KOSOVO: RUSSIA TO BREAK WITH CONTACT GROUP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000305

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM UNMIK SR YI RS
SUBJECT: KOSOVO: RUSSIA TO BREAK WITH CONTACT GROUP

REF: 06 MOSCOW 12819

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: Reasons: 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Welcoming a proposed visit by Special
Envoy Wisner, the GOR's Special Envoy on Kosovo
Botsan-Karchenko warned that Russia would break the Contact
Group consensus on the Ahtisaari timeline at the January 26
Vienna meeting. The GOR will reject an "artificial"
timeline, propose postponing negotiations until after the
formation of a Serbian government, and insist on a solution
acceptable to both Pristina and Belgrade. If pushed to an
early UNSC vote, Karchenko warned of a possible GOR veto. He
urged the West to force Serbia's hand on Euro-Atlantic
integration, and encouraged the Serbian leadership to not
reject the Ahtisaari report out of hand. He recommended
postponement of the Group of Regionals meeting, in the face
of Contact Group disunity. Lavrov's February 1-2 Washington
visit and Wisner's proposed Moscow consultations are
important opportunities to highlight the costs of Russia's
isolation and work to back the Russians off from their
threats of UNSC vetoes. End Summary

Kosovo Timeline: Russia will beg to differ
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2. (C) In a January 24 meeting, GOR MFA Special Envoy on
Kosovo Botsan-Karchenko welcomed a proposed visit by Special
Envoy Wisner to Moscow, in the aftermath of what he expected
would be a difficult Contact Group meeting in Vienna, since
Russia would break with the consensus on adhering to a strict
timeline for the implementation of Ahtisaari's
recommendations. During January 15 consultations, EU Kosovo
Envoy Stefan Lene had reinforced to the GOR that while
certain changes could be negotiated in the minority rights
section of the report, the EU would not agree to modifying
the general principles -- elements of which, Karchenko
stressed, continued to imply that Kosovo independence was the
objective. This approach was unacceptable to the GOR.


3. (C) The GOR will argue that the process needs to be
slowed down in order to facilitate an acceptable solution to
both Belgrade and Pristina Specifically:

-- While Ahtisaari had been forthcoming in building in
another negotiating opportunity, it was unrealistic to think
that the parties could finish their deliberations in February;

-- The GOR's "strong preference" was to await the formation
of the new Serbian government, which had a "legal right" to
defer responding to the Ahtisaari report until its leadership
was confirmed;

-- Russia will "insist" on a postponement of the negotiation
for several weeks in order to demonstrate respect for this
process. Only after the formation of the government should
the Contact Group assess the behavior of Belgrade.

-- As a rule, the GOR did not accept an "artificial" time
frame whether a matter of weeks or years. Karchenko
reiterated Putin's insistence on a negotiated solution, which
the President reinforced during his January 21 meeting with
Chancellor Merkel.

-- In an aside, Karchenko suggested that the GOR also needed
time to prepare for Kosovo independence. Pointing to the
breakthrough visit by Kosovo Prime Minister Ceku in late
November-early December 2006, Karchenko said the GOR made a
significant effort with the Russian media to ensure that the
visit was a success, but still had much to do "to open the
path for better relations" with Kosovo. Karchenko continued
to maintain that domestic pressure was a factor in GOR
decision making.

And may veto
--------------


4. (C) While stopping short of stating that a GOR decision
was made, Karchenko signaled strongly that Russia was
prepared to use its veto at the UNSC. If the Ahtisaari
package moved forward in March, he commented carefully,
Russia "would have no chance to achieve an endorsement in the
Security Council;" the early delivery of the report, he
reiterated, would "make us impose the veto."

Serbia must choose
--------------


5. (C) Karchenko argued that Serbia had two contradictory
ambitions: one was to integrate into Euro-Atlantic

MOSCOW 00000305 002 OF 002


institutions, the other to retain Kosovo. Belgrade needed to
face up to this contradiction -- a process that the West was
best able to force. Russia's interest was in having Kosovo
resolved within the "framework of international law" and
would maintain pressure on the Serbs to constructively
engage. Regardless of U.S. arguments, the GOR believed
Kosovo would serve as a precedent, and it was not a precedent
that the Russian government sought (with respect to the
frozen conflicts). If Serbia was willing "to pay the
admission price of Kosovo" for European integration, Russia
would have no objection. Karchenko quoted Putin's recent
comment to Kostunica that "Russia is not prepared to be more
Serbian than Serbia."

Group of Regionals: Postponement?
--------------


6. (C) Karchenko flagged an immediate concern stemming from
the expected rupture in Contact Group consensus: whether to
convene the Group of Regionals, as requested by Croatia.
Technically, the proposed February 6-8 time frame may not
work for Karchenko; substantively, Russia would be compelled
to express its differences, undermining a common approach.
In any event, Karchenko argued that a meeting of the Group of
Regionals should come after Belgrade and Pristina have
formally responded and suggested that the Croats be asked to
postpone the session. When pushed as to whether Russia
benefited from its isolation, Karchenko noted that many of
the regionals tailor their reactions to the party inquiring,
and questioned the degree of consensus that actually exists
over Kosovo independence.

Russia urges Serbia to Think before Responding
-------------- -


7. (C) Serbian Charge Yelitsa Kuryak told us that Karchenko
urged the Serbian leadership to not reject the Ahtisaari
proposal out of hand, to recognize its many positive features
-- including decentralization, Serbian Kosovar rights, and
protection of church property -- and to propose additional
negotiations on those elements of the plan unacceptable to
Serbia. Kuryak, noting that FM Lavrov had repeated Putin's
comment to Kostunica at a luncheon with the Slavic
ambassadors, argued that the Russian leadership was trying to
play the issue both ways: courting Russian public opinion and
avoiding a precedent that it was afraid of, while making it
more difficult for the Serbian leadership to define a future
without Kosovo. In her view, the GOR benefited most by a
continued stalemate, represented by inconclusive
negotiations. No fan of the GOR or her incoming ambassador
(by her account, a conservative Kosovar Serb),Kuryak
adamantly believes that Russian public opinion is muted on
Kosovo, although the Duma and Russian media continue to turn
to Milosevic's relatives-in-exile in Russia for analysis of
current political developments in Serbia.

And tells the Slovaks to expect delays
--------------


8. (C) Slovak Charge d'Affaires Juraj Priputen told us
January 24 that the MFA informed the Slovaks, who take up the
Presidency of the UN Security Council in February, that they
will adhere to the "Standards before Status" formulation as
one argument for delaying a resolution of Kosovo's status.

Comment
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9. (C) Lavrov's February 1-2 consultations in Washington
and Wisner's proposed early February visit to Moscow provide
opportunities to engage bilaterally with the GOR before
Russia irrevocably breaks with the Contact Group consensus.
Demonstrating Russia's isolation on this issue, the EU's
solidarity, and the American priority attached to a
settlement will be important tools in shaping the Russian
strategy at the UN.
BURNS