarabrin.

South Ossetia
--------------


3. (C) Popov led off by warning that Tskhinvali leader
Kokoity is "impulsive" and that Georgian policies appear to
be aimed at provoking him into aggressive moves. Georgian
backing for Kurta leader Sanakoyev has "no chance" of
success, since Sanakoyev will never win the loyalty of the
South Ossetian people or the acceptance of North Caucasians,
who strongly back South Ossetia. Georgian hopes of dealing
with Sanakoyev to the exclusion of Kokoity will never be
realized, he said; and therefore Russia will not participate
in the commission Georgia has set up to work out status with
Sanakoyev. The current Joint Control Commission format, in
which Kokoity participates, must be maintained. Popov made a
cryptically phrased (comment: and perhaps unauthorized.)
invitation to Bryza to work together with the Georgians and
Russians to make the JCC process a success.


4. (C) Bryza replied that he had been working with the
Georgians to get them to understand that they cannot garner
international legitimacy if they do not engage Kokoity. At
the same time, Bryza questioned how long Russia would want to
be associated with someone as unsavory as Kokoity, given what
all know about his criminal activities, impulsive attacks on
Georgian villages, and blocking of JPFK investigations.
Popov admitted that Kokoity is "a liability," and reiterated
that he is "not indispensable." However, the reality is that
Kokoity exercises real power in South Ossetia and enjoys
strong support in Russia's sensitive North Caucasus. "He
will be around for some time to come," Popov said, though he
noted things could change "in maybe 3 years or so."


5. (C) Popov mentioned that Georgia has now officially
notified Russia that it is pulling out of the 2000 agreement
on economic development in South Ossetia. Bryza said he had
urged the Georgians not to do this, telling them it is unwise
to channel so much aid through Sanakoyev and so little
through the OSCE -- not least because Sanakoyev cannot win
the loyalty of the South Ossetians if he is perceived as a
Georgian stooge.

Abkhazia
--------------


6. (C) Chernov asserted that Georgian actions have eroded the
trust of the Abkhaz in the entire peace process. He
inveighed against the Georgians establishing a summer camp
next to Abkhazia "loaded up with girls and liquor to attract
stupid Abkhaz." Chernov accused the Georgians of doubling
the number of their forces in the Upper Kodori Valley. He
said the Georgians had agreed to resume quadripartite talks
in Chuburkhunja (and the Russians had agreed to relinquish

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the chair of these talks to UNOMIG). Then, however, they
appointed as their negotiator a man who had participated in
combat operations against the Abkhaz; as a "goodwill
gesture," Georgia should replace him. Chernov urged the U.S.
to facilitate a visit to the UN for Abkhaz "Foreign Minister"
Sergey Shamba, saying this issue had now become a litmus test
for the Abkhaz. Tarabrin added that the Abkhaz are accusing
the Russians of being ineffective in talking to the Americans
if they cannot even settle a simple visa issue.


7. (C) Bryza replied that Georgian leaders claimed there are
no Abkhaz youth for many kilometers north of the Georgian
summer camp and so there was little chance of clashes between
"stupid youth who would want to do what we used to do when we
were kids." Still, Bryza had told President Saakashvili that
the U.S. questioned the wisdom of placing the camp in such
provocative location. If Russia believes the Georgians have
increased their forces over previous levels, it should ask
for a joint monitoring mission to investigate. Bryza said he
would discuss the Chuburkhinja appointment with the Georgians
-- though of course if having fought in the war were a
disqualification, the Georgians could object to the
participation of Abkhaz "FM" Shamba.


8. (C) Bryza stressed that the Shamba visit to the UN had
taken on purely symbolic value, as Shamba as access to four
members of the UNSC,s P5 and to a UN Under Secretary General
through the Geneva-Friends Process. The Shamba visit needed
to mark a step forward in the mediation process. Given
Shamba,s nasty claims via DVD to the UNSC last spring that
Abkhaz and Georgians could never live together, and the risk
of conflating the Kosovo and Abkhazia debates at the UN, now
was not the time for a Shamba visit to New York. Such a
visit could be helpful once Abkhaz leader Bagapsh accepted
Georgian President Saakashvili,s unconditional offer to
meet. Bryza had worked hard to persuade Georgian President
Saakashvili to convince him to meet without preconditions
with Abkhaz leader Bagapsh, only to have his work undone when
Bagapsh placed unacceptable preconditions on a meeting. The
Chuburkhinja talks should be resumed (with the Georgians
perhaps offering a more palatable head of delegation),
Bagapsh and Saakashvili should meet, and then Shamba could
make a meaningful, as opposed to symbolic, visit to the UN.
Bryza noted that preparations for the Sochi Olympics, if
handled correctly, could build confidence and restore
economic ties between Georgia and Abkhazia. Chernov said
that right now the results of a Bagapsh-Saakashvili meeting
are "predictable" and urged Bryza to be flexible with regard
to the sequencing. But he and Tarabrin also concurred with
Bryza,s assessment that Russia does not actually want Kosovo
to become a precedent for Abkhazia; rather, Russia worries
that Kosovo may become a precedent with unpredictable and
potentially dangerous consequences across the entire
Caucasus. Bryza said he would discuss the issue with the
Western friends, who have also objected to a merely symbolic
Shamba visit to New York.

Russia's Aims
--------------


9. (C) Charge said that we increasingly hear from American
commentators that Russia's tactics indicate that its strategy
is to preserve the status quo in its neighborhood. A status
quo cannot be maintained forever. What, he asked, is
Russia's long-term strategy? Tarabrin answered that Russia
is for stability, not for status quo. Russia understands
that the status quo cannot be maintained indefinitely.
However, in resolving the conflicts, stability is of the
highest importance. This implies patience and a long-term
view. Conflicts cannot be resolved overnight without
instability. All need to realize that the process will take
a long time. Popov added that Russia wants to resolve the
South Ossetia conflict within the context of Georgia's
territorial integrity, but that will take time. Chernov
echoed that in 1996, when Boris Berezovskiy was Secretary of
Russia's Security Council (and while Chernov was working
there),Russia offered the Abkhaz USD four billion to resolve
the conflict within Georgia's so vereignty; the Abkhaz
refused.


10. (C) New ideas are needed on status, Chernov continued.
Popov suggested that, when the time is right, a trilateral
meeting -- Saakashvili, Bagapsh and Kokoity -- might take on
status issues and work out new ideas. Such a meeting might
take place in Moscow. Bryza said it was an interesting idea,
though with some obvious downsides. He said he understood
the Russian call for patience. The U.S. -- and he in
particular -- have urged patience and restraint on the
Georgians. But our urgings are ineffectual absent visible
progress. If we just tell the Georgians to be "good little
boys and girls" and stop making a fuss, we lose all leverage
over them. The Georgians have to see the results of

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restraint in constant, if gradual, progress towards
resolution of the conflicts.


11. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.
RUSSELL