Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07MOSCOW3519
2007-07-18 13:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

SOUTH OSSETIA: RUSSIAN VIEWS

Tags:  PREL PBTS MARR OSCE GG RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5967
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHMO #3519 1991319
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181319Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2178
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003519 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: SOUTH OSSETIA: RUSSIAN VIEWS

REF: TBILISI 1702

Classified By: PolMinCouns Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003519

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2017
TAGS: PREL PBTS MARR OSCE GG RS
SUBJECT: SOUTH OSSETIA: RUSSIAN VIEWS

REF: TBILISI 1702

Classified By: PolMinCouns Alice G. Wells. Reason: 1.4 (b, d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Russian South Ossetia Negotiator Yuri Popov told us
Russian domestic concerns in the North Caucasus will keep
Russia hostile to the Georgian-backed Sanakoyev regime.
Russian loyalty to Kokoity will last at least until the 2008
Russian presidential transition. Popov got the South
Ossetians to agree to a Tbilisi plenary of the JCC, but he
remains opposed to a meeting with an open agenda, which would
degenerate into the sterile repetition of political
positions. He hopes the U.S. will convince Georgia first to
resolve "everyday" irritants such as water, roadblocks and
fortifications to create the atmosphere for meaningful
negotiations. End Summary.

Prospects for Meetings
--------------


2. (C) Popov gave us a readout July 17 on his last visit to
Tbilisi and Tskhinvali. He expressed great appreciation for
his July 12 meeting with Ambassador Tefft. Also on July 12
Popov and Joint Peacekeeping Force commander Kulakhmetov met
with Georgian Conflict Resolution Minister Antadze and
Georgian JPKF contingent commander Kurashvili. Popov was
disappointed that Antadze refused to accompany him to
Tskhinvali the next day. Popov (and his counterpart working

SIPDIS
on Abkhazia) are increasingly disillusioned with Antadze.
They charge that he has no latitude of his own and merely
follows instructions from MinInt Merabishvili.


3. (C) Popov remained suspicious of Antadze's proposal for a
JCC plenary in Tbilisi. He believed it may be a "stunt,"
designed to fail and thereby show the ineffectiveness of the
JCC format. Nonetheless, Popov persuaded South Ossetian
negotiator Chochiyev to agree to the meeting. Negotiations
as to venue continue as per reftel. Popov remains opposed to
an "open agenda" that will allow the parties to posture and
make political declarations. He hoped the U.S. will use its
influence in Georgia to convince Antadze to work with an
agenda -- starting with the draft that was "more or less
agreed" in Istanbul last spring, but concentrating on
day-to-day irritants such as water, roadblocks and
fortifications. Clearing these away is necessary to create
an atmosphere for meaningful negotiations. Popov hoped the
U.S. will "exert positive influence on Tbilisi to show more
cooperation, good will and flexibility."

Sanakoyev: You've Backed the Wrong Horse
--------------


4. (C) Popov said Russia rejects the Georgian proposal that
FM Bezhuashvili made to FM Lavrov in Istanbul on June 25.
Russia cannot switch to backing Sanakoyev under any
circumstances. Sanakoyev is tainted as a "national traitor"
in the eyes not only of South Ossetians but also of Russia's
North Caucasus ethnic groups. Perhaps in a generation
nationalism will recede as the over-riding force engaging
emotions in the region, but until then Sanakoyev bears a
stain he cannot wash off, and Russia would be stained -- in
the eyes of the North Caucasians -- if it recognized him. In
the run-up to the 2008 Presidential transition, Putin and the
Kremlin are taking no chances on inflaming emotions in the
volatile North Caucasus.


5. (C) Right now, Popov continued, Kokoity is supported by
nationalist emotions and by the visibility of Russian
support. Russia does not consider Kokoity irreplaceable.
But "the U.S. should impress upon the Georgian ruling elite
that if they want to replace Kokoity they should have
patience -- we will not do so before the elections."

Comment
--------------


6. (C) Popov may be using North Caucasus emotions as a
convenient excuse, but the emotions are genuinely there. The
South Ossetians enjoy the natural support of their brother
North Ossetians. But we have been struck by how much
explicitly pro-South Ossetian and anti-Georgian sentiment we
have met among Dagestanis and Chechens (despite their
traditional rivalry with Ossetians) as well as among the
stridently pro-Abkhaz Cherkes, Kabardin and other Adyg
peoples of the northwest Caucasus.
BURNS